

capital equipment, power and a handful of similar inputs.

Today he well may include social costs—the cost of cleaning water and air polluted in producing the product.

Now that society realizes the necessity of maintaining environmental quality and the enormous cleanup cost involved, it also realizes that the price of many products has been unrealistic.

Realism dictates that the cost of cleaning up after the product be included in its price.

The question, then, is how to tie cleanup costs to products.

Economists have been debating two methods. One is to dangle a carrot before industry by offering direct financial incentives, such as tax credits, for installing control devices.

This seems to be losing out to the "big stick" approach—forcing companies to clean up.

The argument is that cleanup cost would be merely another of many costs for a manager to overcome to make and market a successful product. This would bring to bear the managerial skill of US industry, resulting in the most economical approach to the problem.

#### PROXMIER PROPOSED FEE

Last December Sen. William Proxmire (D-Wis.) and nine colleagues introduced a bill to do just this in the field of water pollution.

The bill calls for a federal "efficiency fee" of 10 cents a pound for industrial wastes dumped into the nation's water.

Proxmire estimated that such a fee would produce about \$2 billion a year, much of which could be used to construct and operate municipal sewage plants.

Another way to view this "tax" is as an incentive to industry to overcome it and to recycle waste.

Kneese told The Journal that the ideal situation would be to couple the fee program with a regional approach to water pollution control to achieve economies.

This would mean serving large numbers of industrial municipal and individual polluters with the same piece of highly sophisticated equipment used at a large treatment plant.

It is precisely this approach that the South-eastern Wisconsin Regional Planning Commission (SEWRPC) has proposed for the Fox River Valley. It advised abandoning sewage treatment facilities—industrial and municipal—in Pewaukee, Brookfield, Poplar Creek, Sussex and Waukesha and treating this sewage in a new plant down stream from Waukesha.

#### AMERICAN SECURITY COUNCIL'S REPORT ON THE SALT TALKS

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, last week I had the honor of placing in the RECORD a short article by the assistant editor of the Charleston News & Courier, Mr. Anthony Harrigan, pointing out some of the dangers to be had in dealing with the Russians at the SALT talks.

As I stated at that time, Mr. Harrigan is a distinguished international writer on military tactics and strategy and covered the Helsinki talks first hand as a journalist. Mr. Harrigan has now expanded his opinions in the current Washington Report of the American Security Council. The American Security Council is one of the leading organizations dedicated to our national security and has produced many informed studies on the international strategic balance and on the need for our ABM.

In the report Mr. Harrigan once more places great importance upon the sudden announcement of the Soviet Cosmos 248, which has the capacity for knocking down U.S. intelligence satellites. Thus the argument that we can depend upon electronic detection equipment to monitor Soviet activities no longer holds water.

Mr. President I ask unanimous consent that the Washington Report entitled "America's Stake At Vienna: The SALT Talks, MIRV and the ABM" be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### AMERICA'S STAKE AT VIENNA: THE SALT TALKS, MIRV AND THE ABM

In Vienna on April 16 the United States and the Soviet Union began the second round of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. The opening of these talks—a follow-up to discussions commenced at Helsinki last fall—is a fateful moment in the history of the free world's long effort to safeguard its freedom against Soviet aggression.

The instructions given to the U.S. delegates are secret, and properly so. But President Nixon is on record in his "United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's" as saying that American negotiators will deal with specific positions at Vienna, whereas the Helsinki round of talks were concerned with procedural matters and general issues. Thus it is timely for the American people to consider what is at stake in the SALT talks. And while the talks may result in new opportunities for peace, grave dangers are involved and should be clearly understood. If the U.S. delegates—and authorities at home—lack the toughness, hard-headed realism and endurance that the negotiations require, the United States could find itself cruelly exposed to Soviet nuclear blackmail or worse by the mid-1970's.

#### UNITED STATES AT DISADVANTAGE

The first thing the American people need to understand is that they are at a marked disadvantage in the Vienna negotiations and in dealing generally with the Soviet Union. Aggressors states such as the Soviet Union have a built-in advantage in that they know precisely what they want and resolutely proceed towards their goal of domination with no consideration for truth or international morality. The Soviets, for example, have a history of making "peace" pacts that they have no intention of honoring. The United States, on the other hand, scrupulously honors its international agreements. Realistic Americans know, therefore, that their country cannot put any stock in the word of the Soviet Union and cannot assume good faith on the part of the USSR. An agreement with the Soviets is no better than the means of verifying the degree of the Soviets' adherence to their own pledges.

The fundamental immorality of the Soviet Union poses extreme difficulty for U.S. negotiators. It also introduces great danger into the question of concessions. Yet there are many influential figures in U.S. public life who speak as though the U.S. and USSR were equal in terms of seriousness and honesty of intention and who urge concessions as evidence of American good faith in bargaining. Thus McGeorge Bundy, former White House adviser in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, stresses what he calls the need for "balanced concessions" as a necessary part of the thinking of both the U.S. and Soviet delegations. Mr. Bundy's position is the opposite of realism, for he refers to American "strategic overstrength" and "superfluous nuclear weapons" at a time

when Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird reports that the Soviets have more and bigger intercontinental rockets.

#### UNITED STATES AND SOVIET INTENTIONS

It is terribly important that responsible U.S. officials not engage in balancing of U.S. and Soviet intentions at Vienna. The Soviets undoubtedly were "serious and businesslike" in the Helsinki talks, as President Nixon said. But when haven't the Soviets been serious and businesslike in their efforts to gain domination over the Western countries? At all cost, the United States government, especially the negotiating team at Vienna, must avoid naiveté in viewing Soviet proposals and promises.

Insofar as Soviet intentions are concerned, the U.S. SALT delegates can view a record of duplicity regarding new weapons. Though they had an understanding with the United States not to develop weapons for space warfare, the Soviets secretly developed and tested (as is their custom with all new weaponry) a satellite destroyer known as Cosmos 248. Word of this did not reach the U.S. public until after the Helsinki talks, though the space weapon was launched more than a year prior to the opening of negotiations.

#### COSMOS 248

The military potential of Cosmos 248 is enormous, for it has the capability of knocking down U.S. satellites essential for communications and intelligence. The danger is that the USSR may be able to blind America's electronic eyes whenever they choose. The U.S. Air Force envisioned a similar space weapon years ago, but the concept was shelved during the Kennedy administration.

Cosmos 248 should hold an important place in the thinking of America's SALT negotiators from the standpoint of Soviet intentions and capabilities. Moreover, the successful secret testing of Cosmos 248 should be an object lesson to the U.S. delegates, namely that no amount of American electronic detection equipment can alert this country to secret testing of a new Soviet weapon. In other words, the Soviets could sign an agreement banning further development of MIRV (multiple warhead missiles) and still conduct tests. They could do so in the way they secretly tested Cosmos 248, by holding the tests at a time when U.S. radars and other detection devices were focused on American and Soviet space shots. Coordination of secret military weapons tests with announced space flights is a convenient and effective way for the USSR to mask tests it wants to hide from United States.

#### EFFORTS TO HALT MIRV

The anti-preparedness bloc in the United States has concentrated on halting development and testing of multiple warhead weapons and on thwarting expansion of the Safeguard anti-ballistic missile system. Members of this bloc hope that the SALT talks will cause the U.S. to halt MIRV and ABM developments. For several months, there has been a barrage of articles and speeches by anti-preparedness figures, saying that a MIRV test ban should precede the Vienna meeting. The Soviet MIRV tests in the Pacific in late March underscored the incredible folly of the argument for a pre-Vienna unilateral test halt by the United States.

The anti-MIRV lobby bases its case on the statement that the United States, using electronic means, could verify Soviet compliance with a ban on testing of multiple warhead missiles. This position is shattered by disclosure that the Soviets were able to mask their Cosmos 248 tests. If they could do that, they also could mask MIRV tests.

Fortunately, the U.S. Senate has realists who know the score. One of these, Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.), is firmly committed to the position that the United States should complete testing of both MIRV and ABM systems. He said in late February that the U.S. must make sure that in case of a nuclear

arras agreement with the Soviet Union at Vienna "we remain within lead-time reach of corrective measures," should the agreement be "abrogated." In other words, the U.S. must have its technology up to date in the event the Soviets cheat. This would only be elementary prudence, of course.

#### ABM AND THE SALT TALKS

Insofar as the Safeguard ABM system is concerned, the SALT talks must not be used as an excuse to abort this embryonic program. The Soviets are far ahead in this vital area of armaments. It would be unwise of Americans to dismiss as mere bragging the claim of Soviet Marshal Andrei Grechko that his nation possesses "weapons capable of reliably hitting enemy aircraft and missiles irrespective of height or speed of flight, at great distances from the defended targets." While members of the Senate Disarmament Subcommittee and others have sought to cancel America's limited ABM program, the Soviets have forged ahead in anti-missile defense, thereby increasing their overall military capabilities and buttressing their psychological assurance.

The Nixon administration's proposal for expansion of the Safeguard ABM system is extremely modest. All the administration recommends is construction of one additional Safeguard site to defend the Minuteman complex at Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri, plus preliminary work on five other sites. No request is being made to activate the entire 12-station complex, which represents the real security need. Secretary of Defense Laird has said that the administration proposal is "the minimum we can and must do . . . to fulfill the President's national security objectives." Yet even this minimum effort is bitterly resisted. If this resistance is successful, the position of the U.S. delegates at the SALT talks will be seriously weakened. The stronger the U.S. is militarily the better chance the United States delegation stands in its discussions with the Soviets.

#### THE NEED FOR EXPANSION

The need for expansion of the Safeguard ABM also is illustrated by the build-up of Communist China's nuclear power. Robert D. Heintz Jr., internationally-recognized military analyst, recently reported on the construction of missile-launching facilities in Northwest China, saying: "Today, according to intelligence-satellite photographs, the Chinese are speeding work on these missile sites which seem to be configured for very large weapons."

The entire free world should be concerned about this Red Chinese build-up and welcome American's efforts to create an ABM defense. But this is not the case. Inevitable ignorance of the need for ABM defense is the situation in some quarters. Thus President Pierre Elliott Trudeau of Canada made the astounding statement February 2 that the Canadian government is "rather unhappy" that the U.S. is facing China with anti-ballistic missiles rather than with an offer of diplomatic recognition. As though diplomatic recognition would halt Red China's drive for nuclear arms or provide a protective shield against ballistic missiles!

The Canadian position no doubt arises out of wishful thinking about the nature of the world. Thus some Europeans actually give serious consideration to the Warsaw Pact statement that it wants to discuss "renunciation of the use of threats of force in relation to European countries." The recent unhappy experience of the Czech people should be sufficient to show that such a Warsaw Pact statement is the ultimate in deceit. Yet some people on both sides of the Atlantic are so determined to believe in a Soviet change of heart that they will accept the most self-serving statements of the communist powers.

#### THE NEED FOR REALISM

Complete realism is rare in official circles anywhere in the West these days. The Nixon administration, for all its sound emphasis on strengthened ABM defense, is not without some confusion on basic points. The presidential report, entitled "U.S. Foreign Policy For the 1970's", while it includes many sound observations on the Soviet military threat, is disturbingly ambiguous on strategic programs. On the one hand, the report acknowledges that "sharp cutbacks" in U.S. strategic programs "would not permit us to satisfy our sufficiency and might provoke the opposite reaction." On the other hand, this statement is followed-up by the comment that "sharp increases might not have any significant political or military benefits." The report also asserts that sharp increases might cause Soviet political positions to "harden" so that "tensions would increase" and "the prospect for reaching agreements to limit strategic arms might be irreparably damaged."

This is the position taken by former Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara. Adherence to it is what caused America's loss of nuclear superiority. Indeed reluctance to push for "sharp increases" in strategic programs can only contribute to a widening margin of Soviet nuclear superiority. It is to be hoped that notions of this sort do not color the instructions given the U.S. delegation to the SALT talks. Unless America's negotiators believe in the political advantage of U.S. military strength, the Republic security interests may be compromised at Vienna.

#### SENATORS RANDOLPH AND MOSS URGE COMMEMORATIVE STAMP IN RECOGNITION OF OUR MINERAL HERITAGE—AWARENESS NEEDED FOR THIS NONRENEWABLE RESOURCE AND FOR ITS CONSERVATION

Mr. RANDOLPH. Mr. President, I have for several years expressed an interest in the issuance of a commemorative stamp in recognition of our vast mineral heritage.

Gem materials, for example, must have three principal qualities—beauty, durability, and rarity. Splendor in a gem depends on transparency, brilliance, luster, and color. Luster is a function of the transparency, refractivity, and crystal structure of a mineral; durability is determined by hardness and toughness; and rarity is a major factor in determining the value of a gem. Of the 1,500 mineral species, only about 100 have all the attributes required in gems.

It is interesting that at least one variety of gem stone occurs in each State, a symbol of which is the First Ladies' brooch on display at the Smithsonian Institution and which contains gem stones from each State of the Union.

Mr. and Mrs. Milton Turner of Silver Spring, Md., recently brought a sample of beautiful quartz crystals and other gem and mineral collections to my office for viewing by Post Office Department officials. Mrs. Turner is chairman of "Our Mineral Heritage Stamp Committee." Following the meeting, I met with George King, acting director, Division of Philately; Paul Carlin, executive assistant to the Postmaster General; and Ray Stewart, congressional liaison officer, to discuss the issuance of a commemorative stamp. Other Members of the Senate and House are interested

in the proposal; including Representative HECHLER, of West Virginia.

Mr. President, on April 20 of this year, I wrote the Postmaster General, requesting that he give consideration to the issuing of such a stamp. The Senator from Utah (Mr. Moss) joined in the appeal. It is our feeling that if the stamp were to be issued, it would provide an inducement to travel within the United States. I would hope that it would also help to create an awareness of conservation and beautification.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have the letter printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

APRIL 20, 1970.

HON. WINTON M. BLOUNT,  
Postmaster General,  
Post Office Department,  
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. POSTMASTER GENERAL: Several years ago I expressed my interest in the issuance of a commemorative stamp in recognition of our mineral heritage. I again bring this subject to the attention of the Citizens' Stamp Advisory Committee, which will meet this week to consider future stamp subjects.

I can think of no better symbol of our mineral wealth than the First Ladies' brooch on display at the Smithsonian Institution, which contains gem stones from each State of our Union. A photograph of this unusual pin is enclosed.

Stamps have been issued stressing the conservation of wildlife, water and forests, and it is appropriate to provide one recognizing resources that are not renewable—our minerals—so important in West Virginia and in all States.

The release of a stamp calling attention to our mineral deposits would focus attention on widely diversified segments of our population which have become involved in our mineral heritage.

At present the National Geographic Society is engaged in a vital program to acquaint the youth of our Nation with our vast mineral wealth. Schools are using mineralogical exhibits for a wider area of teaching and a more interesting manner of presentation of the subject. I understand there is much excitement in this method, even among some young people who tend toward delinquency and, thus, by this subject may be able to channel their thoughts toward constructive exploration of rocks which are all about them. They have little or no concept of their content and revelations.

Our senior citizens, as well as our young people, are finding it increasingly interesting to pursue hobbies that lead to exploration of rock formations and the collection of gem stones. It has promoted the "family togetherness" theme since it can become a hobby in which family members of all ages can participate and, indeed, large numbers do now engage in this thrilling adventure.

Searching for the unusual formations is also an exciting type of physical recreation that brings individuals, families, and organizations into the great outdoors to enjoy a better understanding of the appeal and the beauty of nature. Such interest, in turn, can lead to studies or educational pursuits that develop into occupations for the future. Through many groups interested in a mineral heritage commemorative stamp, the publicity gained from it would be an inducement to travel and "See America First." We need to create an awareness of conservation and beautification.

Such a stamp should be released in connection with a Mineral Heritage Week

April 23, 1970

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The following tables show in detail the public image of a "conservative" and of a "liberal," with the percentages based on all persons in the sample:

Image of a conservative	
FAVORABLE	
	Percent
Saves, doesn't throw things away-----	16
Cautious (careful)-----	10
General remarks (favorable)-----	5
Total-----	31
NEUTRAL	
Mentions Nixon, current administration-----	6
Mentions specific person other than Nixon-----	5
Mentions political position or party-----	3
Total-----	14
UNFAVORABLE	
Does not want to change, does not take a chance-----	12
Close-minded, intolerant, self-centered-----	9
Total-----	21
Miscellaneous-----	3
No opinion-----	35
Total*-----	104
Image of a "liberal"	
FAVORABLE	
	Percent
Open-minded, fair-----	12
Generous, good-hearted-----	6
Wants change, active in bringing about needed reforms-----	5
General remarks (favorable)-----	2
	25
NEUTRAL	
Mentions specific person-----	7
Mentions political position or party-----	7
Mentions a specific problem (civil rights, etc.)-----	3
	17
UNFAVORABLE	
Gives things away, spends too freely-----	8
Negative descriptions (Communists, hippies, drug addicts, etc.)-----	5
Gets carried away, wild, too far out-----	4
Permissive, indifferent-----	4
General remarks (unfavorable)-----	4
	25
Miscellaneous-----	2
No opinion-----	37
Total*-----	106

\*Total adds to more than 100 per cent because some persons gave more than one response.

**SAC**

# THE ABM: IS IT A DOOMSDAY MACHINE?

Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, the time is fast approaching when we shall once again be asked to vote authorization of an expanded anti-ballistic-missile system—ABM. Its proponents have long since begun to beat the drums in an effort to alarm the American people into accepting this shockingly expensive, appallingly dangerous weapon.

What, they ask, if we do not have the ABM and an enemy attack appears to be underway? The more terrifying and appropriate question is, however: What if

we do have such a system and use it? The answer, it now appears, is the extinction of mankind through strontium 90 poisoning.

The question was posed and answered last fall by Dr. Ernest J. Sternglass, professor of radiation physics at the University of Pittsburgh. His chillingly entitled essay, "The Death of All Children," received far less attention than it deserved. In order that it be available for consideration by the Senate during this year's debate, I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

## THE DEATH OF ALL CHILDREN—A FOOTNOTE TO THE A.B.M. CONTROVERSY (By Ernest J. Sternglass)

Hopefully it is not too late to ask the members of Congress in their deliberations over the Administration's proposed Anti-Ballistic Missile system to pause and reflect on the nature and urgency of the matter they have been debating.

In view of new evidence on the totally unexpected action of strontium 90 on human reproductive cells, it is apparent that Congress has not yet considered what may well be the most important factor affecting its decision to proceed or not to proceed with the first steps toward the A.B.M. shield. The fact is this: a full-scale A.B.M. system, protecting the United States against a Soviet first strike, could, if successful, cause the extinction of the human race. (Indeed, the scientific evidence indicates that already at least one of three children, who died before their first birthdays in America in the 1960's, may have died as a result of peacetime nuclear testing.) Such is the conclusion indicated by new information on the unanticipated genetic effect of strontium 90, presented at a recent meeting of the Health Physics Society.

Proponents of the A.B.M. system argue that it is necessary to prevent the destruction of our deterrent forces by a massive first strike of Russian SS-9 missiles carrying thousands of multiple warheads. But the threat of such an attack loses all credibility against our present knowledge that the vast amounts of long-lived strontium 90 necessarily released into the world's rapidly circulating atmosphere could lead to the death of all Russian infants born in the next generation, thus ending the existence of the Russian people, together with that of all mankind.

The unanticipated genetic effect of strontium 90 has become evident from an increase in the incidence of infant mortality along the path of the fallout cloud from the first atomic test in New Mexico in 1945, and from a detailed correlation of state-by-state infant mortality excesses with yearly changes of strontium 90 levels in milk.

The computer-calculated change in infant mortality was found to have reached close to one excess death in the U.S. per one hundred live births due to the release of only 200 megatons of fission energy by 1963. This indicates that a release of some 20,000 megatons anywhere in the world, needed in offensive warheads for an effective first strike or in the thousands of defensive A.B.M. warheads required to insure interception, could lead to essentially no infants surviving to produce another generation.

The specter of fallout has of course loomed before in the national anxiety over nuclear explosions. But the result of these studies comprises the first documented, long-range analysis showing direct quantitative correlations between strontium 90 and infant mortality. (They will be published later this year as recorded in the Proceedings of the 9th annual Hanford Biology Symposium.)

The physicists who exploded the first atomic bomb at Alamogordo had expected radioactive materials of some kind and assumed that they would fall to earth downwind as far as fifty miles away. Accordingly, the test site had been located in an isolated area of southern New Mexico. When a subsequent series of tests was held in 1951, six years later, the scientists moved to the isolation of desert country in southern Nevada. By now, however, and without the knowledge of the scientific community, the death rate of children in states downwind from Alamogordo had begun to rise.

The infant mortality rates in the United States have been carefully collected for many years. From 1935 to 1950, the rate shows a steady decline, and mathematical models allow the rate to be extended to show, on the basis of previous experience, what the infant mortality rate for any time, consistent with the immediate past, ought to be. But while elsewhere (with one exception) in the U.S. the rate continued downward as expected; in the states downwind of Alamogordo it did not. There was no change in the infant death rate in 1946—the year after the Trinity test—but by 1950 the rate in Texas, Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, and both Carolinas deviated upward from the normal expectancy. Increases in excess infant mortality of some twenty to thirty percent occurred some thousand to fifteen hundred miles away in Arkansas, Louisiana, and Alabama, where mortality rates were between 3 and 4.5 per hundred live births. Thus, as observed by our research group at the University of Pittsburgh, the Alamogordo blast appears to have been followed by the death, before reaching age one, of roughly one of one hundred children in the area downwind. No detectable increase in mortality rates relative to the computer-determined 1940-45 base line was observed in Florida, south of the path of the fallout cloud, or in the states to the north; and the mortality excesses became progressively less severe with increasing distance eastward, in a manner now understood to be characteristic of the activity along the path of a fallout cloud. Though the increase in infant mortality in these states was taking place during the years 1946-1950, it does not appear to have been associated with the Alamogordo fallout before our studies beginning in October, 1968.

Meanwhile, the study of radiation effects proceeded elsewhere in the scientific community. It became known in the early 1950's that radioactive strontium was concentrated in cow's milk and transmitted, along with the calcium to which it bears a close chemical resemblance, to the rapidly growing bones of the fetus and the subsequent infant. Still, the radiation from strontium 90, though long-lasting, was relatively small in degree; and it was a matter of record, from studies of young women employed in painting luminous watch dials, that very large amounts of radiation over long periods of time are required to produce bone cancer or leukemia in adults. Besides, the survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and their offspring were carefully observed without discovering any very serious long-term effects of radiation. A small number of leukemia cases turned up, and a very few detectable abnormalities among their children, but compared with the rest of Japan the difference was slight. The measurable effects of fallout, at the time, did not seem so ominous after all. So atmospheric nuclear weapons testing proceeded in Nevada until 1958, and continued in the Pacific until 1963 under the pressure of the Cold War. No obvious or clear-cut incidents of serious harm to anyone were reported outside the immediate area of testing.

Still, there was concern among radiobiologists and geneticists over the possibility of radiation effects on the highly sensitive

human reproductive cells, rapidly dividing and developing to form the human embryo during the first few weeks and months of gestation. Evidence from animal experiments, as well as from the observation of pregnant women who had been exposed to X-rays, suggested that ova and embryo might be from twenty to fifty times more sensitive to the development of leukemia than the mature adult. If so, the potential danger of even relatively small amounts of radiation would be greatly magnified.

The evidence implicating X-rays in childhood leukemia had been discovered—quite unexpectedly—by Dr. Alice Stewart of Oxford University, in the course of a survey designed to uncover the causes of a disturbing rise in childhood leukemia among the children of England and Wales during the 1950's. Her study, published in 1958, showed that mothers who had received a series of three to five abdominal X-rays in the course of a pelvic examination gave birth to children who were almost twice as likely to die of leukemia or other cancers than the children of mothers who had not been X-rayed during pregnancy. Subsequent studies showed that only about six percent of all childhood leukemia is related to X-rays, but Dr. Stewart's research remains significant, since before then no serious effects of ordinary diagnostic X-rays had ever been demonstrated, especially since a single abdominal X-ray gives the fetus a radiation dose not much larger than what each of us receives in the course of some three to five years from cosmic rays and the natural radiation in the rocks around us.

It is true that leukemia and childhood cancer are relatively rare. Only about one child in one thousand is affected. Nevertheless, since leukemia and other cancers are the second greatest cause of death among children between five and fourteen (ranking only after accidents), Dr. Stewart's findings were regarded by physicians as startling, and efforts were made to check them. Perhaps the most definitive such examination was done by Dr. Brian MacMahon at the Harvard School of Public Health. Using a study population of close to 800,000 children born in large New England hospitals, where careful records of X-rays given to mothers were available, Dr. MacMahon confirmed Dr. Stewart's findings. He observed only about a forty percent increase in the cancer rate among exposed children, probably because of improvements in X-ray technology that allowed lower exposures.

Meanwhile, in April, 1953, a sizable amount of nuclear debris from a test explosion in Nevada was wafted downwind some two thousand miles to the east and, thirty-six hours later, deposited by a rainstorm over the Albany-Troy region of New York State. Dr. Ralph Lapp, one of the first scientists to be concerned with the hazards of peacetime nuclear testing, drew attention to this heavy local fallout. Subsequent examination of the childhood leukemia pattern in this area showed that leukemia doubled over a period of some eight years after the fallout—and then decreased. Here, for the first time, was a documented case in which fallout appeared to produce serious effects at a rate consistent with what was expected from the study of children exposed to prenatal X-rays.

Further examination of the leukemia rate for the entire State of New York revealed a pattern of increase and decrease following the sequence of individual test series in Nevada between 1951 and 1958, with a characteristic time delay of about five years after each detonation. The rise and fall were particularly marked in the age group from five to fourteen years, the group most indicative of radiation-produced cases.

More disturbing yet, the evidence showed that the arrival of the fallout was followed by a halt in the normal decline of the rate of stillbirths. For the previous fifteen years,

from 1935 to 1950, the stillbirth rate had shown a regular and progressive decline. Within a year after testing began in Nevada in 1951, the rate began to deviate upward. Between 1957 and 1963 the fetal death rate, instead of steadily declining as it had from 1935 to 1950, leveled off completely at around twenty-three per thousand live births. In 1964, the fetal death rate rose to 27.3 per thousand, the first such leap since records had been kept in New York State. In 1965 and 1966, it declined slightly, as a gradual reduction of fallout in milk and food took place throughout the U.S. In contrast to New York, the fetal death rate for California—upwind of the Nevada test site, and therefore not affected by it—continued its steady decline, in line with the 1935-1950 figures from which New York so sharply deviated. Still, the rate of decrease began to slow down in California also—two to three years after the onset of hydrogen bomb tests in the Pacific in 1954.

The implications of the fetal death rate could be considered much more serious for society than the incidence of childhood leukemia, since there are more than ten times as many fetal deaths reported than cases of childhood leukemia. Moreover, for every fetal death reported, an estimated five or six are not reported, yielding perhaps fifty or sixty fetal deaths for each case of leukemia. Consequently, the search for further evidence continued. More fallout seemed to be followed by more fetal deaths, but no precise statistical correlation had been drawn. Since the amount of strontium 90 deposited in the soil is easily measurable, the cumulative deposit of strontium 90 was plotted against the excess of fetal mortality over what the mortality should have been if the 1935-1950 decline had persisted. The finding: except for the first few years of testing in Nevada, when short-lived isotopes rather than the long-lived strontium 90 were dominant, the fetal death rate in New York followed the same general pattern, as the accumulated strontium 90 on the ground. Both curves showed the same decrease in rate of climb coincident with the temporary halt of nuclear testing from 1958 to 1961; both show a sharp rise beginning with the large Soviet test series in 1961. Two years after the test ban in 1963, both the fetal death rate and the radioactivity in the environment once again began to decline.

A similar pattern in the fetal death rate exists in the data for the United States as a whole for all periods of gestation up to nine months. Again, there is a steady rate of decline until the Fifties, a leveling off in 1951-52, and an actual rise in 1954, corresponding to the onset of the Pacific H-bomb tests; and a second rise in 1961, corresponding to the Soviet test series.

But perhaps the most disturbing evidence of all indicates that the rates of the infant mortality in the United States and all over the world seem to have been affected by nuclear testing. The infant mortality rate is far more accurately known than the fetal death rate, since the death of a baby, unlike a miscarriage or an abortion, rarely escapes notice in the advanced countries. Like fetal deaths, infant mortality had shown a steady decline in the period 1935-1950; but beginning with the Nevada tests in 1951 and continuing until just after the test ban in 1963, the rate suddenly leveled off in the U.S. This leveling off did not occur in such other advanced countries as Sweden, Holland and Norway, or in Southern Hemisphere countries like Chile and New Zealand, until late in the 1950's when hydrogen-bomb tests in the South Pacific and Siberia began to produce worldwide fallout on a much increased scale. Only after the major portion of the most violently radioactive material from the 1961-62 tests had disappeared did U.S. infant mortality begin to decline again in 1965, at a rate close to the previous 1935-1950 decline.

The most serious effects appeared in the age group from one month to one year. Here, the rate of deaths per one thousand live births should have been, according to the 1935-1950 figures, about 2.7. Instead, the observed number was 5.4 per thousand, twice what it should have been and twice what it actually was in Sweden, where the rate had steadily declined to 2.6 per thousand.

Not only was there a drastic change in overall infant mortality for the U.S. as compared to the rest of the advanced countries, but there were also disturbing patterns of change within the U.S. For example, the infant mortality rate started to level off sharply in the Eastern, Midwestern and Southern states within two years after the onset of atomic testing in Nevada in 1951, while it continued steadily downward in the dry Western states. But this is exactly the known pattern of accumulated radioactive strontium on the ground and in the diet, since strontium is most heavily deposited in states of high annual rainfall, especially in those to the east of Nevada.

Serious difficulties remained, however, in establishing a casual connection between nuclear testing and these drastic changes in fetal and infant mortality. First, why should fallout, and in particular strontium 90, cause fetal and infant deaths, since it goes to the bones and should therefore cause, if anything, bone cancer and leukemia many years later? Second, there was no observed direct quantitative relation between different levels of strontium 90 in the body and mortality rates at any given age. Therefore it was difficult to see how the very small amounts of radiation resulting from peacetime testing could possibly have been the cause of the deviations in fetal death and infant mortality, especially since no significant genetic effects had been observed among the children of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki survivors.

The causation puzzle now appears to be solved. In 1963, K. G. Luning and his co-workers in Sweden published their discovery that small amounts of strontium 90, injected into male mice three or four weeks prior to mating, produced an increase in fetal deaths among their offspring. No such increase appeared when corresponding amounts of chemically different radioactive cesium 137 were injected. More recently, evidence presented at an International Symposium on the Radiation Biology of the Fetal and Juvenile Mammal in May, 1969, has demonstrated severe chromosome damage, fetal deaths and congenital malformations in the offspring of female mice injected with strontium 90 before and during pregnancy. Similar effects have now been observed for very small quantities of tritium, produced by both A-bombs and relatively "clean" hydrogen weapons.

In the light of these studies, the absence of genetic effects in Hiroshima is understandable. In Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the bombs were detonated, not on the ground as in New Mexico, but at such an altitude that there was essentially no fallout in these two cities proper. The radiation exposure there resulted almost exclusively from the brief flash of X-rays, neutrons and gamma rays at the instant of explosion. Consequently no special effects related to strontium 90 appeared in the children of the survivors; but the rate of cancer deaths among children up to fourteen years in Japan as a whole jumped by more than two hundred percent between 1949 and 1951, four to six years after the bombs, when the fallout had had a chance to produce its effects throughout the southern parts of Japan—exactly the same delay observed after the fallout from Nevada arrived in Albany-Troy.

But the problem remains of demonstrating a direct connection between the levels of strontium 90 in human fetuses and infants, on the one hand, and observed changes in fetal and infant mortality, on the other. Such a direct connection seems to emerge



from the so-called "baby-tooth survey" carried out by the Dental School of Washington University in St. Louis, supported by the U.S. Public Health Service and directed by Dr. H. L. Rosenthal. Using the data from tooth-buds and mandibular bones of aborted fetuses and from baby teeth collected in the greater St. Louis area, Dr. Rosenthal's study showed that the concentration of strontium 90 in the teeth followed closely the measured concentrations in bone and milk. Measurement of the strontium 90 content of milk anywhere in the world permits a calculation of the concentration in the bones of infants and fetuses developing in the same areas. We have found a direct correlation between the yearly changes of strontium 90 contained in the teeth (and therefore the bones and bodies) of the developing human fetus and infant, and the changing excess mortality rates, going up and down together as atmospheric tests began in 1951 and stopped in 1963.

From our examinations of the infant mortality changes from a computer-fitted base line for 1935-1950, for various states in which the Public Health Service reported monthly values of the strontium 90 concentrations in the milk since 1957, there emerges a close correspondence between average strontium 90 levels and infant mortality changes. Whenever the strontium 90 rose to high values over a four-year period, as in Georgia, a large, parallel, year-by-year rise in infant mortality also took place; while in areas where there was little strontium 90 in the milk, as in Texas, the infant mortality remained at a correspondingly lower value. Other states such as Illinois, Missouri, New York and Utah also show a rise, peaking in the same 1962-1965 period at levels between these extreme cases, each according to their local annual rainfall and strontium 90 concentrations in their milk.

For the United States as a whole, we found a detailed correspondence between and among: 1) the excess infant mortality relative to the 1935-1950 base line; 2) the total strontium 90 produced by nuclear weapons; 3) the strontium 90 thus produced actually reaching the ground; and 4) the four-year average concentration in U.S. milk from 1955, the year after the first large H-bomb test; and 1965, the year when strontium 90 concentrations began to level off and started to decline once again.

At the peak of this excess infant mortality, it was the District of Columbia that showed the largest excess in 1966—157 percent, compared with an average excess of 72 percent for the U.S. as a whole. The low value was found in dry New Mexico, minus-eleven percent—actually below the 1935-50 base line.

To appreciate the magnitude of these effects, it must be recognized that in the 1950's about 2.5 to 3.2 infants out of every hundred born in the U.S. died before reaching the age of one year. The average excess infant mortality, therefore, represents close to one child out of one hundred born, or one of every 2.5 to 3.0 that died during the first year of life.

Since about four million children were born annually during this period, close to 40,000 infants one year old or less died in excess of normal expectations each year, totaling some 375,000 by the mid-Sixties and continuing at about 34,000 per year since the end of atmospheric testing by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.

It is no wonder, then, that infant mortality has been a major concern of our Public Health Service since this trend was first pointed out in 1960 by Dr. M. Moriama of the National Center for Health Statistics.

However, as Dr. Moriama and his associates observed during an international conference devoted entirely to infant mortality in 1965, none of the factors so far considered—medical care, population movement, new drugs, pesticides, smoking or epidemics

of infectious disease—suffices to explain the observed facts.

That the recent excesses in infant mortality cannot readily be explained by medical and socioeconomic factors normally influencing mortality trends may be seen from an examination of the death rate in the various states following the Alamogordo blast. At the University of Pittsburgh, we have plotted the percentile infant mortality excesses or decrements relative to the computer-determined 1940-1945 base line for the first and fifth years after Alamogordo. In 1946, one year after the detonation, there was no sign of any excess infant mortality in the states downwind from New Mexico; but by 1950 a clear change toward excess infant mortality appeared in the states over which the fallout cloud had drifted, and only in those states. Furthermore, the excess mortalities are seen to be distributed in such a pattern as might be expected from nuclear fallout originating in New Mexico, since the effects are lowest in the dry area of western Texas, and largest in the areas of heavy rainfall first encountered by the cloud, namely Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama, declining steadily thereafter toward the Atlantic.

The only other area that showed a clear excess infant mortality greater than ten percent as compared to the 1940-1945 period was found to be North Dakota. There, subsequent measurements of strontium 90 in the milk, carried out by the Health and Safety Laboratories of the Atomic Energy Commission, revealed the highest concentrations anywhere in the U.S. for which data is available prior to 1960. The causes of this "hot spot" are not yet fully understood, but they are quite possibly connected with known accidental discharges of radioactivity from the Hanford plant of the Manhattan Project, directly to the west, in the early years of its operation, where the fissionable plutonium for most of the nuclear weapons was produced beginning in 1944.

Since no excess infant mortality was registered along the path of the New Mexico fallout cloud in the first year after the detonation, the deaths occurring downwind in later years could not have resulted from the direct effects of external radiation from fallout on the developing embryo. It becomes clear then that we are dealing with an effect on the reproductive cells of the parents, or a so-called genetic effect.

The evidence available so far therefore suggests that radioactive strontium appears to be a far more serious hazard to man through its long-lasting action on the genetic material of the mammalian cell than had been expected on the basis of its well-known tendency to be incorporated into bone. The resultant effect appears to express itself most noticeably in excess fetal and infant mortality rates among the children born two or more years after a nuclear explosion. Presumably such factors as lowered birth weight and reduced ability to resist ordinary infectious diseases are involved, accounting for the greatest increase in infant mortality in the U.S. as compared to the advanced countries of Western Europe since the early 1950's. Children who receive adequate medical care are more likely to survive these factors than those who do not.

What does all this imply for the debate over the deployment of new nuclear weapons systems, such as the A.B.M. or the M.I.R.V. (Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicle), carrying many nuclear warheads in a single missile? To appreciate the probable genetic effects of a large nuclear war, we can consider first the effect of small tactical-size nuclear weapons comparable to the 20 kiloton bombs detonated over Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and in the desert of Alamogordo. Since increases of some 20 to 30 percent excess infant mortality were observed from a thou-

sand to fifteen hundred miles downwind in Arkansas, Alabama and Louisiana, where mortality rates were between 3 and 4.5 per hundred live births, the detonation of a single, small tactical-size nuclear weapon on the ground in the western United States appears to have led to one out of one hundred children born subsequently dying before reaching the age of one year. Therefore, the detonation of a hundred or so weapons of this size, amounting to the equivalent of only two megatons in the form of small warheads, would be expected to lead to essentially no children surviving to maturity in the states directly downwind.

But according to a former Defense Secretary Clark Clifford, speaking at a N.A.T.O. conference in the Fall of 1968, we have close to eight thousand tactical nuclear weapons in the kiloton range ready to be released in order to protect our European allies from a ground attack by Russia. Thus, we would probably achieve the protection of Western Europe at the cost of the biological end of these nations through the death of the children of the survivors, together with the likely death of most children subsequently born to the people of Eastern Europe, Russia and China as the radioactive clouds drift eastward around the world until they reach the United States. Thus, the use of the biologically most destructive small nuclear weapons in tactical warfare now appears to be at least as self-defeating as the release of large quantities of nerve gas, killing indiscriminately soldiers and civilians, friends and enemies alike.

But, what about the use of large megaton warheads in a massive first strike or in A.B.M. missiles detonated high up in the stratosphere or outer space, as proposed for the Spartan missile that is to provide us with an impenetrable shield against a first strike attack by large Chinese or Russian missiles in the 1970's?

According to the figures on infant mortality in the United States, based on the testing of large hydrogen weapons in the Pacific and Siberia, both in the atmosphere and outer space, close to one out of every one hundred children born are likely to have died as the result of only about 200 megatons worth of fission products into the world's atmosphere, under conditions which were especially designed to minimize the possible effects on health.

According to the testimony of Defense Secretary Melvin Laird in the Spring of 1969, the U.S.S.R. will have the capability of launching some 500 SS-9 missiles, each capable of carrying 25 megatons worth of bombs in the form of many multiple warheads, or a total of some 1500 to 2500 warheads. Together with comparable numbers launched by smaller missiles, the total megatonnage would therefore be of the order of 10 to 20,000 megatons needed in a first strike that attempts to destroy most of our thousands of missiles and bombers at the same time.

Thus, the threat of a first strike by Russia loses all credibility since, in order to have any chance at all of preventing devastating retaliation, it would necessarily have to release so much radioactivity into the circulating atmosphere that it would lead to the death of most Russian infants born in the next generation, ending the existence of the Russian people together with that of all mankind.

Since it takes at least three to five Anti-Ballistic Missiles launched to insure a high probability of interception, the U.S. must be prepared to launch some 5000 to 15000 A.B.M.'s in order to provide a meaningful "shield" against such a massive attack.

We know that each Spartan missile must contain a warhead of at least 2 megatons to produce a sufficiently intense X-ray pulse to achieve interception, so that the use of this system to protect our own missiles and cities

would require the detonation of some 10,000 to 30,000 megatons into the stratosphere, not counting any radioactivity from the Russian warheads, from our own counterstrike, or from the Russian A.B.M. missiles.

Thus, even if anti-missile systems were to work with ideal perfection on both sides, preserving every home, every school, and every factory from destruction, the release of long-lived radioactive materials would produce more than a hundred times as much radioactive poison as during all the years of peacetime testing. Based on the excess mortality observed during the period of testing, this would most likely be sufficient to insure that few if any children anywhere in the world would grow to maturity to give rise to another generation.

Nor will it make much difference how high above the atmosphere the bombs are detonated, because the strontium 90 takes twenty-eight years to decay to half of its initial activity, long enough for most of it to return to earth well before another generation of children is born. And even if a perfectly "clean" weapon containing no fissionable material at all could ever be developed, the carbon 14 it produces would get into the genetic material controlling the life processes of all living cells, and it takes 5770 years before half of its radioactivity is exhausted.

The implications of the warning mankind has received from the death of its infants during nuclear testing are therefore clear:

Nuclear war, with or without anti-missiles or elaborate shelters, is no longer "thinkable" due to a fatal flaw in the assumptions of all our military war-gamers, namely the unexpectedly severe biological sensitivity of the mammalian reproductive system to genetically important by-products of nuclear weapons, which must now be regarded not merely as vastly destructive explosive and incendiary devices, but as the most powerful biological poison weapons that man has yet invented.

#### THE U.S. NATIONAL ARBORETUM

Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, on April 22, many of the people of the Nation took time out to stop and think about our earth and its struggle for survival. One aspect of this day was that we seemed to see more clearly both the beauty of nature and the destructiveness of man. There were many speeches made about what ought to be done, and I hope that it was not just rhetoric.

If we want to look for something to do that will stop a part of man's destruction of nature, we have to look no further than the Nation's Capital. The U.S. National Arboretum is one of the most beautiful spots in the Washington, D.C., area. It is a magnificent spot in which we can withdraw from the noise and smells of our highly industrialized society where we can get away from the fumes and sight and sound of cars and trucks and buses and enjoy the serenity of nature.

Now, however, an East Leg Parkway has been proposed that would run along the arboretum side of the Anacostia River, using precious arboretum land.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that an article written by Mr. Tom Stevenson and published in the Washington Post of April 19 be printed in the RECORD. The article eloquently describes both the arboretum and the threat to it.

If we are serious about saving our environment, it is with small but important issues like this that we must deal and deal decisively.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### NATURALISTS FEAR RUIN OF ARBORETUM

(By Tom Stevenson)

The U.S. National Arboretum is considered one of the great arboreta of the world and one of the big attractions of the District of Columbia. Yet, an effort is being made to take a lot of Arboretum acreage and use it for a roadway. The decision rests with Congress.

Robert F. Lederer, executive vice president, American Association of Nurserymen, and Mrs. Glenn B. Eastburn, executive director, American Horticultural Society, have warned their members that a proposed East Leg Parkway along the Arboretum side of the Anacostia River would require the use of land now occupied by the Arboretum. Richard P. White, chairman of the National Arboretum Advisory Council, says that the proposal, if adopted, would cripple the Arboretum.

"In jeopardy," said Dr. White, "is a collection of plants worth millions of dollars, really priceless, since they could not be moved to a new location without heavy losses, and some of which, due to their worldwide nature, could never be replaced; and a corps of trained scientists in horticultural research, highly efficient, that might move elsewhere and that would be hard to replace, once lost."

One of the outstanding attractions at the Arboretum is the Gotelli collection of dwarf conifers. Over a period of 15 years, William T. Gotelli, of South Orange, N.J., assembled more than 1,500 plants from all parts of the world. In 1963 he gave the collection to the Arboretum. He said it was too fine for one person to possess, and he wanted it at the Arboretum where all could enjoy it. Here the conifers of normal growth contrast pleasingly with their dwarf counterparts, in an arrangement of rocks and stone-mulched beds set among velvet green grass walkways.

In late April and early May, 70,000 azaleas on the slopes of Mount Hamilton, in the Arboretum, are in bloom beneath a canopy of tulip, oak and dogwood trees.

Along the Anacostia River are hundreds of magnificent camellias, both sasanquas and japonicas. Last fall the Camellia Society of the Potomac Valley in a test program, produced thousands of blooms on the japonicas by regulating their growth through a process called gibbing. More than 100 varieties of sasanqua are planted along trails and among statelike Japanese temple trees.

Nearby, a central alley bordered by specimen plants of flowering dogwood is set among hemlocks and informal plantings of other dogwoods. In the collection are about 65 kinds of dogwood, including the weeping form, the bunchberry and the Chinese dogwood.

The collection of more than 600 crabapples represents one of the largest test plantings in this country. Though the trees are still young, crabapple blossoms are beginning to add considerably to the flower display of mid-April, the effect being heightened by underplantings of daffodils. Ornamental crabapples are considered the most dependable of all small flowering trees for cold climates. At the Arboretum there are varieties suitable for every region that experiences temperatures below zero in the United States. The Arboretum's collection is also beginning to provide information on the best varieties for the middle and upper South.

There is a fine collection of hollies, American, English, Chinese, Japanese and miscellaneous evergreen types. The plants are labeled to help visitors identify them. The holly plantings also suggest possible landscape use of these plants. In addition to the hollies on display, the Arboretum has research collections which are being used in breeding programs to develop superior forms,

particularly for sections of the country where hollies are not now climatically adapted.

The holly trail leads to a unique six-sided teakwood bench from which one can view plantings of 25-foot tall hybrid magnolias, deciduous hollies and crabapples.

Fern valley is a naturalistic planting of ferns and other plants native to Eastern North America. Of special interest is a wall for lime-loving ferns, made from limestone rocks said to have been originally used in a rocky parapet constructed by Braddock's army.

A start toward a complete collection of flowering cherries at the Arboretum was made through a gift by National Capital Optimists. The collection is being added to each year, and will serve for research and possibly hybridizing.

Many of the plantings at the Arboretum in addition to the flowering cherries, have been contributed by the general public individuals nurserymen and garden clubs.

In addition to being a beauty spot, the Arboretum is an educational institution—an outdoor museum in which one can study many kinds of trees, shrubs and other plants. It is a research institution, using its plants for cultural observation and in breeding and testing programs. In cooperation with the New Crops Research Branch of USDA, it distributes new plants and seed to other botanic gardens of this country.

#### LIMITING FARM PAYMENTS TO \$10,000 PER CROP OF COTTON, WHEAT, AND FEED GRAINS

Mr. GOODELL. Mr. President, considering the inflationary pressures in our economy and the budget constraints which are applied to so many vitally needed programs, it seems unbelievable to me that we should still continue wasteful programs of large farm subsidy payments to a small handful of wealthy producers.

When the Agriculture Appropriations Act was considered in the Senate last year, I offered an amendment to the bill which would have limited the payments to individual producers of cotton, wheat, and feed grains to \$10,000 per crop. Because I had to offer my amendment to the appropriation bill, this limitation would have applied only to the 1970 crops.

Basic farm legislation expires this year. We now have an unparalleled opportunity to enact long-range changes in the farm program which would have the effect of placing permanent limitations on these programs. I intend to offer my amendment again this year and I will be working with Senator BIRCH BAYH in a bipartisan effort to bring this about. We are planning to introduce our amendment next week. If our proposal is enacted, a potential saving of \$250 million annually could result.

Last year I placed in the RECORD a list, by State, of producers receiving \$10,000 or more from these three programs in 1968. Figures are now available for 1969, and they show an alarming increase in just 1 year. The number of payees receiving \$10,000 or more increased by 1,877 in the cotton program, by 2,836 in the feed grains program, and by 1,806 in the wheat program.

Mr. President, for the benefit of Senators who will be considering a limitation on farm subsidies this year, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD a table provided by the Department of Agriculture which lists by State

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families by President Nixon. The bill is scheduled for a vote on the House floor next month.

Until now, the preliminary results of that \$4.5 million government-financed experiment have been put forth in general terms or in cold statistics.

But last week, Mathematica, a research group based here, released verbatim quotations from interviews with 10 per cent of the more than 7,000 families who receive the cash guarantees in New Jersey and Pennsylvania.

Although a few families expressed some reservations or misconceptions about the program, more typical responses included such statements as it is "four to five times better than welfare" or "It seems simple and uncomplicated compared to most government programs."

Unlike welfare, the families do not have to fill out complicated forms, do not have to account for how they spend their money, do not have to forfeit assets, and are not supervised by case workers and investigators.

In fact, the experiment's workers go out of their way not to advise families. If families need help, such as finding housing, they receive a list of agencies to contact so that they can learn to help themselves. The cash payments are strictly divorced from any services.

To be eligible for the payments, a family submits to a quarterly interview and reports its income and family composition each month. The income report form, as one family said, "couldn't be simpler. You'd have to be pretty stupid" not to understand it.

The one-page form, covering a four-week period, asks the family to list any changes in household members (because grants are based on family size) and to list earnings before taxes and other income such as Social Security benefits.

Families include their paycheck stubs with the report. If they don't have stubs, they can submit signed statements from employers. Their benefits are recalculated every four weeks, but are based on average earnings over the last three-month period.

Because the experiment is aimed simply at determining how income guarantees affect work patterns of those who receive them, the families are under no obligation to account for how they spend the extra cash.

But the families have shown a strong desire to prove they are worthy of the payments. Many have voluntarily attached paid bills to their income declaration forms to show how they have spent the money.

That the money is being used in a variety of meaningful ways was also shown by the interviews that Mathematica conducted last month in Trenton, N.J., where the first project families were selected in 1968, and in Paterson, Passaic and Jersey City, N.J., and Scranton, Pa.

Two Scranton families are using the money, spread over a three-year period, to renovate their homes.

"This way we are increasing the value of our home and will have something to show for the money," one family said.

That family has renovated one room and named it the "Council of Grants to Families" room. The Council is the subsidiary which issues the payments to the families.

Another family, noting that the payments were enabling it to move from a "dump" to a nicer apartment, said:

"We are trying to plan ahead. In three years, I might be making good money, and by then the kids will be older and my wife could possibly work. It sure has raised our standard of living."

A 60-year-old mother, living with her son's family, said the payments would make it possible for her to delay in applying for Social Security benefits until she was eligible for the maximum amount.

The income guarantee is helping one railroad worker to sit out a layoff, and has

helped factory workers to get through "vacation without pay" periods.

A commonly expressed view was that the money gave families a small measure of security in case of illness or job difficulties. This was best expressed by the family that said:

"We aren't using the money to pay the electric bill or things like that. We put a little aside and just having it gives you peace of mind in case anything should happen."

Several families were negative in their responses, saying the money wasn't sufficient to help them provide adequately for their families.

A few families looked upon their bimonthly checks as windfalls to be used for spending sprees.

One young father has been quite successful in using his guarantee to extend his credit rating so that he could lavishly furnish his public housing apartment—complete with bar. He also tried to con the experiment's workers out of giving him his payments in one lump sum so that he could have a "stake."

Among those interviewed, there was almost universal contempt for the existing dependent children's welfare program, which began in the 1930's and would be replaced by the Nixon administration's Family Assistance Plan of income guarantees.

One family said that "on welfare you can't go any place or raise your cultural level." Another said welfare "kills people," and a third said welfare "makes liars and cheats" out of people.

Only a few of the income experiment's families did not endorse the concept of a national income guarantee plan.

"I don't think it will work," one father said. "It's like putting the whole country on welfare."

But the overwhelming view was expressed by families that said the program was a "good idea," that "all the people in the cellars and in the slums need it," that "you need a program for those not rich."

"Professionals can always find a job in their field," one Jersey City father said. "But there is no such thing as a guaranteed factory job."

Similarly, a Scranton father said: "It's giving those who are already trying a chance to get ahead. Everyone can't count on steady work . . . Take Scranton. Six years ago if you wanted a job as a dishwasher you had to fight at least 10 other guys to get it. Think how much this program would have meant then."

Most of the families showed a clear understanding that the income guarantees, which average less than \$100 a month, go down as earnings go up.

"You work more, you get less," said one father.

Another said he took a job knowing that the guarantee would go down, because he wanted to better himself. And one enrollee, who now only receives \$20 a month, said that small incentive has made him "work harder in the last months putting in overtime whenever I can."

Under eight different combinations of tax rates and guaranteed income levels, the guarantees are entirely eliminated when earnings go above a certain level. To date, 10 per cent of the families in Trenton, Paterson and Passaic have increased their earnings so that they no longer are eligible for the guarantees.

One father correctly figured the point where he no longer would be eligible for benefits and said, "I'd be happy to go above it"—indicating, as many of the answers did, that the cash payments do not slow down work effort.

Typical comments were "I'd rather work than sit," and "it's all I ever knew all my

life." Another family head said work was necessary so a guaranteed income plan would be "more an insurance policy than a hand-out."

The experiment is being financed by the Office of Economic Opportunity under contracts with the Institute for Research on Poverty at the University of Wisconsin, and Mathematica.

Although developed under the Johnson administration, the experiment is proving to be a unique testing ground for President Nixon's revolutionary welfare reforms, which appear assured of Congressional passage this year.

The reforms are mammoth in that they establish the first uniform federal income guarantee (\$1,600 for a family of four) and include working poor families, as well as the non working poor, for the first time.

Critics have said the program might lead to widespread loafing. But the Mathematica interviews suggest the program, in the words of one father, will give the "guy who tries the feeling that it is worth it."

[From the New York Times, Feb. 28, 1970]

#### INVENTORY OFFERS TO SUPPORT TEST OF WELFARE GRANTS AND WAGES

(By Jack Rosenthal)

WASHINGTON, February 27.—A computer scientist from White Plains, N.Y., thinks that the Government is approaching welfare reform in the wrong way and is willing to put \$500,000 of his own money to prove it.

"The present system is terrible, and even the President's welfare reform plan would, in effect, put poor people in the same 50 to 67 per cent tax brackets as industrialists," says Leonard M. Greene, a 51-year-old inventor and producer of on-board computers for commercial aircraft.

He regards even a current Federal income-grant experiment as unsatisfactory and this week wired an offer to the Office of Economic Opportunity.

He would, his telegram said, personally support a broadening of the experiment to cover 100 poor families if they could receive income grants and also be allowed to keep all outside earnings.

The present experiment, conducted in New Jersey, seeks to determine what 1,359 low-income families do with income grants if they are permitted to keep some but not all outside income.

#### PRELIMINARY FINDINGS

The O.E.O. issued a preliminary report last week indicating that families with grants are more likely to work than non-recipients. The experiment has two years to run.

An O.E.O. spokesman said today that the agency was not prohibited from accepting private grants. Mr. Greene's proposal, he said, "is an interesting offer" but the agency will have to learn more about it before acting.

Mr. Greene hopes to broaden the experiment to find out what happens to work incentives when poor people can keep all they earn plus the grants.

Mr. Greene, a one-time test pilot and air taxi operator, says the offer could cost him \$500,000 over two years. He admits with a shrug that he is not sure the contribution would be tax-deductible.

In a slightly "mod" suit and wide tie, he does not look at all like a zealot, but like the wealthy businessman he has become as the result of his computer inventions.

"I don't consider myself a nut," he says, "or even as all that altruistic. I'm successful, but so what? Unless our society can solve this (poverty) problem, I'm a success on a sinking ship."

Mr. Greene came to Washington this week seeking support in Congress for his own welfare reform proposal, keyed to the same idea as his offer to O.E.O.—that the poor should

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get income grants and be able to keep all outside income besides.

Under his "fair share" plan, all citizens, poor or not, would receive income allowances. Those received by the poor would be untaxed or taxed at low rates. The amount of tax on the allowance would increase gradually, like the income tax, so that non-needy families would keep nothing of the allowance.

Mr. Greene believes that the Nixon Administration's proposed family assistance program, to reform the present welfare system, suffers from the same fault as the O.E.O. experiments.

Under the proposed program, pending in Congress, a poor family would be guaranteed \$1,600 in annual Federal grants. It could earn an additional \$720 without penalty. But it could keep only half of any earnings above that.

## REBUFFED BY TRAINEE

"And that's tantamount to a 50 per cent tax," Mr. Greene says, "67 per cent if you add what the states might add."

Mr. Greene first came to devise a welfare reform system three years ago when his Safe Flight Instrument Company offered a good salary to a black youth to become a computer technician-trainee.

"And yet the boy had to turn us down," recalls Mr. Greene, eight of whose own 12 children are now in college. "The additional income would have disqualified his family from its place on the waiting list for public housing. What kind of society is it that compels a young man to barter his whole future for a place on an apartment waiting list?"

He believes that present law encourages people "to become 'vegetabilized' and live on the dole. The only work they can seek is in hidden, cash jobs like driving cabs, caddying—and crime. These cash jobs are precisely those with no future."

"We should be encouraging people to work and to get ahead," he says, "not penalizing them for it."

## ENDING THE WAR

Mr. SCHWEIKER. Mr. President, I commend President Nixon for the work he is doing to end the tragic Vietnam war and for his excellent speech to the Nation on this work on Monday night.

In my view, the President accomplished two significant things by this speech:

First. Despite reported pressures from various military sources to curtail American troop withdrawals, he announced a continuation of the present rate of troop withdrawal without any break in the monthly average.

Second. We preserved a flexibility in the daily handling of our disengagement from Vietnam which he should maintain as Commander in Chief of our Armed Forces.

All Americans should be heartened by his pledge of withdrawal of an additional 150,000 troops in the next year. The President, by this dramatic step, has shown his good-faith intention to end the war, but without moving so precipitously as to endanger the lives of American troops not included in present withdrawal plans.

I have often told the people of Pennsylvania in the last year-and-a-half that President Nixon has taken steps which no previous President has done by actually removing troops, by actually scaling down the intensity of the combat, and by actually reducing the level of American fatalities.

I share his regret that negotiations in Paris have not borne fruit up to this point, but I urge continued efforts in Paris in the hope that there still may be encouragement from this quarter.

President Nixon showed Monday night that he is on the right track, and he has my full support.

THE WARSAW GHETTO UPRISING:  
A COMPELLING REASON FOR SENATE RATIFICATION OF THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION

Mr. PROXMIER. Mr. President, this week marks the 27th anniversary of the Warsaw ghetto uprising. It is particularly fitting and proper that we should pay tribute to the inhabitants of the Warsaw ghetto who gave their lives in an attempt to preserve the rights of their comrades.

In September 1939, the Nazis invaded Poland, and by October had completely taken over the country with its Jewish population of over 3 million. The occupation was immediately followed by a series of restrictive laws, designed to subject the Jews to starvation and disease. In Warsaw, this was accompanied by the institution of the "ghetto," an area of 100 city blocks, into which 450,000 Jews were confined.

In the face of many hardships imposed on them by the Germans, an organization called the Jewish Fighter Organization—ZOB—was formed. The militancy of this group grew when it was learned that the thousands of Jews who were deported daily faced certain death in the gas chambers. However, due to the scarcity of firearms and the limited cooperation of the non-Jewish resistance, it was not until April 19, 1943, that the ZOB presented an organized attempt to drive the Germans from the ghetto.

Initially, they were successful, inflicting heavy German casualties, and routing their tormentors. Nevertheless, the Nazis responded with soldiers, tanks, and bombs. By May 16, they had leveled the ghetto and but for a few exceptions, had liquidated its entire Jewish population.

In 1948, the United States, along with 47 other countries, signed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The designers of this declaration among other things sought to define and to prevent the crime of genocide as it was practiced by the Germans against the Jews in World War II.

This week hearings open on the Genocide Convention. The United States was instrumental in drafting this convention, as it has been in the drafting of many other human rights conventions. However, we have not yet ratified this or any treaty which would demonstrate our strong opposition to the crime of genocide. It would indeed be a tribute to the brave people of Warsaw if the United States took speedy action in the ratification of the Genocide Convention.

EASTERN AIRLINES NEWARK TO  
WASHINGTON SHUTTLE

Mr. CASE. Mr. President, as one who joined with our entire congressional delegation in the effort to keep the Newark to

Washington shuttle in operation, I am, naturally, pleased that Eastern Airlines now has decided to continue the service.

I believe that the expansion and improvement of this service, as opposed to its more continuance, would be in the interest of Eastern as well as in the public interest.

SALT

CHINA AND U.S. POLICY A TIME OF  
TRANSITION

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, Mr. A. Doak Barnett, senior fellow, the Brookings Institution, delivered a most interesting speech before the Women's National Democratic Club on March 2 which was entitled "China and U.S. Policy: A Time of Transition." Mr. Barnett summarizes briefly the present situation in China and the major factors that have impelled Peking to reexamine its policy. He also examines the transition in the American attitude toward China and suggests some actions that the United States might take to improve our relations with the most populous nation in the world.

I ask unanimous consent that the text of Mr. Barnett's speech be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I call attention to a few sentences toward the end of Mr. Barnett's speech. Mr. Barnett observes that "the key immediate issue is whether we should build an anti-Chinese ABM." Mr. Barnett comments that "on this the Nixon administration, in my judgment—despite the rightness of the direction of its general China policy—is quite wrong. The arguments against an anti-Chinese ABM, on political and other grounds, wholly apart from technical grounds, are overwhelming in my view."

Mr. Barnett testified before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Law, and Organization, on April 9 on the specific question of the ABM and its effect on U.S. relations with China. At that time, he made an extensive statement on the undesirability of going ahead with an anti-Chinese ABM system. I ask unanimous consent that Mr. Barnett's statement to the subcommittee on April 9 also be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the items were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

TESTIMONY BY DOAK BARNETT BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON ARMS CONTROL, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION, SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE, APRIL 9, 1970

Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, let me begin by saying that I am very grateful for this opportunity to meet and discuss with you a number of questions relating to arms control—questions focusing on the ABM and the SALT talks and their relevance to the broad problem of U.S.-China relations.

I would like to make two preliminary comments about my statement. First, the views I will express today are purely my own, and do not in any way represent views of The Brookings Institution, which does not itself take any stands on policy issues. Secondly, since I have very recently written an article



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(appearing in the current issue of *Foreign Affairs*) which summarizes many of my views on questions we are considering today, I am taking the liberty of drawing material from that article for the purposes of the statement I am now presenting to you.

We are now, in my view, at a rather critical juncture in the evolution both of our policy toward China and our policy regarding arms control.

For the first time in several years, there now appears to be at least a limited basis for hope that movement can take place in our relations with mainland China, movement which may reduce tensions and increase contacts between us. The current Warsaw talks will help to determine whether some progress is possible, or whether the freeze of the last two decades will continue.

At the same time, I believe that the arms control negotiations which we and the Russians have initiated are clearly the most important ones in the postwar period. We are about to meet again in Vienna at a time when both sides are poised to deploy new weapons systems—in our case, ABMs and MIRVs—if no agreements to forego such systems can be reached. Decisions made in the period immediately ahead by Washington and Moscow individually, and by both at the SALT talks, will determine, therefore, whether the U.S.-Soviet arms race will accelerate or slow down in the years immediately ahead. These decisions will also—and this is one of the major points I wish to make today—have a very significant impact on the prospects for improved U.S.-China relations. The evolving triangular relationship among the U.S., Soviet Union, and China is now such that any action by one or two of the three inevitably affects the others.

Since my assignment today is to focus attention on matters relevant to U.S.-China relations, and specifically to consider how we should view the ABM issue and SALT talks in relation to the "China problem," I will not comment on other fundamental questions, such as whether effective ABM systems are technically feasible or how they might affect the stability of the U.S.-Soviet balance. I assume that others will discuss these questions with you.

Let me proceed with my assignment and start by saying that I believe the Nixon Administration is to be commended for the new general approach it has adopted in our overall China policy. In his February 18 report to Congress on foreign policy, the President stated that we do not now wish to "isolate" mainland China but rather hope that in time it "will be ready to re-enter the international community," that we look forward to a "more normal and constructive relationship" with the Peking regime, that "the principles underlying our relations with China are similar to those governing our policies towards the U.S.S.R.," and that we will "take what steps we can toward improved practical relations with Peking." This is a very sound and very encouraging approach, in my opinion. Moreover, the limited steps we have taken recently to implement this approach—namely the liberalizing of passport and travel regulations and the reduction of trade restrictions, are highly desirable and deserve strong support. The Administration should now be urged to continue making further and more substantial steps along these same lines—for example, by removing all restrictions on nonstrategic trade with mainland China.

However, having said this, I must immediately go on to say that in my view, the deployment of an anti-Chinese ABM area defense would be extremely undesirable and would, in fact, run directly counter to, and tend to undercut, the basic objectives that underlie our new overall China policy.

Deployment of an anti-Chinese ABM would be both unwise and unsound, I believe, for a number of reasons. Let me sum-

marize these briefly now, and then proceed to elaborate on some of them at greater length.

(1) The ABM is not necessary for the defense of the U.S. against any foreseeable "Chinese threat." For the indefinite future, the U.S. will continue to have overwhelming nuclear superiority in relation to China, and there is every reason to believe that our superiority will operate effectively to deter the Chinese from any offensive nuclear actions or threats. It is not necessary, therefore, to try to achieve a total damage denial capability by building ABMs.

(2) If the U.S. insists on building an anti-Chinese ABM system, Peking will probably interpret this to mean (whatever Washington says to try to convince it otherwise) that we are determined to maintain an unrestricted capability of making "first strike" threats against China, and that we insist on denying China the ability to acquire even a limited, defensive, "second strike" capability. There is every reason to believe that this would tend to reinforce Peking's worst instincts in interpreting our motives and would work against the possibility of improving our relations.

(3) China's present opposition to all international arms control agreements is rooted, in part at least, in its basic sense of vulnerability and nuclear weakness. Peking obviously has been, and still is, fearful of threats by the superpowers and of U.S.-Soviet "collusion" directed against China. Until China achieves a minimal defensive deterrent itself, this situation is likely to continue. However, once the Chinese do acquire a limited "second strike" capability, it is at least conceivable that leaders in Peking may at that point be more inclined than at present to consider the advantages of arms control agreements in terms of their own interests. If so, the chances of inducing China to participate in arms control may increase at that point. An anti-Chinese ABM will probably work to postpone that day.

(4) For these and other reasons, the U.S. should itself forego building an anti-Chinese ABM area defense system, and in addition should attempt, at the SALT talks, to reach agreement with the Soviet Union that neither we nor they will build such systems. If, in the absence of such agreement, either or both proceed to deploy anti-Chinese systems, this will tend to reinforce Peking's fear of anti-Chinese collusion between Washington and Moscow, which at least would complicate, and could well seriously set back, the prospects for improving U.S. relations with China.

Let me now elaborate on some of these points, starting with a few comments on Chinese motivations, nuclear capabilities, and foreign policy behavior, and how one should view the "Chinese threat."

There is no doubt, I believe, that ever since 1949 the Chinese Communist regime, in its relations with the superpowers, has felt very vulnerable to external pressures and possible attack by one or both of the major nuclear powers. Particularly since the late 1950's—following the Sino-Soviet split and the start of U.S.-Soviet collaboration in the arms control field—Peking has felt itself to be, in a sense, "encircled" by the two superpowers. It is still, in a fundamental sense, weak and knows it; its basic posture in big power relations is, therefore, of necessity defensive.

One of China's basic aims has been, and still is, to acquire at least a minimal nuclear deterrent to improve its ability to deal with the U.S. and Soviet Union. Its hope is to achieve a position less unequal than in the past, and to strengthen its bargaining position and leverage in relations with the big powers. Above all, its aim is to deter attack against China and reduce China's vulnerability to external pressures. This is the basic military-strategic motivation behind its nuclear program.

Without attempting to summarize in detail the progress of China's nuclear program, let me say that while its technological progress has been impressive in many respects, its actual nuclear capabilities are very limited and will remain so for a long time to come—because of the relative weakness of China's resource base.

By the middle or latter 1970's China will, at best, have accumulated perhaps 15 to 40 operational ICBMs plus 100 to 200 MRBMs and a limited number of other bombs deliverable by aircraft. (The most recent Defense Department estimates suggest that by 1975 China may have 10 to 25 ICBMs and 80 to 100 MRBMs.)

To provide a crude basis of comparison, today, the U.S. and the Soviet Union each has over 1,000 ICBMs, plus many thousands of other nuclear weapons deliverable by a variety of sophisticated systems including missiles, airplanes, and submarines.

Projections of China's nuclear capabilities through the 1970's make several things clear. There is no possibility that in the foreseeable future Peking can aspire to parity with the U.S. and the Soviet Union in the nuclear field. The Chinese cannot come close to achieving a "first strike" capability against either of the superpowers. Under any conceivable circumstances, in the event of a Chinese attack, Washington or Moscow could retaliate massively. The question is whether—and if so, when, and with what consequences—China may be able to acquire a limited, defensive, "second strike" capability which will serve as a minimal deterrent for China—that is, a capacity, if subjected to U.S. or Soviet nuclear attack, to retaliate and hit at least some targets in the attacking country or, in the U.S. case, possibly American forces in the Pacific or bases in allied countries. To date, it has yet to achieve this.

If the U.S. and Soviet Union, forego building anti-Chinese ABM systems, they will, in effect, be accepting the fact that by the latter 1970's, China will have acquired a small defensive, "second strike" capability.

What risks or costs would this involve? It would require acceptance of the fact that the U.S., and the Soviet Union, cannot with impunity consider or threaten nuclear "first strikes" against China. One can question, however, whether this would involve high costs. The arguments and inhibitions against considering nuclear "first strikes" in most conceivable situations are already very great. (Conceivably, this may be less true for the Soviet Union, than for the U.S., as the vague hints about a possible preemptive strike in 1969 suggest, but even Moscow must feel strong inhibitions about initiating a nuclear "first strike.") Moreover, in most limited conflicts in Asia, nuclear weapons are likely to be almost irrelevant.

The possibility that key non-nuclear powers such as Japan, India, and Australia might feel more vulnerable and threatened cannot be ignored. If this impelled them to embark on independent nuclear programs, the cost in relation to U.S. aims (including the desire to prevent proliferation) would be substantial. Yet, as long as such countries have confidence in the U.S. commitment to defend them against nuclear threats, and as long as it is clear that American nuclear superiority in relation to China is such that any offensive nuclear threats by Peking would not really be credible, there is no reason why China's acquisition of a minimal deterrent should basically alter the position or the views of such countries.

It is sometimes argued that if the U.S. maintains a "first strike" capability against China and builds invulnerable defenses, presumably by development ABMs, the Japanese are likely to have greater confidence in our defense pledges. I believe that it is much more likely, however, that if the U.S. focuses on such a defense strategy, rather than relying on the continued applicability of mutual

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deterrence, the Japanese may conclude that the U.S. in a crisis condition might concern itself only with its own defense and abandon interest in allies not protected by such defenses.

The fact is that not only have the Chinese to date resisted whatever temptation they may have felt to engage in "bomb rattling," it is difficult to see how, from their position of nuclear inferiority, they will have any significant capacity for credible "nuclear blackmail" in the foreseeable future. Peking's cautious emphasis, to date, on defense as its sole aim in developing nuclear weapons suggests that Chinese leaders may already realize this.

Some might fear that once the Chinese believe they have acquired a credible deterrent, they might tend to become more aggressive in areas such as Southeast Asia, feeling that they could take more risks in non-nuclear or subnuclear situations, involving conventional weapons, because they would be less vulnerable to nuclear counter-threats. Whether one considers this to be a significant risk depends very much on one's general assessment of China's foreign policy goals, strategy, and behavior.

If one views China as a power committed to broad territorial aggression and expansionism by military means, willing to take large risks, and prone to irrational action (i.e., inclined to commit aggression without regard for possible consequences), there would be cause for major concern. However, among specialists on Chinese affairs, both in and out of the U.S. government, there appears to be a fairly broad consensus that analysis of China's behavior and doctrine over the past two decades does not support this view. In general, this consensus, which I believe is sound, maintains that:

Although China encourages revolutionaries abroad, it is not committed to broad territorial expansionism. Among its national goals is the recovery of certain areas that it considers to be lost territories, but even in regard to these territories its inclination is to pursue long-term, low-risk policies, not broad military expansionism.

It appears to be pre-disposed to keep Chinese military forces within China's boundaries, and it seems likely to continue doing so, except in cases where it feels Chinese security—or that of a Communist buffer state on its periphery—is seriously threatened (as it did in Korea).

Its primary stress, both in the structure of its conventional military forces and the doctrine governing their use, is on defense rather than offense.

It cannot and does not ignore the possible risks and costs of large-scale conventional war, even when nuclear weapons are not involved, and it places a high priority on the desirability of avoiding large-scale war of any sort with the major powers.

It is strongly pre-disposed, in general, to low-cost, low-risk policies. While it clearly encourages and supports revolutionary struggles in other countries, such support does not include Chinese manpower on any significant scale. Even Maoist doctrine insists that all revolutionaries must be "self-reliant," and should depend primarily on indigenous resources; it opposes the use of Chinese forces to fight other revolutionaries' battles for them.

China has used pressures and probes against its neighbors for a variety of purposes, but in doing so its use of force has generally been carefully calculated, limited, and controlled.

In crisis situations, it has tended to act with considerable prudence and caution, and repeatedly it has moved to check escalation when there has appeared to be a serious risk of major conflict.

There is, of course, no absolute guarantee that these patterns of behavior, which seem to have characterized Chinese actions over

the past two decades, will persist in the future. Nevertheless, there is a remarkably broad consensus among China specialists that they are likely to continue. In fact, there is a fairly widely-held view—a view that I share—that post-Mao leaders are likely to be more pragmatic and realistic than Mao, and subject to even greater internal as well as external constraints.

As a result of the internal disruptions caused by the Cultural Revolution in China during the past four years, the Peking regime has clearly been weakened in some respects. Consequently, there are now new constraints, in fact if not in theory, on Chinese policy, which will certainly affect its strategies abroad.

Moreover, as a result of the steady deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations in the 1960's, the "Russian threat" appears to have replaced the "U.S. threat" as Peking's major foreign policy preoccupation, and this seems to have impelled the Chinese leadership to consider new options and strategies, to reduce China's present isolation and vulnerability and explore new opportunities for maneuver and flexibility.

It is at least plausible to believe, therefore, that future Chinese leaders may downgrade the importance of revolutionary aims (not ending, but possibly deemphasizing, Chinese activity in this field) and upgrade the importance of state-to-state relationships and more conventional political and economic instruments of policy. There is remarkably little support among China specialists for the idea that China is now, or is likely to be in the future, prone to act in an irrational or highly reckless manner, which it would certainly be doing if it were to ignore the continuing fact of its nuclear inferiority, and its vulnerability to both conventional and nuclear retaliation, even if, and when, it acquires a minimal deterrent.

If these judgments are correct, there are strong reasons to assume that once China achieves a nuclear deterrent it can be expected, in a basic sense, to act much as the other nuclear powers have, and to be constrained, as they are, by the realities of nuclear deterrence. There is little basis for arguing that the U.S., or Soviet Union, can feel secure vis-à-vis China only if they have a total damage denial capability and an unquestionable ability to threaten China with a "first strike". To argue this is to argue, in effect, that the U.S. and the Soviet Union can only feel secure under conditions that guarantee that the Chinese will continue to feel highly insecure.

As I stated earlier, if the U.S. operates on other assumptions and proceeds to build an anti-Chinese ABM, this will not only tend to strengthen Chinese suspicions that we are determined to maintain a potentially threatening "first strike" capability against China and to deny China even a minimal defensive "second strike" capability, it will also tend to postpone the day when China may be willing to consider participating in international arms control agreements.

Fundamental change in China's posture on strategic and nuclear arms control issues will not be easy for Peking to make, under any circumstances, because of China's basic weakness relative to the two superpowers. However, if one asks when and under what conditions a more flexible and pragmatic leadership in China might be inclined to change its posture on arms control, and even begin to see arms control measures as in the interest of China as well as of the other powers, the answer would seem to be the following: When China is convinced that its own nuclear development has reached a stage where it has at least a minimal credible nuclear deterrent—that is, some kind of defensive "second strike" retaliatory capacity—so that it will be able to deal with the U.S. and Soviet Union on terms less unequal than at present.

It is not easy to define when this point will be reached. But it will doubtless be reached eventually, whether or not we build an anti-Chinese ABM. It is almost certain that in time the Chinese will have acquired a sufficient nuclear capability so that no one could be sure whether, if China were subjected to a "first strike", it could not mount a significant retaliatory strike, at least against allies or forces in the Pacific if not against the U.S. itself.

Whenever the Chinese, and we, are convinced that China has acquired some sort of limited "second strike" capability, the possibility that Peking may reconsider its present blanket opposition to arms control may increase, for a variety of reasons. The realization that pursuit of parity is a will-o-the-wisp is likely to begin to sink in, in China. Moreover, once China has acquired any sort of credible deterrent, some Chinese leaders may conclude that it is more feasible to try to reduce the gap between China and the superpowers through agreements limiting (or reducing) U.S. and Soviet capabilities than by trying to catch up in a hopeless race. And, as the cost of deterrence goes up (it inevitably must, as China gets involved in more sophisticated hardware), and as the competition for resources in China increases (between those stressing economic development and those emphasizing defense), there may be greater pressures within China, on economic grounds, to limit investment in strategic arms development.

The construction of anti-Chinese ABM systems would be likely, therefore, to postpone the day when there may be some realistic hope of including China in international arms control. It would tend to raise the level of nuclear development which Peking's leaders will consider essential as a minimum goal. And in general it will tend to make more remote the possibility of establishing a "more normal and constructive relationship" with China and the possibility of inducing Peking to "re-enter the international community"—which are now our stated, and in my opinion eminently sensible, goals.

What does all of this suggest regarding the decisions we should make and the policies we should pursue regarding an anti-Chinese ABM system—both in our own consideration of the problem and in discussions with the Russians at Vienna?

I strongly believe we should clearly decide that, in terms of our broad national interests and aims, we should not build an anti-Chinese ABM system, because it conflicts with the main thrust of our new China policy and is unnecessary for our defense—wholly apart from other possible reasons. The cost of such a system would certainly be in its disfavor, too, but clearly the costs would be tolerable if it were essential in terms of our defense and foreign policy goals. The point is that it is not only unessential, but would tend to be damaging in terms of our overall objectives.

We should not only make this decision ourselves; we should also in the SALT talks attempt to reach agreement with the Soviets on this issue, so that both we and they will forego traveling this road. This would be desirable in relation both to our aims regarding China and our desire to check the U.S.-Soviet arms race.

Both the U.S. and the Soviet Union must concern themselves, more than they have in the past, not only with the problem of strategic stability in their bilateral relations but also with the task of inducing China, over time, to improve relations in general and, eventually, to participate in arms control efforts and accommodate more fully than it has to date to the requirements of the nuclear age. Neither need fear that the Chinese will be able to achieve a "first strike" capability, or approach nuclear parity, in the foreseeable future. Nor should they consider China's eventual acquisition of a minimal

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deterrent to be a special danger. While it is true that China's acquisition of a credible deterrent will improve Peking's defensive capabilities, it will not significantly alter the overall nuclear balance. Moreover, China can be expected to act much as other nuclear powers have, and to be constrained, as others are, by the realities of mutual deterrence. Equally important, when China achieves a credible deterrent, Peking's leaders may be more inclined than at present to reassess their strategic policies and consider the value of arms control.

The hope should be that Moscow as well as Washington will see the importance of this. But even if Moscow does not, the U.S. in shaping its own strategic and arms control policies, should take the "China problem," as well as the problem of U.S.-Soviet bilateral relations, fully into account.

## CHINA AND U.S. POLICY: A TIME OF TRANSITION

(A. Doak Barnett's speech at the Women's National Democratic Club on Mar. 2, 1970)

I'm delighted to be with you and to talk with you briefly today about trends in China, as I see them, and in U.S.-Chinese relations. For the first time in quite a long time, there is something to talk about. For a good many years, this has been a rather gloomy subject to discuss—and I have discussed it for a good many years—not because relations between the two countries have been so bad, but also because there has been so little seeming prospect of any change or improvement.

During the past few months, this has begun to change, and although there is certainly no basis yet for great optimism or enthusiasm about the prospects, there are at least some rays of hope and small signs of a possible thaw, and this makes the subject of U.S.-China relations much more interesting, and more timely and encouraging, than it has been for some years.

I think it is clear, in fact, that we are now in a transition period; and although no one, certainly not I, can really predict or foresee the future, the future definitely seems more open-ended than it has been for a very long time.

China itself is in the midst of an extremely important transition period. Its situation both at home and abroad is basically different in many respects than what it has been in the past. But the U.S., too, is in the midst of a transition in its policy towards Asia as a whole and in its policy and attitude toward China specifically, so that China's changing situation and our changing attitude and policy have introduced, it seems to me, new elements of flexibility and change into a situation that has been frozen for so many years.

Now let me begin with a few comments on changes that have been taking place or are now underway in China itself, because they are an extremely important ingredient in the situation. I obviously cannot, in a very few minutes, do justice to the extremely complicated and even traumatic events that have taken place in China in the five years since the so-called Cultural Revolution began in '65.

The Cultural Revolution has been a remarkable, and in some respects a unique, historical phenomenon. In essence, it has been a struggle in which an aging and extraordinary utopian revolutionary leader lost faith in, and actually lost control over, for a while, the revolutionary regime which he had created; and then set about organizing what, in effect has been a second revolution.

Mao in the early '60s no longer had day-to-day control over the Communist Party which ran China, so he turned to the Army, or at least part of the Army under Lin Biao who was Defense Minister, and to the youth of the country, particularly youth in the schools and colleges and mobilized both to

attack the majority of his old revolutionary colleagues and the entire Party and Government bureaucracy which had dominated the country for fifteen years.

In a basic sense Mao had real cause to be disturbed by trends in China in the early 1960s. There was in China, in the aftermath the great leap forward and the economic depression which followed it a definite decline in ideological fervor and morale; a real growth of deadening, ossifying bureaucratic behavior; an emergence of vested interests and parochial interests; a growing and very serious generation gap; and increasing frustration and disillusionment among the youth.

In response to these trends and to the real economic crisis which China experienced in that period, the leaders in charge of day-to-day affairs in China did appear to become less and less revolutionary; more and more pragmatic, if you will—in Mao's terms revisionist—more and more like leaders in the Soviet Union.

And it was in this context, I think, that Mao decided that he was going to make one final, apocalyptic attempt to try to halt the decline and deterioration of the revolution, as he saw it, in China and try somehow to revitalize the revolutionary process, to try, in short, to ensure that the particular brand of values that he believes in would persist after he died.

In some respects this was a rather grand idea, a heroic revolutionary effort. The fact is, however, in my view at least, that Mao was a romantic, a Utopian, in thinking that he could do this, that he could impose his views on the country, and completely unrealistic in believing that he could achieve his aim, that he could perpetuate his values, by tearing down the bureaucratic structure of the regime that had been built up in the previous fifteen years; by setting loose chaotic forces for change and conflict.

He did set loose these forces. He was able to tear down, in a large degree, the bureaucratic structure that had grown up in the previous fifteen years. He was able to purge most of those who disagreed with him at the top in China. But he was not able—he has not been able to date, and will not be able—suddenly to replace all this and create a new order based on his particular values.

Consequently, after this long and very chaotic period in China, China is now in the process, slowly and painfully, of trying to rebuild its political system, trying to define a whole new set of policies. In this situation, the Chinese leadership is very different from what it was in the decade before 1965, certainly very different from what it was in the 50s. Even though Mao's brooding presence is still there and he is able to inject himself into the situation when he wants to, he does not have real control over the situation in China; and the leadership, I would say, is basically a coalitional type of leadership in which people representing interests of very conflicting sorts are somehow trying to get along, somehow trying to run the country, somehow trying to evolve new policies.

As a consequence, the regime has had a very difficult time defining clear policies. As a matter of fact, it seems to me, if one looks back to the Party Congress last spring, the most notable thing about it was the failure to announce any real strategies and policies, and in my opinion this lack of policy has continued throughout the past year (it is now almost a year since the Party Congress).

In a sense, the atmosphere in China is almost like that of an interregnum already, even though Mao is still there. Clearly the Maoist era is approaching its end, but the post-Mao era has not yet started. And in a basic sense, one gets the sense of a country waiting for its old revolutionary leader to pass from the scene. Mao and his closest followers still do press for revolutionary policies of a variety of sorts, but they are not really able to carry them out throughout the coun-

try effectively. Others resist, drag their feet, sometimes push in other directions. And yet, until Mao does pass from the scene, those who might favor quite different policies, less Utopian policies, are inhibited from really pressing for what they believe in, because Mao's prestige is such that they cannot.

As a result of what has happened, the power structure in the country has changed to a very great extent. For one thing, power in a de facto sense has been decentralized very substantially. Peking just does not have the capability now to try to manage and direct everything from the center as it did ten years ago. Instead it is local leaders, military and other leaders in the provinces and at lower levels, who are running China in many, many respects.

Furthermore, it is not the party—and this is unparalleled in any Communist country—it is not the party which is running the country really now; it is the Army. Into the vacuum that was created by the Cultural Revolution, the Army had to step in. It was the only really centralized instrument of power left in the country, and it has stepped in; from the center right down to the local level the Army and military people are performing functions the party used to perform.

The party and government are now in the process of being reconstructed after the events of '67 and '68, but it is very slow, very painful, and there are many kinds of local conflicts, as the people involved try to decide what kind of a party it will be and who will be members of it.

When Mao dies, there will clearly be another period of uncertainty, some confusion and perhaps a power struggle. My own guess, though, is that somehow a coalitional type of leadership will be put together, a collective type of leadership. It will hold the country together. It is likely, in my view, to move in some new directions. As a matter of fact, I think it is highly probable that post-Mao leadership will move almost precisely in the directions that Mao has feared: it will move away from the idea of great, Utopian, apocalyptic, grand strategies; away from the radical revolutionary policies that Mao has tried to promote the last few years. Of necessity, I think it will move toward a somewhat more realistic, pragmatic policy designed simply to cope with the immediate and very pressing problems that the country faces and will face. There will be concern about the need to restore a larger degree of order, a larger degree of unity, a larger degree of purpose, to get the country back on the course of rational development. I believe China will move in these directions over time.

China's international position has also undergone some very great changes in the same period. The Chinese encountered a series of rather dramatic set-backs in their foreign policy in 1965, just on the eve of the Cultural Revolution: the coup in Indonesia—the Chinese had put a great deal of stock in their relations with Indonesia and the possibility of a revolution there—the failure of the attempt to hold a second Bandung Conference at Algiers that year—in which the Chinese invested a great deal of political prestige—and others. Then came the Cultural Revolution.

Although the Chinese adopted, and continued to exhibit a very militant, verbal posture, favoring revolutions all over the world, in practice they became so preoccupied with their internal problems that they virtually abandoned normal foreign policy activities abroad. For a couple of years, I think it is fair to say, China had no real foreign policy—it turned inward, and cut many of its external ties.

One indicator of this is the fact that at the height of the Cultural Revolution, in forty-odd embassies abroad China only had one ambassador. The rest had all been called home in connection with the Cultural Revolution. This situation started to change as the Cultural Revolution itself began to grind

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towards a halt in late '68 and early '69. Peking then began to look cautiously outward again; it began to renew its foreign policy activities abroad.

Last spring it sent back the first group of seventeen or so ambassadors. Possibly two or three may have gone subsequently. All of these, incidentally, have been professional diplomats, not Maoist ideologues. Subsequently, it has promoted trade in a very systematic and non-ideological way, and it has entered into negotiations with a number of countries about the possibility of establishing relations—Canadians and Italians. It has also entered into negotiations with the Russians over border problems, and most recently has agreed to renew negotiations with us.

Looking at what has happened to China's foreign relations through this period, I think the most important and most dramatic change has been in China's relationship with the Soviet Union, as a result of the Sino-Soviet conflict. This conflict, as I am sure you know, has been developing for years, from the late '50s on and has escalated step by step over the years.

The Soviet military build-up around China has been steadily increasing since about 1965, certainly since 1967. And finally, last year as you know, there were some very important and dangerous border clashes between the Russians and the Chinese in Manchuria and in Sinkiang, on the Chinese-Russian border there. I think it is clear that by last year the Chinese genuinely feared the possibility of a major war with the Soviet Union, genuinely feared Soviet attack, and were forced to the conference table by some subtle and not-so-subtle Soviet threats. They have been talking in Peking since last fall, but there is little sign—in fact, no sign—that the negotiations have accomplished anything to date and I suspect that progress will, at best, be very slow.

The sequence of events, I think, clearly has led the Chinese to regard the Soviet Union as a more immediate and more real threat to Chinese security today than the U.S., and this is a very fundamental change. The danger of a Sino-Soviet war is now Peking's single most important preoccupation in foreign policy, in my view, and within China there is a wide range of programs going on right now that are said to be, and to an extent doubtless are, preparations for the possibility of war. This threat hanging over China has been a subtle factor influencing its foreign relations with almost everyone else, including ourselves.

So there are number of major factors that have been impelling Peking to reexamine its policy: the situation at home, one of uncertainty and considerable fluidity; the need to rebuild a foreign policy, after a period in which they had almost no foreign policy and were very isolated, during the Cultural Revolution; the pressure of professionals concerned with foreign affairs, and certain other leaders in Peking, to have a degree of flexibility in rebuilding China's foreign policy; a new sense of threat from the Soviet Union, which I would say is probably the most important factor; and a feeling, which I think is valid and is shared by most of the powers concerned with Asia, that the situation in Asia is changing, that it is developing toward a much more multi-polar situation than in the past, a situation in which there will be more opportunities for maneuver and flexibility, and more necessary for it.

So this is the context in which China has begun to show some signs of increased flexibility. It is still groping. It certainly has not yet defined any clear new foreign policy or foreign policy strategy, but it is groping for new policies, as we on our side are doing.

These are, in very crude and simple terms, some of the facts that have been influencing the other side. The U.S. has also, I think, been undergoing an extremely significant

transition in our attitude towards China. This has happened fairly gradually and in some respects undramatically—so much so that many Americans don't realize how much change has taken place.

Throughout the 1950s, U.S. attitudes and policies towards China were extremely hostile and fearful. We were committed not only to contain China, but also to isolate it, to keep it out of the international community, and to exert as much pressure on China as possible, in the hope that somehow the regime would change. I believe change in our attitudes began in the U.S. government as early as the Kennedy administration, but Kennedy was not able, or did not in any case take steps to change our policies.

During the Johnson administration there were some important steps, more important than many people realize, to redefine our broad posture toward China. At one point, in one very important speech, for example, Johnson actually called for "reconciliation" between the U.S. and China, a very different stance from that we had been committed to in the '50s. But during the Johnson administration there were few concrete steps taken to translate this change of posture into change of actual policy toward China.

The process of making real policy changes began last summer under the Nixon Republican administration.

Several factors help to explain this process of change, I think. One is just a gradual cooling, that time has brought about, in the emotions of the 1950s—which reached a peak in the mid '50s as a result of the Cold War, in general, and the Korean War, in particular.

A second factor has been a revised view of China and its potential threat. This is in part because of the Sino-Soviet split. It is obviously not true that China and the Soviet Union are today a cohesive, monolithic unit working against us. They are competing against each other as well as competing against us.

There are other factors too. Observation of Chinese foreign policy behavior over twenty years has indicated to people in and out of the U.S. government, who have studied Chinese affairs, that the Chinese have not been adventurous and irrational. They have, in fact, been prudent and very cautious in situations where there has been crisis and danger.

As a consequence, I think, in 1970 the "China threat" seems quite different from what it was in the '50s; and validly so, I would say. Today there is simply not the sense of China posing a great, overriding threat to us, or to the rest of Asia, that many Americans tended to feel in an earlier period.

For these and other reasons, Nixon decided fairly early in his administration that he was going to take—or approve—some small concrete policy changes, and he started last summer. You are all aware of them, I think, but to remind you, in the middle of last summer we liberalized travel restrictions as far as China was concerned, and opened the first crack in the twenty-year total embargo that we had imposed on China trade—first by allowing tourists to buy Chinese goods in Hong Kong; then last December we took what was still a small, largely symbolic step but it is nevertheless significant—we decided to allow American subsidiaries abroad to trade with Communist China. Significantly, there has been almost no criticism in Congress; or by the public of these steps; that is a sign, I think, of the basic change that has occurred in public attitudes.

I have no doubt, myself, that these are just the first steps in a new direction, and are not the end of it. I would expect, in the relatively near future, some further steps, probably in the trade field—perhaps steps to open up some direct trade between the U.S. and China.

Then early this year, we and the Chinese finally agreed to sit down at Warsaw and reopen the talks that had lapsed for almost two years, and we have now had two sessions in rapid succession. I do not know what took place at either of these meetings. I am quite impressed, in fact, by how well the people in the State Department as well as the Chinese are observing their agreement not to leak what is going on. I find this encouraging; it suggests both sides are looking at these talks as serious negotiations and are not just viewing them as propaganda gambits.

But there are hints, I think, that the U.S. Government is encouraged by the meetings, and personally I think it is very possible that they will produce some results.

Having said that, let me say that in my opinion one should not have unrealistic hopes about large changes in our China relations rapidly developing out of these talks or other trends. The legacy of twenty years of almost no contact, and of intense hostility, certainly is not going to disappear overnight. At best, steps towards normalization of relations are going to be slow, and take time.

But I nevertheless think that it is extremely encouraging that the U.S. has adopted the stand that it has, and that the Chinese are showing at least a hint of flexibility. The present administration has said that we will work towards a normalization of relations with China; that we will deal with China on the basis of the same principles that underlie our dealings with the Soviet Union—this is a big change from our approach in the past—and that we will focus first of all on small steps that will improve practical relations. I think this is an entirely sound, desirable posture and a desirable general direction for us to move.

There are, of course, some very large obstacles down the road, if we find it possible to move down this road, before we get to the point of any real normalization of relations. Probably the crucial one, and the most difficult one, is Taiwan. We are committed to the defense of Taiwan against any military attack. It is clear that we will, and should, maintain this commitment. The Chinese Communists are committed to the ultimate liberation, recovery, and incorporation of Taiwan into China. It is clear that they will maintain this as an objective. So it is a major problem. Conceivably, though both sides might show some tactical flexibility about it. It is clear that neither can change its basic position in the years immediately ahead. The question that we will face as we go down the road of some mutual compromise is whether the Taiwan issue can, for a while, be finessed, can in effect be put aside while we and the Chinese Communists deal with other problems and hope that we can make some progress on them.

In the 1950s, Peking was willing to do this, and looking back it is clear that it was rigidity and inflexibility on our side that prevented some mutual accommodation in the latter 1950s. For the past decade, however, Peking has had a very rigid and inflexible view. The question is whether the Chinese will now be slightly flexible; I think we are now encouragingly flexible. I am hopeful that perhaps both sides will be. On the U.S. side, though, I think it is terribly important that we not stop with the two or three important, but essentially symbolic and no very large, steps we have taken in adjusting our policy, but continue taking a number of other steps.

On some matters, we may well find it possible to reach agreement with the Chinese at Warsaw; on others, though, I think we ought to be prepared to continue taking unilateral steps on our side, on the assumption, and in the hope, that over time this will influence Peking, and will stimulate Peking to take responsive action, even perhaps parallel action.



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There are many things that I think we still need to do. We should not stop, and be pleased with ourselves, because of the small progress we have made. We should continue exploring every possible avenue for increased contacts. On this, incidentally, the most practical approach would be: instead of putting primary stress on trying to get Americans into China, we should take every opportunity to invite Chinese to come to meetings and conferences in this country. This is going on; the U.S. government is for it. We ought to keep doing it until the Chinese begin to send a few people; then I think they will reciprocate and let some Americans visit China.

In trade, I think it is clear—I am convinced most people in the U.S. Government believe this now—we should move to remove all restrictions on nonstrategic trade with China and put China trade on precisely the same basis as trade with the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries. There is every reason to do this; and no real reason not to do it.

Before very long we must also readjust our policy on the China seat in the U.N. This is a terribly complicated subject, and I cannot deal with it adequately now. My own preference, considering the various alternatives, is for us actively to explore some formula for "dual representation"; even though Peking and Taipei both disapprove of this. I am not convinced that it is not possible to work out some formula which ultimately they might be willing to accept.

We must also show greater sensitivity than we have in the past to China's military and strategic fears, and avoid all unnecessary military pressures and provocations. To cite one example, we obviously do not send airplanes on reconnaissance missions over the Soviet Union any more; we rely on satellites. But, out of Taiwan, there are still such flights over mainland China all the time. It seems to me that we should rely on satellites for intelligence about China, as we do about the Soviet Union and avoid this kind of very provocative action.

Even in regard to Taiwan, while maintaining our defense commitment regarding Taiwan—which we can and must—I think we can and should make some adjustments in our policy. We have already made one, incidentally, which has practically escaped notice. We have virtually abandoned active patrolling in the Taiwan Strait. We do not need the patrol in the Taiwan Strait. What we need is the Seventh Fleet and our Polaris Fleet in Asia; we do not need to have ships touring up and down the China coast. We have virtually stopped doing this, and I think this is both significant and desirable.

However, we should also commit ourselves to remove the limited American military presence on Taiwan, after Vietnam if not before—but preferably before, if we can. We do not have a large presence there. It is mainly connected with one air base which serves as a refueling station for U.S. planes going to Vietnam. But this is something that certainly is of concern to the Chinese Communists, and something we could do without reducing our capacity to fulfill our commitment to Taiwan—and something I think would be desirable.

More broadly—and this is very important—we should take the problem of China policy fully into account in our general strategic and arms control policy; this, I would say, we have not done. The key immediate issue is whether we should build an anti-Chinese ABM—a nationwide light area defense. On this the Nixon administration, in my judgment—despite the rightness of the direction of its general China policy—is quite wrong. The arguments against an anti-Chinese ABM, on political and other grounds, wholly apart from technical grounds, are overwhelming in my view.

For the indefinite future we will have absolute, unquestioned, overwhelming nuclear superiority over China—on the basis of any projection of what the Chinese may be able to do. There is no reason not to proceed on the assumption that our present deterrent against China will be wholly effective in preventing China from even considering any offensive use of nuclear weapons against either us or our allies.

Actually, there is every reason to believe that China's main strategic motive in developing nuclear weapons is to try to acquire a limited defensive second-strike capability. That is all they can hope for. They hope to deter us from considering nuclear first-strikes against China. If we insist on building an anti-Chinese ABM, in effect what we will be saying to the Chinese is that we insist on having a total, continuing, one-sided superiority; that we insist on having a total damage-denial capability against China; that we insist on having a credible first-strike capability against China; and that we insist on having the option of threatening China, without any fear of any kind of a retaliation, for the indefinite future.

This is hardly likely, I think, to be reassuring to the Chinese about our intentions. I would argue that it runs directly counter to the main thrust of our new China policy, and that is, moreover, not necessary from any security point of view. We need, therefore, to make our strategic policy and our China policy more consistent than they now are.

I would argue, therefore, that on this issue, at Vienna, when we meet with the Russians in the SALT talks, our aim should not be to get Soviet and U.S. agreement to build ABMs. We should get U.S. and Soviet agreement that neither of us will build anti-China ABMs.

Let me make just one final comment about the overall Asian context of our China policy in the '70s. On many respects there is going to be a new ball-game in the '70s; we are beginning to realize this but have not fully adjusted to it. Instead of bi-polar confrontation between two ideologically motivated sides—a theoretically monolithic Sino-Soviet block versus a U.S. with a subordinate, compliant Japan—instead of this, there is going to be an increasingly complicated four-power relationship and four-power balance.

All four of the major powers involved in the region—the U.S., Soviet Union, China and Japan—are going to play significant roles, influential roles. All of them, including Japan, I would say, are going to play fairly independent and autonomous roles.

Of the six bi-lateral relationships involved in this four-power balance, it is clear that the one today that is least developed, and yet may have the greatest potentialities for at least some change in the years immediately ahead, is the U.S.-China relationship. If we are wise, we will take the opportunity that we have now to press ahead as much as we can to see what extent we are able, as the Nixon administration has proposed to move toward a normalization of relations with China—without any unrealistic wishful thinking or overoptimistic expectations, but with some basis for the first time in twenty years for believing that some change may be possible.

#### LOWERING OF VOTING AGE

Mr. SMITH of Illinois. Mr. President, the Senate has taken what is, to my mind, unduly hasty action in moving to lower the voting age to 18 in all elections by mere congressional fiat.

I hasten to assure Senators that I am not opposed to extending the franchise to American citizens below the age of 21. I am, however, seriously concerned about

how we reform our political institutions. The Constitution implies and it has been traditionally accepted, that elector qualifications are within the provinces of the several States. Four States have already set the voting age below 21.

I am a cosponsor of Senate Joint Resolution 147, which would lower the voting age by constitutional amendment. This approach provides for review, in the ratification process, by the States without affecting, one way or the other, a State's right to lower the voting age if that is the desire of its citizens. The Senate's action ignores and preempts the rights of the States to determine the age at which its citizens shall vote.

Another aspect of a lower voting age which has been ignored by the Senate's action is the whole question of the rights and responsibilities of full citizenship. Citizenship for an adult American affects more areas than the responsibility of casting a ballot.

In most States a minor cannot sign a binding contract, but must have an adult cosigner to an apartment lease or to finance an automobile.

The age at which a man or woman may marry without parental consent differs from State to State and is frequently different for men and women within the same State.

A guardian or trustee must be named in many States for any person under 21 who inherits property.

The lists of prospective jurors are drawn from the voter rolls. By extending the franchise, we may be automatically extending the privilege and responsibility of jury duty from age 21 to age 18.

I do not intend to suggest that any of these additional rights and responsibilities of full, adult citizenship should not be extended below the age of 21. I do, however, suggest that these equally important rights and responsibilities should be considered by the States when they act to lower the voting age or when they consider ratification of a constitutional amendment to lower the voting age.

These corollary rights and responsibilities of adult citizenship should not be ignored when considering the voting age, any more than the rights and responsibilities of the States to establish the voting age should be ignored as the Senate has done by its action on the Voting Rights Act.

The Chicago Tribune and the Illinois State Journal have published excellent editorials on the question of lowering the voting age by the means the Senate has elected to use. I ask unanimous consent they be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the editorials were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

[From the Springfield (Ill.) State Journal, Mar. 18, 1970]

#### SOUR LEGISLATION: LOWERING OF VOTING AGE

At the moment the United States Senate appears to be content with its 64-to-17 vote passage of the Voting Rights Bill, amended to permit 18-year-old Americans to participate in elections.

The passage of time might give those who

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voted for the measure some sobering second thoughts. Senators, even more than the lay public, should be well aware that the voting rights extension it approved simply is sour legislation.

There are two troublesome aspects.

As the United States of America pursues its fight to guarantee all citizens equality of opportunity, it should not itself project the image of discriminating against its citizens or states.

Yet the Voting Rights Act does discriminate by singling out a handful of states for the focus of federal efforts when the problem is acknowledged to exist in all of them. It supports its actions on data that in some instances are six years old. The danger is that the measure can divide instead of unite Americans.

Secondly, and perhaps of more immediate concern, was the Senate's willingness to tamper with the heart of the mechanisms that make our republic what it is—constitutional authority that relates to the separation of powers.

A constitutional method was available to the Senate to lower the franchise age through the regular procedures for amending our basic law.

Instead of using it, the Senate chose, against the advice of the attorney general and its own constitutional students—to attempt to interpret the Constitution on its own.

There is a disturbing thought that the leadership of the Senate and a majority of its members bow to highly emotional pressures of the moment.

That would, of course be too strong a conclusion to draw from an isolated example. As important as it is. Unfortunately, there is considerable other evidence.

The leading example is the effort of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in recent years to establish our foreign policy. Another is the Senate's willingness to advise at great length in respect to the political philosophy that the administration's nominee for the Supreme Court should have, but decline consent on the basis of judicial qualifications.

Or consider for a moment the proposal by Sen. J. William Fulbright that the Senate should declare any United States military activity in Laos "unconstitutional." The constitution does not contemplate that Congress also should double as the judicial branch of government.

One of the great values of our constitutional process is that it deliberately discourages haste and whimsy, opting instead for the slower approach that benefits from national debate and due process of law.

[From the Chicago (Ill.) Tribune.

Mar. 16, 1970]

#### THE VOTING AGE IS A STATE MATTER

The United States Senate, by a vote of 64 to 17, has approved an amendment to the voting rights bill which would lower the voting age to 18 in all elections, federal, state, and local.

Even the author of this proposal, Sen. Mike Mansfield (D. Mont.), the majority leader, implicitly acknowledged that its constitutionality is doubtful. He said he favored continued work by a Senate subcommittee on a proposed constitutional amendment to lower the voting age. This alternative will be available if the House refuses to accept the Senate amendment or if it is enacted and later held unconstitutional by the courts.

A number of senators challenged the Mansfield amendment on constitutional grounds, but the majority apparently was more concerned about the possibility of offending 13 million potential new voters than about the violence it might do the Constitution or what is left of the federal principle in our system of government.

We favor reduction of the minimum voting age to 18, but we believe this is a matter for state action. Kentucky and Georgia already have lowered the minimum to 18; Alaska has lowered it to 19, and Hawaii has lowered it to 20. No federal action is required, but if it is desired a constitutional amendment is the procedure prescribed by the Constitution itself.

The 15th amendment was adopted to give Negroes the vote, the 19th to give women the vote, and the 24th to abolish poll taxes. Altho constitutional amendments were deemed necessary in all these cases, the United States Senate now proposes to ignore the Constitution in respect to federal legislation to lower the voting age.

The Constitution is explicit. It provides that electors of senators and members of the House of Representatives from each state "shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the state legislature." For the election of the President and Vice President, the Constitution provides that "each state shall appoint, in such manner as the legislature thereof may direct," as many electors as it has senators and representatives in Congress.

Clearly then the states, and not Congress, are empowered by the Constitution to prescribe qualifications for voting. Supporters of the Mansfield amendment relied upon the specious argument that the 14th amendment guarantees, among other things, "the equal protection of the laws" for all citizens, and authorizes Congress to enforce its provisions by "appropriate legislation." Under this authority, Congress, in the voting rights act of 1965, denied states the right to require literacy tests in English for persons who have completed the sixth grade in another language. The Supreme court, in *Akzenbach versus Morgan*, upheld this section of the act as applied to a New York statute which excluded Puerto Ricans, illiterate in English, from the franchise.

This law, however, was a determination by Congress that English literacy tests deny "the equal protection of the laws" to citizens who are literate in another language. It does not follow from the Supreme court's decision that a state law classifying citizens by age for voting purposes is discriminatory. If that were the case any qualification whatsoever would be discriminatory, for some could vote and others could not.

A dissenting opinion by Justice John M. Harlan, who was joined by Justice Potter Stewart, upheld New York's literacy test law. It said the act of Congress could not be sustained "except at the sacrifice of fundamentals in the American constitutional system—the separation between the legislative and judicial function and the boundaries between federal and state political authority." An attempt by Congress to usurp the right of the states to determine the minimum age for voting would do far greater violence to the constitutional system.

#### OVERPOPULATION AND POLLUTION

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. President, as we move into the last third of the 20th century, it has become dramatically clear that the danger we face from the destruction of the habitat and life support systems of man by overpopulation and pollution of all kinds is as great as that from nuclear holocaust.

The danger involved in the technology of progress and abundance was evident in the development of DDT and other long-lasting pesticides which proved extremely effective for fighting crop pests and diseases, but also proved to have other unwanted and deadly impact on

other parts of the environment by spreading through the soil and waters and into the air to the farthest reaches of the world.

Polluted air and waters damage the quality of the present and destroy the promise of the future. We face the possibility of being inundated with the bottles, cans, jars, and other packaging cast-offs of a consumer society.

But recognition of the problem has begun to grow. Yesterday, April 22, was Earth Day, and its celebrations and observances did much to build greater awareness of the need to carve out new priorities dedicated to humanity, livability and quality, rather than just more progress, bigness and abundance.

Kenneth E. Boulding, professor of economics and director of social and economic research for the Institute of Behavioral Science at the University of Colorado, in the April 1970 issue of the *Progressive* magazine which is devoted entirely to environmental articles, calls for a nonpolitical systems approach to the problems of the environment. He says:

We need a new image of the total dynamics of the social system more realistic than those provided by ideologies either of the right or of the left.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that this fine article, entitled "No Second Chance for Man," which outlines the framework within which efforts to improve the environment must take place, be printed in the Record.

NO SECOND CHANCE FOR MAN

(By Kenneth E. Boulding)

One of the agreeable things about the young of any generation is that they tend to think that they invented the world, and it is this indeed that keeps the world fresh. It is likewise a strong sign of being over sixty that one points out, much to the distress of the young, that a great deal of what is happening has happened before. The current excitement about the environment in particular is at least the third peak of interest in this particular issue in this century.

Excitement about the environment seems to have a generation cycle of some thirty years. The first major peak in this country was at the turn of the century, associated particularly with Governor Gifford Pinchot, America's first professional forester, Theodore Roosevelt, and the first conservation movement, which gave us the Bureau of Reclamation and expanded the National Park and Forest System. The second peak was in the 1930s, with the dust bowl and the great dust storm of 1934, in which noticeable portions of the Great Plains landed on the steps of the Capitol in Washington, and this produced the Soil Conservation Act, contour plowing, and all that.

It is not wholly surprising, therefore, that another generation has discovered that the world is not wholly indestructible. Now it is perhaps air rather than soil, and cities rather than forests, which have created the anxiety, but the anxiety is of course quite legitimate. There is nothing in the proposition that something has happened before to argue against its happening now. It is possible, however, to get a certain perspective on what is happening now, and perhaps also to avoid certain mistakes, if we see it as part of the much larger process.

We probably know more about the economics of the environment, surprisingly enough, than about its biology and physics. One of the real problems of the present crisis is that we know so little about the earth as

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providing publicity and special programs to focus attention on the role of the secretary. Today, as Secretaries Week draws to a close, I call upon the Congress to join me in recognition of the vital part played by secretaries in government, business, education, and the professions.

The year 1970 marks the 19th annual observance of Secretaries Week, which was initiated in 1952 by the National Secretaries Association, in cooperation with the U.S. Department of Commerce. This year, extra emphasis was placed on the responsibilities of secretaries to their employers and their profession. To this end, many have taken part in secretarial seminars, providing a forum for consideration of these matters. I extend my warmest congratulations to the National Secretaries Association for the successful completion of this week of celebration and discussion, and to the secretaries themselves for their continued commitment to the betterment of our society.

#### SENATOR SPONG STRESSES NEED FOR ONGOING ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERN IN EARTH DAY SPEECHES

Mr. SPONG. Mr. President, it has been my privilege to speak at four Virginia institutions of higher learning this week in connection with programs marking the observance of Earth Day.

I have discussed the need to improve the quality of our environment in talks at the University of Virginia, at Charlottesville; Mary Baldwin College, at Staunton; Christopher Newport College, at Newport News, and Old Dominion University, at Norfolk.

The response of the audience was gratifying. The younger generation is aware of the extent of pollution problems. I hope, however, that the present zeal for improving the quality of our environment is not a passing fad. In my talks to Virginia college students, I stressed that pollution abatement and control must be an ongoing mission. It has taken generations to befoul our environment. It cannot be cleaned up with a wave of a wand.

Our knowledge about some aspects of pollution is still primitive. Additional research is necessary if we are to develop the factual information necessary to achieve progress.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that my remarks at a public seminar at Old Dominion University be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the remarks were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

REMARKS BY U.S. SENATOR WILLIAM B. SPONG, JR.

Our contemporary culture, primed by population growth and driven by technology, has created problems of environmental degradation that directly affects all of our senses. One doesn't need to be a scientist to realize that. He need only to use his eyes, ears and nose.

Henry Thoreau foresaw the trend more than 125 years ago. In writing about machines, he said: "They insult nature. Every machine or particular application, seems a slight outrage against universal laws. How many fine inventions are there which do not clutter the ground."

Even before the days of Thoreau man was misusing the environment to assimilate his waste products. And until relatively a few years ago, there was no evidence of any adverse effects. In the process of transforming matter into energy through combustion, and of synthesizing new products through chemistry, man has used the air and water as dumping grounds for his wastes. In achieving technological progress and scientific breakthroughs, man has modified his environment. At first, the changes were insignificant because there were no major concentrations of population, and untamed frontiers were abundant. No one was particularly concerned over an occasional fish kill because another good stream was only a few miles away. If smoke from a factory became bothersome, it wasn't too difficult to escape to a cleaner area nearby.

In short—man until very recently has accepted pollution as the price of technological progress. This laissez faire policy was questioned only when the scientific community began warning that man was pouring wastes into the environment at a rate faster than nature could reprocess them. The evidence that man was exceeding nature's assimilative capacity showed up in the form of polluted rivers, algae-covered lakes and smog-laden atmosphere.

In the United States we are pouring carbon monoxide, sulfur oxides and other potentially dangerous pollutants into the atmosphere at a rate of 142 million tons per year.

Our garbage growth exceeds our population growth. It has been estimated that an average of 5.3 pounds of solid waste is collected per person per day. That is more than 190 tons per year. By 1980, some 235 million people are expected to be generating eight pounds per person per day. That would be 340 million tons per year. These figures cover only those wastes that are handled by collection agencies. Overall, the nation is generating about 10 pounds per person per day of household, commercial and industrial wastes. In addition, about seven million motor vehicles are junked annually in the United States. More than three-fourths of them may be salvaged in varying degrees, but the excess contributes to an accumulation of abandoned vehicles that has been estimated at from nine million to 16½ million.

Even the oceans, our last frontier, have not been spared. Back in about 1675, the Governor of New York, Edmund Andros, issued a decree prohibiting the dumping of dirt or refuse "or anything to fill up ye harbor or among ye neighbors or neighboring shores under penalty of forty shillings." Nearly 300 years later we are still having problems with the disposal of the same type of wastes, and we have essentially the same type of control measures.

Unfortunately, the problems have been compounded by the extensive population growth extending from Boston to Norfolk. Because the land is covered with people, space has largely been exhausted for landfill operations. Incineration causes air pollution difficulties, so the wastes of this urban megalopolis is being dumped on the continental shelf.

The total amount of solid wastes being dumped into the ocean from the New York Metropolitan region alone, spread uniformly over Manhattan Island, would form a layer six inches thick each year. Viewed in another way, the discharge amounts to about one ton per person per year.

But New York isn't the only area that has resorted to sea disposal. The Corps of Engineers recently reported that 22 sites were used for waste disposal in the ocean between Boston and the mouth of Chesapeake Bay.

A research oceanographer who testified before the Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution only last month said "knowledge of the effects of these waste disposal operations on the ocean is at best sketchy and

completely absent for many areas and types of wastes."

It has been assumed that materials dredged from New York Harbor and hauled to the ocean for dumping consists primarily of clean sands, and that sewage sludges generated at waste treatment plants is just another form of manure. But the oceanographer said data he has collected indicate that this is far from the case for many wastes. For example, he said dredged materials in many parts of the harbor contains large amounts of sewage solids and are soaked with chemicals, including petroleum and petrochemicals. Sludges contain high concentrations of metals known to be toxic to marine organisms.

Wastes introduced into coastal waters may travel for long distances. The expanse of water between southern Massachusetts and Cape Hatteras is essentially a single unit, and currents generally move from the north to the south.

A little-known provision of the recently-enacted Water Quality Improvement Act will remedy the situation insofar as dumping is concerned for the first three miles offshore. The statute requires federal permittees and licensees to obtain from state water pollution control agencies a certificate of reasonable assurance that they will not violate applicable water quality standards. It would seem desirable to me to consider international agreements limiting the dumping of wastes, or an extension of our sovereignty further out to sea.

Oil spills present equally serious problems. In just 30 years, seaborne oil commerce has increased ten-fold. Moreover, the size of tankers is increasing at a dramatic rate. The Torrey Canyon was one of the ten largest tankers in the world three years ago when it went aground with 118,000 tons of crude oil. Its size soon will be run-of-the-mill. Nearly 200 tankers of more than 200,000 tons have been ordered by shipping companies in recent years, and ships of 500,000 tons capacity are being designed.

The pollution potential from collisions and accidental groundings are enormous. Moreover, the largest number of accidents occur close to shore or in ports—areas that frequently are of greatest economic, nutritional and aesthetic importance to mankind.

Pollution from shipping is only part of the problem. Offshore drilling rigs also pose a threat, as was dramatized by the Santa Barbara episode. The number of wells drilled annually off the continental United States has more than doubled in the past decade. Exploration is underway or planned in waters off 50 countries of the world.

It has been estimated that a minimum of a million tons of oil a year is spilled, flushed or leaked in oil operations. Half the seafood of the world comes from one-tenth of one per cent of the area of the sea, primarily the coastal areas which are most subject to pollution.

These are the results of a society that has become a virtual slave to technology. Fortunately, an increasingly large segment of the American public has come to realize that instead of devoting ourselves exclusively to the development of new things which are assumed to be better because they are bigger or operate faster, we must consider whether something new is worthwhile in terms of the total context of the environment.

This will necessitate a change in values by consumers as well as the obvious sources of pollution. After all, productivity is governed by demand. Many environmental activists want the "good life," but they also want bigger and better color TV sets, more powerful automobiles, and throw-away pack aging that isn't readily degradable.

Industry, on the other hand, must act responsibly. It must find ways of producing without polluting. Industry must act regardless of whether it costs more and re-

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ardless of how the increased cost is absorbed. In the words of one corporate executive, "Industry will adapt voluntarily to the imperatives of environmental conservation, or ultimately it will be forced to do so."

The country's population growth and the pattern of its distribution will require changes in present-day attitudes. In George Washington's day the population of the country was less than four million. We passed the 100 million mark in 1915, the 200 million mark in 1968, and by the year 2000 we will reach 300 million. But to see the situation in its true perspective one must examine where the growth has occurred. In the early days of the country there were only about 320,000 persons living in what we know as cities. Today, more than 140 million Americans—70 per cent of our total population—are crowded on two per cent of the land. If the present trend continues for another 25 years, 100 million additional people will be stacked on top of the 140 million already living in our cities and suburbs.

In considering the nation's population growth we must recognize that quality of life is related to quantity. Man obviously is highly adaptable. We have survived many environmental changes. But until we learn more about ourselves and can use our knowledge to ensure lives of happiness and fulfillment for all our citizens, control of population must be a high-priority national goal.

We also must exercise better management of our resources of land, air and water. This necessarily will involve more anti-pollution research, more controls and more money. Congress has been seeking solutions for several years to the problems involved in reclaiming the environment. Admittedly, most of our progress has been achieved in the past five or six years. The basic tools for control of air and water pollution are already on the statute books. They no doubt will be strengthened.

For example, there is need for better controls over the use of pesticides, particularly the persistent chlorinated hydrocarbons. The present federal administrative machinery to abate pollution is fragmented and should be modernized. Federal authority to control emissions from motor vehicles should be expanded to include other modes of transportation.

Each of the areas I have discussed today presents separate problems. They are not simple by any means. Several include highly complex economic issues which—if we are to act responsibly—must be taken into account.

**SALT**

#### SECRETARY OF DEFENSE LAIRD

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, an editorial in the April 22 Washington Post, entitled "Secretary Laird on Strategic Arms," characterizes Secretary of Defense Laird's address on Monday, April 20, as "disjointed and indifferently argued." It then brings up specific points from this speech which appear out of tune with the writer's views—but ends up with the conclusion "Secretary Laird has somehow given a persuasive arms control speech." It is surprising how a "disjointed, indifferently argued" speech can be described as "persuasive" unless, perhaps, there was more to the speech than the Post editorial chooses to discuss.

From the phrases "perhaps with less design" and "he did not think it implied what we did," it is intimated that this speech was not meant to be pertinent to arms control, but just turned out that way. Rather, the Post seems to assume that the Secretary's speech was just a rationale for current U.S. weapons pro-

grams. For example, the Post says Laird's address—

focused on the gains the Soviets have made in strategic nuclear weaponry in the past five years and concluding from this the necessity for our proceeding with . . . MIRV and SAFEGUARD.

Is that really the message which Secretary Laird was delivering? I submit that a much more pertinent conclusion could be taken from the following section of his speech:

The Soviets have a momentum going both in strategic weapons deployments and in strategic weapons developments. If their strategic posture could be expected to stay at the operationally deployed posture which exists today, I believe we would have a tolerable situation. What must concern us, however, is the momentum the Soviets have established both in deployments and developments and where that momentum may carry them.

While the editorial does use the middle sentence to point out that our posture today appears adequate, it completely ignores the other two, which are discussed at length in the Secretary's speech. From reading the full speech, it appears obvious that this issue of momentum—not past actions by the Soviets—was the major reason for the Secretary's conclusion that MIRV and Safeguard should proceed. This conclusion is supported by other sections of the Secretary's speech, such as "in the mid-to-late 1970's we would no longer be able to rely" and "pending a successful outcome in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, therefore, prudence dictates that we must continue our approved program to MIRV current forces" and "this is why we must also, at the very least, preserve an option to defend a portion of our land-based retaliatory forces."

Although we could accept a misinterpretation of the rationale put forward by Secretary Laird and perhaps ascribe it to a careless reading of his remarks, another section of the editorial is much more bothersome. One wonders what the Post suggests when it says:

And the more horrendous one makes the Soviet potential appear in both technologies, the more feeble one's own argument becomes for development of the U.S. counterweapon—especially when one is, like Secretary Laird, endeavoring to stress the magnitude of Soviet threat and the relative modesty of our own response.

This sentence conveys a clear message to me—which is that we should roll over and do nothing in the face of this Soviet momentum. I suggest that this is one of the reasons, perhaps the major reason, why Secretary Laird is voicing his concern—that is, for the past 5 years we have been, in his words, virtually in neutral gear. Apparently, we should do even less, now that the Soviets are in high gear. I for one cannot accept this reasoning as a proper or acceptable philosophy for the United States.

It appears to me that Secretary Laird has made a rather cogent case for the current U.S. position, and that rather than being disjointed, his address is a valid explanation of the situation we face. From my reading of the speech, this position appears as follows:

First. We are concerned about the

momentum behind the Soviet strategic buildup, and where that momentum will place them vis-a-vis the United States in the future unless we take offsetting actions or get a meaningful early agreement in SALT.

Second. The current strategic situation is not intolerable but could become so unless the United States takes steps to offset this Soviet momentum. These steps are geared to what can happen, rather than what has happened.

Third. The steps we have planned are negotiable at SALT and that is the place to resolve these issues.

Fourth. Pending success at SALT, we should not abandon these plans because we have no indication that the Soviet Union intends to slow down this momentum.

Fifth. We are serious in our approach to, and hopeful for success in, SALT.

Thus, I agree that "Secretary Laird has somehow given a persuasive arms control speech," but not, as the Post would have us believe, by accident. I believe he pointed out with excellent reasoning our approach to SALT, our concern about Soviet programs, and our desire—which I share—to resolve these issues at the conference table with the Soviets, rather than ignoring the other side of the strategic equation.

I ask unanimous consent that the Post editorial and the text of Secretary Laird's speech be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the items were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### SECRETARY LAIRD ON STRATEGIC ARMS

In San Francisco, in 1967, Secretary McNamara announced the Johnson administration's decision to go ahead with the Sentinel anti-ballistic missile system at the end of a long speech which had consisted mainly of arguments for not doing so: the facts he adduced simply pointed in a different direction from the conclusion he was to reach. Something similar happened—perhaps with less design—at a luncheon of the Associated Press on Monday, when Secretary Laird delivered an 18-page address focused on the gains the Soviets have made in strategic nuclear weaponry over the past five years and concluding from this the necessity for our proceeding with both the scheduled deployment of MIRVs in June and the (limited) Phase II deployment of the Safeguard ABM. It was a disjointed, indifferently argued speech and presumably it was meant to put pressure on the Soviets in Vienna and the congressional critics at home. But a close reading yields up another, unexpected result. For even those of us who did not oppose the President's ABM program last year and who are willing to acknowledge that summary, across-the-board arms agreements have their dangers and impracticalities must concede that Secretary Laird's Monday rationale for going ahead with MIRV and the ABM constitutes—despite itself—one of the most cogent arguments we have yet heard for a nuclear weapons deployment freeze. His own solutions, on the other hand, have only the most tangential relationship to the problem he describes.

The point is not facetious and it does not rest on either a disbelief in the Soviet progress Secretary Laird has cited or a sentimental hope that our conflict with the Soviets can be called off by joint communique. Rather, what the secretary's speech revealed with a special clarity was the built-in illogic of the position which must argue simultaneously the case for MIRV (which is designed



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to penetrate an ABM) and for an ABM (which is designed to defend against a force which has been MIRVed). And the more horrendous one makes the Soviet potential appear in both technologies, the more feeble one's own argument becomes for development of the U.S. counter-weapon—especially when one is, like Secretary Laird, endeavoring to stress the magnitude of Soviet threat and the relative modesty of our own response. In this connection the point might also be made that it is not quite accurate to describe the Soviets' effort as having been in "high gear" as compared with our own having been in "neutral" since 1965 "in both deployment and development of strategic nuclear weapons." While it is true that we have diminished our megatonnage, reduced the size of our bomber force and held to fixed numbers of land-based ICBMs and sea-based ballistic missiles, the development of MIRV—as the secretary himself observes—points to a massive multiplication of the nuclear warheads we will have available.

But we are not of a mind to argue with the secretary so much as we are to ponder the implications of much of what he said—even though he did not think it implied what we did. Secretary Laird, in his posture statement a while back acknowledged that the Soviet ICBM buildup, if it continued at the present rate, could make the planned Safeguard ABM obsolete in short order. In this address, while he argues the urgency of our proceeding with sea-based MIRVs as a hedge against a pre-emptive strike that would do in our bomber and land-based missile force, he also warns against the danger of depending solely on submarine-based missilery. He does not make a persuasive case that either the progress of the Soviet ABM or the progress of the Soviet MIRV requires the deployment of our own MIRVs in two months, any more than he indicates that the Safeguard system will be adequate to the threat that may materialize. And as to the figures he provides on the Soviet ICBM development in the past five years, what the secretary characterizes as a Soviet attempt to "change the balance of power" turns out by his own account to be more like a Soviet attempt to create one: "The United States then, unlike the situation today, clearly occupied a superior position." We still do, of course, despite the gigantic efforts of the Soviets over the past five years. But the figures laid out by Mr. Laird suggest that the point may have been reached now when the much talked of nuclear weapons deployment freeze would in fact be in our common interest. As he himself put it while warning of the dangers ahead, "If their strategic posture could be expected to stay at the operationally deployed posture which exists today, I believe we would have a tolerable situation."

Whether or not some kind of freeze is in order is up to Mr. Nixon's negotiators to explore. Meanwhile, Secretary Laird's speech, as part of a tactical approach to the Soviets may or may not be of practical value. Elsewhere in his text the secretary observes that arms, as such, are not the cause of an arms race: "The fundamental driving force in an arms race is what one country perceives as possible objectives of another country's actions." That, like much of the rest of what Mr. Laird told the A. P. luncheon, is classical arms control dogma—only his perspective on it was a bit one-sided. What makes addresses like Secretary Laird's a bit chancy just now and the deployments he has in mind questionable is precisely that—how our objectives will be perceived—apart from whatever they actually are. As we said, Secretary Laird has somehow given a persuasive arms control speech, better in fact that those we have listened to in recent days and weeks by acknowledged opponents of what he is supporting.

ADDRESS BY THE HONORABLE MELVIN R. LAIRD,  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

I was particularly pleased when your President, Paul Miller of Gannett Newspapers, called me on a Saturday morning several months ago to invite me to speak to the Annual Luncheon of the Associated Press on the subject of the strategic balance. I told him that I regarded this forum as particularly appropriate to express my views on the need to make available to the American people additional information regarding national security.

When I assumed office 15 months ago, I immediately established as a top priority goal the restoration of credibility in the Department of Defense. Since then we have attempted to follow President Nixon's stated desire to make more information available to the American people.

The editors of the Associated Press and all members of the communications media in this country have a deep interest in this subject. I pledge to you that we shall continue to devote maximum attention to reducing and hopefully eliminating overclassification in the Department of Defense. And, we will provide all the information we can within the limits of national security, consistent with the safety and legal rights of our citizens.

This open news policy has brought about significant progress in at least five major areas where information was previously withheld from the American people.

1. Previous policy was to restrict public discussion of Prisoner of War matters. Present policy is to foster public discussion and to focus worldwide attention on the plight of our prisoners of war in order to gain humane treatment for them and to obtain their release.

2. Previous policy was to withhold from the public information on chemical warfare and biological research matters. Present policy is to keep the public informed about our new policies in these two areas, the reasons for these new policies, and the steps being taken to implement them.

3. Previous practices on reporting the costs of major weapons systems led to a major credibility problem in the Department of Defense. Our new policy of full disclosure on major weapons costs will help to restore the Department's credibility and will assist us in gaining better control of costs and in developing better management practices.

4. For several years, the American people were denied knowledge about our activities in Laos. Today, the American people are being informed about what we are doing and what we are not doing in Laos.

5. In the past, overuse of classification denied to the American people pertinent information on the nature and scope of the strategic nuclear threat. In my view, there is still too much classification, but we have tried and will continue to make more and more information available on this subject which is so crucial for the future security of our country.

In my remarks today I will attempt to shed more light on the crucial subject of the strategic threat. In particular, I want to discuss with you editors the nature and scope of the growing Soviet threat, recognizing full well that, in Vietnam, our negotiators have just begun round two of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, commonly called SALT.

I hope for success at SALT. I want to emphasize that point. I also want to emphasize that our top military leadership hopes for success at SALT. Where the security of the United States is involved, it is this objective—insuring national security—which is most important. A lower-cost means to achieve that objective, lower compared to what otherwise may be required, if it can be achieved within tolerable risks—is ob-

viously most desirable to all Americans, civilian and military.

The budget we have recommended to Congress for the next fiscal year demonstrates how deeply the Nixon Administration is committed to progress at SALT. We have called this year's defense budget a traditional budget. It is transitional because in terms of military capability, it is basically a status quo, stand-pat budget. We have postponed basic national security decisions in the strategic field in order to give maximum opportunity for SALT to be successful, and to foster a meaningful beginning for the era of negotiation President Nixon and the American people seek.

The objective of the Nixon Administration is to restore and maintain peace. With regard to SALT, the President's actions and words document this Administration's accent on negotiation rather than confrontation.

In my Defense Report to Congress in February, I expressed concern that the United States, by the mid-1970's, could find itself in a second-rate strategic position with regard to the future security of the Free World.

Today, in keeping with our policy of maximum information, I intend to present additional reasons for this concern.

It is important to discuss the growing strategic threat because it is essential for the American people to understand the complex issues involved, if we are to insure our national security interests through the decade of the 1970's. The American people need to understand the reasons President Nixon is pursuing the course he has recommended in this year's transitional budget.

As Secretary of Defense, I must face the fact that we are taking a risk by postponing hard decisions which the increasing Soviet threat poses for us. I recognize that in the interests of lasting peace, some risks must be taken. But, it is my judgment that as the American people are provided additional information, such as we are discussing here today, they will agree that we are literally at the edge of prudent risk. And the inescapable conclusion will be that if the Soviet strategic offensive buildup continues, the risk to our nation will become too great to sustain without major offsetting actions.

Therefore, what I particularly want to focus on today is the basic asymmetry between what the United States has been doing and what the Soviet Union has been doing in the field of strategic nuclear weapons in recent years.

In a word, for the past five years, the United States has virtually been in neutral gear in the deployment of strategic offensive forces, while the Soviet Union has moved into high gear in both deployment and development of strategic nuclear weapons. In the 1965-67 time period, the United States decided on a level of strategic nuclear forces, including Multiple Independently Targeted Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs), which was deemed adequate to preserve our deterrent posture for the threat of the 1970's which was projected then. No basic change has been made in the force level decisions established in the mid-1960's.

The Soviet Union, by contrast, has engaged in a major effort since 1965 to change the balance of power. The United States then, unlike the situation today, clearly occupied a superior position.

Except for the minimum "hedge" that SAFEGUARD will provide, we have not responded to the Soviet strategic offensive buildup with new deployment programs. We did not respond in past years because the United States deliberately chose to assume that the Soviet buildup at most was aimed at achieving a deterrent posture comparable to that of the United States. We have not responded this year because, as I have said, we fervently hope that SALT can render such a response unnecessary.

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As much as we might wish it otherwise, however, we must concentrate our attention on what the Soviet Union is actually doing. In the current situation of a diminishing U.S. deterrent and Soviet momentum, we simply cannot base our plans and programs on what we hope the Soviet Union may do either unilaterally or in SALT. The Soviets have a momentum going both in strategic weapons deployments and in strategic weapons developments. If their strategic posture could be expected to stay at the operationally deployed posture which exists today, I believe we would have a tolerable situation. What must concern us, however, is the momentum the Soviets have established both in deployments and developments and where that momentum may carry them.

Let me explain in more detail the basic problem.

The most crucial aspect of national security is the strategic balance between nations that have competing interests in the world. The strategic balance has a direct effect on relations between the superpowers. It has an indirect effect on other nations both in terms of their own relations with each other and in terms of their relations with the superpowers. As one example, a situation of clear superiority on the part of the Soviet Union would have profound implications for any future political or military confrontation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. In fact, a clear strategic superiority on the part of the Soviet Union would affect our interests and our obligations throughout the world.

In our continuing debate on defense matters, it has been said many times that the driving force behind the so-called strategic arms race is the "action-reaction" phenomenon. The recent ABM-MIRV discussions in this country illustrate this. The argument is made, for instance, that the deployment of defensive missiles by one side tends to generate increased offensive deployments by the other side.

I certainly agree that one side's actions definitely can influence what the other side does. But just as weapons in themselves are not the cause of wars, neither are a country's actions in weapons deployment—in themselves—the driving force in a so-called arms race. The fundamental driving force in an arms race is what one country perceives as possible objectives of another country's actions.

Let me explain it this way. Our goal is a stable peace. Our strategic policy to achieve that goal is deterrence. As publicly stated, the basic rationale for United States weapons deployment in the strategic field has been and remains deterrence. Our actions of the past several years underscore the fact that deterrence is our fundamental policy and that we seek no more than a posture of effective deterrence.

Because we in the United States seek a posture of deterrence to protect our interests and those of our allies, we obviously could recognize as legitimate a Soviet desire for a comparable deterrent to protect its interests.

I know that the actions of the Soviet Union in recent years have raised questions in the minds of some of you editors and others about the true objectives they are pursuing.

As I have said many times, I do not believe that it is appropriate for me, as Secretary of Defense, to attempt to assess the strategic intentions of another country. However, under my responsibilities, I must be concerned about present and potential strategic capabilities.

You representatives of a free press understand fully the national security price an open society must pay when competing with adversaries who cloak their plans in secrecy and attempt to hide both their objectives

and their hardware behind the mantle of a closed society. The whole world knows what we in the United States have and what we plan in the national security field. Meaningful essentials are laid bare in an open forum—in official statements, in Congressional hearings, in the give and take of Congressional hearings, in the give and take of Congressional and public debate and in the reports of a free and competitive press. I would not have it any other way.

Let me emphasize again my conviction that the American people have a right to know even more than has been available in the past about matters which affect their safety and security. There has been too much classification in this country. In particular, too much has been withheld in the past about what has been going on in the closed societies of the Soviet Union and Communist China.

As we all pray for success in Vienna, let me point out that, in my view, the American people will support an arms limitation agreement only if they are confident they have the relevant facts about the strategic balance.

The facts I am about to present are not taken from external Soviet discussions of their strategic forces. They do not come from press conferences in Moscow, from testimony in the Kremlin, from news stories in Pravda, or from published annual Defense Reports by Marshal Grechko.

Rather, the information I am presenting to you is based on our own observations of what the Soviets are doing—and on our belief that this information and these facts should not be withheld from the American people and should be made available to others in the world.

Let us examine what has happened in the past five years to shift the relationship between U.S. and Soviet strategic forces and to provide an accelerated momentum to the Soviets in the strategic field:

In 1965, the Soviet Union had about 230 launchers for the relatively old-fashioned missiles—SS-3's, SS-7's and SS-8's—some-what similar to our TITAN. We had 54 TITANs in the inventory at that time.

Today, these two forces remain essentially the same. So in this category of old-fashioned multimegaton weapons the Soviets had and still maintain a better than 4-1 advantage.

In 1965, the Soviet Union had no relatively small ICBM launchers comparable to our MINUTEMAN. By 1965, we had 880 MINUTEMAN missiles operational and had established that the total force level for MINUTEMAN would be 1,000 launchers. In the 1965-67 time period, the United States finalized plans to convert a portion of the established MINUTEMAN force to a MIRV MINUTEMAN III configuration.

Today, the Soviet Union has over 800 such launchers operational, and a projected force that could exceed 1,000 launchers within the next two years. These launchers include both the SS-11 and SS-13 missiles. Concurrently, flight testing of an improved SS-11 missile continues. Thus, at present construction rates, the Soviets will achieve parity in MINUTEMAN-type launchers within the next two years or so and could move into a substantial lead in this category by the mid-1970's if they continue to deploy these missiles. The previously scheduled U.S. program to MIRV a substantial part of MINUTEMAN continues in progress.

In 1965, there were no operational launchers for the large Soviet SS-9 missile which, in its single warhead version, can carry up to 25 megatons.

Today, I can report to you that there are some 230 SS-9's operational with at least 60 more under construction. Testing of an SS-9 multiple reentry vehicle—the triplet version—continues. The U.S. has no counterpart to this program involving large missiles. So,

in this area, the Soviets have and will maintain a monopoly.

In 1965, neither a depressed trajectory ICBM nor a Fractional Orbital Bombardment System existed in either the Soviet or U.S. inventory.

Today, the Soviets have tested both configurations and could have an operational version already deployed. The United States has developed nothing comparable to these systems.

In 1965, the Soviet Union had about 25 launchers for Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) on nuclear submarines, and about 80 more on diesel submarines. Most were designed for surface launch only. The U.S. had 464 SLBM launchers operational on 29 submarines in 1965 and Congress had authorized the last of the 41 nuclear-powered submarines in our POLARIS Force in the previous fiscal year.

Today, the Soviets have over 200 operational launchers on nuclear submarines for submerged launch SLBMs and about 70 operational launchers on diesel submarines. In the next two years, the Soviets are expected to have some 400-500 operational launchers on POLARIS-type submarines, and at present construction rates—6-8 submarines a year—could match or exceed the number in the U.S. force by 1974-75. United States POLARIS submarines still number 41 and no increase is projected in current plans. Conversion of 31 of our POLARIS submarines to the MIRVED POSEIDON missile is planned, and eight conversions have already been authorized by Congress.

In 1965, there was no development underway of a so-called Undersea Long-Range Missile System (ULMS) in the United States and there appeared to be none in the Soviet Union.

Today, the United States is spending relatively small sums in the research and development area on preliminary investigations of such a system. I can also report to you today that the Soviet Union, on the other hand, already is testing a new, long-range missile for possible Naval use.

In 1965, the Soviet heavy bomber force consisted of slightly over 200 aircraft, about 50 of which were configured as tankers. The U.S. heavy bomber force strength was about 780 in 1965.

Today, the Soviet heavy bomber force is slightly under 200, with about 50 still configured as tankers. U.S. heavy bomber strength has declined to about 550 today.

In 1965, we estimated that the Soviet Union had a complex of ABM launchers being constructed around Moscow as well as a number of radars under construction which could provide early warning acquisition and tracking functions for ABM use.

Today, we believe that 64 Moscow ABM launchers are operational together with sophisticated early warning radars and tracking capabilities. ABM testing for new and/or improved systems continues. Today, the first two SAFEGUARD sites have been authorized, but will not be operational before 1974-75. This modified deployment schedule is considerably behind the schedule Congress had approved in 1967 for the planned SENTINEL area defense, which called for initial capability in 1972, and nation-wide coverage in 1975.

Thus, in the space of five years—from 1965 to 1970—the Soviet Union has more than tripled its inventory of strategic offensive nuclear weapon launchers from about 500 to about 1700—which includes some 200 heavy bombers in both totals—and continues the momentum of a vigorous construction program. In that same period, the Soviet Union has virtually quadrupled the total megatonnage in its strategic offensive force. The United States, on the other hand, in the same time period, made no increase in its established level of 1710 strategic nuclear

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missile launchers and reduced its heavy bomber strength of 780 by over 200. In that same period the United States also reduced its megatonnage by more than 40%.

To repeat: The United States has taken no action to increase the total of approved strategic offensive delivery vehicles in the past five years in response to the rapid growth in Soviet strategic delivery vehicles. We have, of course, maintained certain options and other steps have been taken to preserve our deterrent in the face of this increase.

Two programs that have been the subject of intense public discussion are, of course, our MIRV and SAFEGUARD systems.

Let me emphasize that MIRV is needed to preserve our deterrent. Many people do not fully understand why it is necessary for us to continue the previously planned, Congressionally-approved and funded deployment of MIRV systems. The point is made that the current number of strategic nuclear weapons on alert in our force is sufficient for immediate retaliatory use in a crisis. Because MIRVing would more than double the number of deliverable weapons, the conclusion is drawn that this is unnecessary.

This conclusion could be valid, if we assumed that the POLARIS, MINUTEMAN, and Bomber forces all would survive a surprise attack and that the Soviet Union would not deploy an extensive ABM system. However, as was pointed out in my Defense Report in February, the rapidly-growing Soviet strategic offensive forces could seriously threaten both the U.S. MINUTEMAN and strategic bomber forces by the mid-1970's.

Assuming we do not take additional actions to offset the expanding threat—and this apparently is what some people urge—I must, as Secretary of Defense, face the disquieting possibility that in the mid-to-late 1970's we would no longer be able to rely on either the Bomber or MINUTEMAN force to survive a surprise attack. In such a situation, we would be left with only the POLARIS/POSEIDON deterrent force in our strategic arsenal for high confidence retaliatory purposes. This would pose intolerable risks for American security.

Thus, the critical choice in the face of that situation is this:

1. Do we rely on the fraction of the 658 current weapons that will be at sea on our POLARIS force if we do not convert to POSEIDON and do not defend our land-based strategic forces?

2. Or, do we continue the previously established program to convert 31 POLARIS submarines to the long-approved POSEIDON MIRV program—which would provide approximately the same number of sea-based retaliatory weapons on alert that we currently have today in the sea-based and land-based retaliatory forces combined, but with much reduced megatonnage?

Pending a successful outcome in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, therefore, prudence dictates that we must continue our approved program to MIRV current forces.

Moreover, as the experience of the past five years demonstrates, it would be dangerous and imprudent to place unquestioned reliance on the invulnerability of any single strategic system for more than five to seven years into the future.

This is why we must also, at the very least, preserve an option to defend a portion of our land-based retaliatory forces. That is a major part of what the proposed minimal addition to the SAFEGUARD Defensive program is designed to do. I will come back to that.

Because we want to give the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks every chance of succeeding, we are deliberately accepting certain risks by postponing hard choices related to strategic offensive weapons. These risks are acceptable only in the context of proceeding

with the MIRV deployments that have been programmed and approved for several years and the SAFEGUARD increment we are recommending this year.

A second and equally important reason for MIRV is that it helps preserve our deterrent by increasing confidence in our ability to penetrate Soviet strategic defensive forces which, by the mid-to-late 1970's also could be quite formidable. In addition to the extensive air defense capabilities they already possess, the Soviets are pursuing a vigorous anti-ballistic missile research and development program designed to improve the present operational system or to develop substantially better second-generation ABM components.

We now have evidence that the Soviet Union is testing an improved long-range ABM missile. They are also expanding their radar surveillance coverage. We cannot rule out the possibility that they have or will give the extensively deployed SA-5 surface-to-air missile system an ABM role. We believe such a role is technically feasible for this system.

With regard to SAFEGUARD, which I mentioned previously, let me say this. In addition to other objectives, the reoriented SAFEGUARD program, initiated last year, is designed to provide protection for our land-based deterrent forces, the MINUTEMAN and Bombers. As you know, the President directed that each phase of the SAFEGUARD deployment is to be reviewed each year to ensure that we are doing as much as necessary but not more than that required by the threat. The increments of SAFEGUARD proposed so far will provide protection for a portion of our land-based deterrent, and permit flexibility with regard to our future course of action.

Without approval by Congress of the Modified Phase II SAFEGUARD protection proposed by the President, we would be forced to recommend going forward this year with other strategic nuclear offensive force programs.

All of my comments so far have, of course, been focused on the more immediate and troublesome threat posed by the Soviet strategic force buildup. The nuclear weapons program of Communist China also concerns us and directly relates to the need for preserving timely SAFEGUARD options as we move toward the mid-1970's. Time does not permit a discussion of this issue and the interrelationship of maintaining adequate strategic offensive and defensive forces to meet both the Soviet and Communist Chinese threats.

Where does all this leave us, and what is President Nixon attempting to do with the decisions he has incorporated in his Fiscal Year 1971 transitional defense budget?

Clearly, this Administration has not accelerated the previously planned deployment of offensive systems during our 15 months in office. On the contrary, we have slowed it down. The only major change we have made has been modification of the previously approved SENTINEL ABM deployment; and that change was a slowdown, not a speedup. We slowed the original deployment plan Congress approved, keyed it to the emerging threat on an annual review basis, and re-oriented it to provide more timely protection needed for our land-based deterrent forces.

If the programmed forces established by the last Administration some years ago and approved by Congress were deemed appropriate and necessary for the security of the United States in the 1970's against the then projected threat, I am at a loss to understand how critics can claim that the Nixon Administration has escalated the arms race. The record clearly shows that we have not done so. We have chosen instead to defer major new weapons decisions as long as possible pending developments in the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks. In continuing the MIRV and ABM programs, we are simply going ahead with programs on which our

deterrent policy was formulated by previous Administrations, even before the current momentum of Soviet strategic programs became clear.

With regard to the important talks which have just resumed in Vienna, the President has stated that every U.S. system is negotiable. To those who argue that the U.S. should take specific, and perhaps unilateral, action at the start of these negotiations, I would reply that the place to resolve these issues is at the conference table with the Soviets. Let us try to find out at the conference table the meaning of the Soviet Union's increased weapons deployments and let us conduct these important negotiations with full recognition of these continuing Soviet deployments.

My appraisal today has covered some of the available evidence of the Soviet military buildup. I am not unmindful, however, of possible other directions of Soviet policy that could be relevant to our security. There have been reports that Soviet economic problems may place pressure upon their leadership to devote major attention to internal matters, thus reducing the recent emphasis on a continued military buildup.

As Secretary of Defense, I will continue to hope that the shift in national priorities we have instituted in America will be duplicated in the Soviet Union. But until evidence of that shift is discernible in weapons deployment activities, I have no alternative but to base my actions and recommendations on the evidence available, much of which I have shared with you editors today and, through you, with the American people.

#### BLAME FOR RISING FOOD PRICES

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. President, all too often the American farmer is blamed for the rising food prices. However, statistics which have recently been made available indicate that while food prices have been rising, the price the farmer has been receiving has been declining. For example, recently when the price of bread increased from 22 to 23 cents, the price the farmer received for wheat, milk, and shortening decreased from 3.6 to 3.3 cents.

We now know that the farmer, like the wage earner, small businessman, and the homebuyer and builder, has suffered greatly from the inflation we have been experiencing. With a return of only 3 percent on his investment as opposed to a 10-percent return by major industrial corporations and some of the large farms, the average farmer finds it increasingly difficult to continue operating when his prices are falling and the country is experiencing a 6-percent rate of inflation.

I think it is important that we recognize the fact that the average farmer has been greatly hurt by inflation and that he is not responsible for the increase in food prices.

#### EARTH DAY COMMENTARY

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, pollution and environmental problems have become the subject of massive attention in recent months—magazine articles, television programs, statements by the President, and many public officials, and a number of bills introduced in Congress.

On April 22, Earth Day, we had a national environmental teach-in, with various special activities to focus on the

environmental crisis being planned across the country. Although I understand that Senator NELSON played a leading part in formulating this idea, it was developed, organized, and energized by many young people.

I welcome and commend all this activity and I am hopeful that it will lead to some truly significant accomplishments in combatting the critical environmental problems. At the outset, however, I feel compelled to offer a word of caution. There is a tendency among Americans, and all humans I suppose, to feel that if we talk about a problem long enough, if we express enough indignation and concern, that it will somehow go away. Witness the example of the Vietnam war. Many Americans seem to have convinced themselves that after all the tumult in this country in the months prior to March 31, 1968, Vietnam ceased to be a problem.

Many people have tried, and some have apparently succeeded in phasing the war out of their minds, despite the fact that the death and destruction continues daily.

Just as we cannot afford to lessen our concern about Vietnam until we have brought the war to an end, we must not deceive ourselves into believing that by voluminous talking and writing we have resolved the environmental crisis.

The crisis is of such proportions that it is going to take a concerted and large-scale, longterm effort to effectively deal with it. One encouraging aspect of all the concern about the environment and ecology is that there are signs that this is an issue that could unite rather than divide Americans. All of us are affected by these problems and all of us need to work together in solving them.

Several significant measures have been passed by Congress as we have belatedly moved to confront these problems. Of course, as in the case of many other domestic needs, environmental quality activities are severely limited due to the lack of available funds. As I have often stressed, it is a matter of priorities, and as long as we have such a massive involvement in Vietnam and are spending billions for more and more armaments, these crucial domestic programs will be short changed.

This is even more tragic because reasonable expenditures now may save some enormous costs later. We need to act immediately to prevent the further despoiling of our air, water, and soil, rather than to wait until matters are completely out of control.

As an example of our current priorities, the \$1.5 billion the administration plans to spend on the ABM this year is considerably more than allocated for control of air and water pollution. The fiscal 1971 budget provides \$275 million for the Supersonic Transport—SST—aircraft as opposed to \$106 million for air pollution control.

The total cost for the SST is estimated at \$2.5 billion or more. We have been told that the SST can be used only for transoceanic flights because of the clamorous sonic booms. If they are flown over land they would add further to our considerable "noise pollution" problem.

Anyone who lives or works near a major airport probably feels that this problem—plus the grimy exhaust-laden air—could not get much worse. All too typical of the times is the fact that the U.S. Army Band may have to move its traditional Washington outdoor summer concerts from Watergate. Because of the aircraft flying into or out of National Airport, trying to play or hear music is a losing proposition.

The folly of the SST should be evident. The jumbo jets already in service can carry more passengers over a longer range at lower fares than the SST. And if we are really worried about transportation, should not the problems of the millions living in our urban areas take precedence over the desires of a few who may be eager to get from the New York traffic jam to the London traffic jam a little faster?

The money could be well spent on developing and expanding urban rapid transit rail systems, which would help alleviate the squeeze and pollution in our streets. Or the funds could be applied to developing and improving high-speed rail service between our major cities, thus reducing the mayhem on our highways.

Technology has brought some benefits to mankind, but no longer can we afford to ignore the human and environmental consequences of technological development.

We must also keep in mind the increasing population pressures in world, which heighten environmental difficulties. Our deteriorating transportation situation, our problem with waste disposal, our noisy, dirty, crime-plagued cities make the problems of urbanization all too clear.

The need to raise more food for the ever-increasing world population can wreak additional damage by upsetting the balance of nature. We increase the threat to survival by heavy use of pesticides and certain chemicals which pollute streams, linger in living tissues, and threaten wildlife species. The pollutants we pour into the air not only harm man's health directly, but also may change atmospheric conditions dangerously.

I have in the past and will continue to support programs to provide assistance for population control programs in developing countries, as well as voluntary family planning in our own country, and I believe such programs are of great importance.

A very visible component of our environmental blight is the ugliness, clutter, and litter that we see not only in our urban areas, but in the countryside as well. This is why it is important to act to preserve some of our more beautiful natural scenery. An example of this is the bill to make the Buffalo River in Arkansas a national river, a part of our national park system. This bill would enable the preservation, in its free-flowing, natural state, of an important segment of this beautiful river in an area which contains unique scientific features. This bill was passed by the Senate in September, and we are hopeful of favorable action in the House.

In many sections of the country water

supplies are contaminated, and marine life is imperiled. Between 15 and 20 million fish are being killed each year by water pollution. Some of our rivers have even become fire hazards. However, the budget request for water pollution control is less than the program authorized by Congress in 1966.

Solid waste disposal is a problem that grows by the hour and is plaguing more and more cities. We are burying ourselves under 7 million scrapped cars, 30 million tons of waste paper, 48 billion discarded cans, and 28 billion bottles and jars a year. Newspapers in two Arkansas cities, Fort Smith and Pine Bluff, have recently reported on the increasing problem there. On an average, every Arkansan living in an urban area throws away 4 pounds of solid waste every day of the week. A State official points out that most Arkansas cities are still operating open dumps where garbage is burned. This contributes considerably to air pollution and is against the law. A Fort Smith reporter, Taylor Joyce, recently wrote in the Southwest Times Record:

For as long as some local residents can remember there has been an open dump down along the Arkansas River on Fort Smith's northwest side. There has been almost perpetual burning there, creating noxious odors and blanketing the city with billows of smoke.

The dump has attracted insects and vermin and has been a breeding ground for flies, mosquitoes and rats.

The City Health Department wants to eliminate the dump because of the health hazards it creates.

But perhaps most important of all, the Arkansas Pollution Control Commission says the dump has to go because it poses an air and water pollution threat.

In Arkansas we have had the opportunity to avoid some of the problems and mistakes which have occurred in the older, industrialized States. The opportunity is rapidly slipping away from us. Not many months ago, speaking of the Arkansas River development project, I stated that by preserving the beauty of the river, the purity of the water and air, and retaining favorable living conditions for those who work in the area, it could truly be a model development. Now, it is most disconcerting to read of a statement by a State Health Department official who says that the Arkansas River could not be made pollution free because of increasing industrialization of the river valley and pollution caused by out-of-State sources. In an editorial on the subject, the Arkansas Gazette pointed out:

As it happens so frequently in the environmental field, the problem is interstate in nature and it presents a challenge for the federal anti-pollution effort that President Nixon promises his administration is ready to undertake. Already the federal government has spent over a billion dollars to create the inland waterway, and that ought to be enough to give it a vested interest in the quality of the water that flows down the costly river channel.

The problems are vast and numerous. We are, literally, surrounded by them. I hope that Earth Day will have marked the beginning not of conflict and confrontation, but of resolute and united action on many fronts to improve the quality of life and living conditions.



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## A WORLD VIEW OF THE ENVIRONMENT

(Remarks of Senator WARREN G. MAGNUSON before the second annual International Geoscience Electronics Symposium, Washington, D.C., April 16, 1970)

I am deeply honored by your welcoming me to this International Symposium, and I in turn would like to re-extend the welcome of the United States to those of you who have come here from foreign lands. I know your Symposium will be a success; for you have assembled here a vast amount of talent, experience, and achievement from many nations.

Problems of the environment are an appropriate focal point for this Symposium, not only because the United States is experiencing a period of intense environmental awareness but also—as our visitors can tell us—because the United States has no monopoly on environmental problems or environmental concern. Few, if any, environmental ills are unique to a particular country. With the exception of isolated species of wildlife whose existence is threatened, most environmental problems—like pollution—are common to all industrialized nations, regardless of their size or form of government.

We are all familiar, for example, with the problems of the United States and other Western nations; but it is interesting to note that the Soviet Union is undergoing environmental difficulties similar to our own. Pollutants from pulp mills are quickly destroying beautiful Lake Balkal, and a recent accident in a chemical plant is known to have killed millions of fish in an important Soviet river. And while we in the United States are still in the "talking stage" with respect to noise pollution, the Soviets have already taken action: cars and trucks are no longer permitted to drive through Moscow during the hours when most Muscovites are asleep. Perhaps these developments foreshadow a new contest to replace the arms race and the space race: an "environment race" between the East and the West to see who will have the cleanest air and water and the quietest streets. This would be a healthy and welcome form of competition indeed.

Yet the problems of environmental quality are global in scope and extend far beyond the industrialized nations of the East and West. Rapid population growth and economic development efforts make the environment a problem for the modernizing nations of the world as well—regardless of their political systems or their foreign policy. The Ganges River in India is more polluted than the Rhine; DDT is spread far more thickly in the tropics than in North America. Any nation that hopes to increase its Gross National Product, its per capita consumption, or other indices of economic growth is faced with an inescapable dilemma about the impact of such development on its environment.

With this realization in mind—that environmental problems are rooted in the growth of population and technology, not in ideology—I want to share with you tonight a special hope, a hope that I believe is more than just a dream. It is a hope born of concern for the dozens of modernizing nations for whom environmental quality is a necessarily low priority today but for whom the experience of the industrialized nations could provide valuable assistance in making economic growth and environmental quality compatible. These nations have seen, and desire, the glamorous fruits of industrialization; and most of them have not yet paused to consider questions of ecology that we ignored ourselves for generations. A cooperative international effort could clarify the choices these nations face and could help them avoid the costly mistakes that we made in similar stages of our own development.

But my hope is born of other, more ominous concerns about the international as-

pects of environmental quality; concern about DDT being found in the fat of Antarctic penguins; concern about the oil globules that now dot the surface of the oceans; concern about the steady build-up of carbon dioxide in the Earth's atmosphere. These findings indicate that international cooperation on environmental problems would be more than helpful—it may hold that key to survival for all of mankind.

I know that it isn't fashionable today to raise the issue of survival when speaking of the environment. We are told not to be alarmists, not to jeopardize public support for environmental programs by raising unjustified fears. But the rate at which the nations of the world are pumping poisons into the air, the water, and the soil makes survival a very real issue in the long run. No portion of the complex chain-of-life on this planet can die without threatening all other forms of life; the "death" of the oceans, for example, might seal the fate of mankind.

The issue that this raises is stark: no nation can survive while other nations perish; no country can prosper while other countries pollute the ocean and the atmosphere. Ultimately, for man to continue his existence on this planet, international cooperation and understanding will have to prevail. A pragmatic concern for survival will force us to achieve what an idealistic concern for peace and friendship never could: the realization that we are all brothers, destined to perish or prosper together as a species.

Adlai Stevenson, an American who was really a citizen of the world, summed up this realization long ago. He wrote that:

"We all travel together, passengers on a little spaceship, dependent on its vulnerable reserves of air and soil; all committed for our safety to its security and peace; preserved from annihilation only by the care, the work, and the love we give our fragile craft."

Ironically, we had to launch spaceships of our own before we saw what Stevenson had seen: Earth is a spaceship herself, on which every member of the human race travels together through the solar system and the infinite universe. An Apollo astronaut on the lunar surface can block out the vision of our distant planet simply by lifting his thumb. When he looks at Earth, he can see no national boundaries, no capitals, no place names, no armies. All he can see is a tiny, shining ball suspended in the black void of outer space.

Most of us will never stand on the moon. That makes our task even more difficult than the astronauts'. We must learn to see Earth as the astronauts have seen it, yet we must do so without ever leaving the ground. If we can achieve this vision—and we must achieve it—we will concentrate less on the issues that divide mankind and more on those matters that emphasize our common problems and our inter-dependence. We will realize that pollution of the Yangtze, the Ganges, the Rhine, or the Dnieper is no less important to our continued existence than pollution of the Missouri and the Potomac. We will learn that DDT is no less hazardous to us all if it is sprayed on the Indian subcontinent instead of on the United States. And we will see that all wastes and poisons from around the world mingle together in our common environment—the air, the water, and the soil—to form a blanket of danger that envelops the guilty and innocent alike.

When we achieve this understanding, we have only two alternatives available: action or despair. To despair is to forget mankind's greatest virtues: his ability to cooperate, his ability to pass knowledge between peoples and between generations, his ability to establish goals for himself and to work until those goals have been met. Even with the aid of these abilities, however, action will not be easy. We will have to overcome centuries of mistrust, generations of conflicting ideolo-

gies, and years of suspicion and fear. But we will never be alone: no nation, no government can ignore the issue of survival.

Fortunately, there are many international organizations working today to bring about controls on pollution and harmful substances—the United Nations, NATO, and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, to name only a few. These groups are attempting to establish international treaties, inspection procedures, and environmental police powers. Their success—and the success of many similar organizations—is essential to all men.

But these organizations, important as they are, cannot provide one vital function that must be performed: the gathering and dissemination of environmental information to all nations of the world. Since each of us has a stake in the environmental quality of other nations, we cannot afford to work only through existing international organizations that include some nations and exclude others. NATO by definition involves only one community of nations; the United Nations excludes the largest country in the world.

In addition, each of the existing organizations on the world environmental front is *political* in nature and is involved in disputes between different nations and blocks of nations. Even though politics will play an important part in environmental treaties and arbitrations, politics must not be allowed to interfere with the free flow of information and knowledge between all nations and all people. The world pool of knowledge and talent is a resource that belongs, like the air and water, to all mankind. No nation should be denied access to this pool because of political disputes with other nations. In fact, the solution to international environmental disputes may hinge on the sharing of knowledge and technology by all nations alike. This knowledge includes more than conventional environmental techniques—the technology of mass transportation, housing development, and automobile safety are clearly related.

So tonight, I am proposing for the first time that a *new* international organization be created. This organization, which might be called the World Environmental Institute, would serve as a central information center for all nations of the world. Every nation—regardless of its form of government or its international and domestic policies—could consult the Institute for expert advice on all forms of environmental problems. The Institute would serve both as a research center and as the repository of that worldwide pool of knowledge and talent. Through the use of computers, any country could obtain a thorough guide to the scientists and scientific studies around the world that relate to a particular environmental problem.

Under the auspices of the Institute, a continual exchange of scientists and technological information between the countries of the world would be possible on a non-political basis—not simply on the unilateral scale of today but on a multilateral level never dreamed of before. Task forces could be set up—consultants who would work as a team and on request visit the distant parts of the globe to undertake special projects. A constant flow of specialists between the Institute and other public and private research centers throughout the world would insure a balance in the Institute's personnel and purpose.

The Institute would be an international organization similar in spirit and purpose to the Olympic Games; but, like the Games, it would not heal the political divisions of the world, even with respect to environmental problems. International environmental disputes would continue to rage, with British soot falling on Swedish forests and with an Egyptian dam upsetting the ecology of the Mediterranean. The Institute would not attempt to arbitrate such disputes—that is the

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function of organizations like the United Nations. But the Institute would attempt to provide as much and as accurate information as possible to all those concerned and to the international organization within which such conflicts will be resolved. The Institute, let me emphasize again, would have no police powers—it would be like a reference book available to any and all nations with environmental difficulties.

It is not my intention to supplant the work of those hundreds of research institutions where scientists are now at work on complex ecological problems. On the contrary, the World Environmental Institute would serve as an index to these men and their work—helping to speed the flow of knowledge between those few who discover and those millions who need. The Institute will be an exchange, a reference center, a "clearing house" on environmental information—not a monolithic super-bureaucracy. It will be founded on a simple ideal: that the stock of knowledge about environment problems ought to be held in common by all men and that all men should have access to such knowledge whenever they desire it.

Surely the time has come for the United States to take the lead and to propose creation of the Institute to the nations of the world. The time has come for us to realize that world leadership and world prestige are based on the power of ideas, not on the power of weapons. And the time has come for knowledge—that most precious of man's many resources—to be liberated from the prisons of nationalism and the shackles of the Cold War.

In the next few days, I will introduce a Senate Resolution designed to accomplish these aims. The Resolution will express the sense of the Senate that the United States should begin now to explore, both formally and informally, the attitudes of leaders around the world with respect to the creation of the World Environmental Institute. The Resolution will further urge that the Institute proposal be placed on the agenda of the World Environment Conference scheduled by the United Nations for Stockholm in 1972 and that nations who are not members of the U.N.—like Red China—be extended specific invitations to participate in that Conference. In addition, I personally stand ready to meet with foreign leaders and scientists in this country and abroad to promote the creation of the Institute.

Perhaps the plan I have laid before you is only a dream; perhaps, despite my hopes, the centuries of nationalism cannot be washed away by all the polluted waters of the world. Perhaps mankind cannot muster the will and the energy to insure his own survival. But as a Nobel Prize-winning novelist once wrote, man is not yet a finished creation: he is a challenge of the spirit. Response to that challenge of the spirit is the measure of man.

Survival is a challenge. Cooperation is a challenge. Peace is a challenge. A world view of the environment is a challenge. We may not meet these challenges, but we must try. For our response to these challenges will determine not only how we are remembered by future generations—it will determine whether or not there will be future generations to remember us at all.

Mr. KENNEDY subsequently said: Mr. President, yesterday, as America observed Earth Day, many proposals were put forth in many parts of the country to help solve the evils that pollution has done to our environment. I think yesterday's observance will bring many Americans to a greater realization that we must act to preserve and improve the environment of this Nation.

And, at this time, as we study the effects of Earth Day, I would also like

to call to the attention of the Senate a proposal put forth by the senior Senator from Washington, Senator MAGNUSON. In an address on April 16 before the second annual International Geoscience Electronics Symposium, Senator MAGNUSON made some very constructive proposals on the larger question of international cooperation to prevent pollution. His address deserves the careful consideration of all of us.

I understand that the majority leader, Senator MANSFIELD, has introduced this address into the RECORD. I would like to ask as well that the RECORD include a copy of an editorial from the Boston Globe of April 20 which examines and commends Senator MAGNUSON's proposal.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

## COURAGE ON POLLUTION

Sen. Warren G. Magnuson (D-Wash.) proposes that the United States take the lead in the establishment of a "World Environmental Institute" to conduct research and store knowledge on a problem that knows no national boundaries.

It is our obligation to support the proposal, which should not, for the most compelling of political and moral reasons, be dismissed as merely another idealistic, do-gooder scheme.

For the United States, because of its not-altogether-blessed status as the world's most prosperous nation, is, in fact, the world's biggest polluter.

It is to a measurable degree the demand for the consumer luxury of air-conditioning that produces New York's Summer brown-outs. They take their name more from the color of the sky than from the dimming of the lights in August.

The power plants (Mayor Lindsay is trying to do something about this, as are authorities in Boston) belch sulfurous fumes into the sky in order to manufacture the current to run the machines that clean the air. This cycle is increasingly futile.

Fly over the Bronx-Westchester line some bluebird-April day and look south, where you might expect to see the world's most magnificent city. You can't even see Central Park.

The ocean is dying where New York barges its sludge. Lake Erie is dead, and Michigan salmon are declared inedible. It is, largely, American DDT that is found in the too-fragile shells of osprey eggs that do not hatch and in the livers of polar bears and penguins.

Most tragically, it is petroleum to run the automobiles and the power plants of the United States that threatens the beaches and rocky foreshores of the world.

In his address that announced his proposal to the second International Geoscience Electronics Symposium, Sen. Magnuson stressed the international aspect.

"The world pool of knowledge on environmental problems," he said, "is a resource that belongs, like the air and the water, to all mankind."

"No nation should be denied access to this pool because of political disputes with other nations. Pollution of the Yangtze, the Ganges, the Rhine or the Dnieper is no less important to our continued existence than pollution of the Missouri or the Potomac."

"No nation can survive while other nations perish; no country can prosper while other countries pollute the ocean and the atmosphere. We are all brothers, destined to perish or prosper together as a species."

The senator wants the institute open to all nations, regardless of foreign or domestic policies, and he insists that the institute would be totally non-political.

Pollution, however, is already a political issue because the economic realities of the American consumer society render it political. This country has been accused, and can expect to be accused with increasing frequency and uncomfortable accuracy, of spoiling the earth in its attempt to subdue it and meet the insatiable demands of its citizens' rising economic expectations.

There is no indication that these demands and the technological capacity to meet them are going to disappear in the immediate future. Trovrau's bean patch simply does not turn Reuther's auto workers' wives on.

In this sense, the United States and all the industrial societies have a great deal of rethinking to do about the meaning of progress and the purpose of life and the courses they choose to pursue happiness.

In time, the rethinking will be done. Meanwhile, the world needs to know that this country is responsibly aware of the situation it largely has created and is actively in pursuit of means by which the blessings and the consequences of technological advance can be reconciled.

Sen. Magnuson has proposed a way. That it will, inevitably, be subject to politicking, much of it designed to embarrass this country, should not deter conservationists. Ecology is more than an issue to distract people from immediate concerns.

Just as it took courage to admit, as most people now do, that the war in Vietnam was damaging our interests, it will take courage to confess our share in the despoliation of the world. Our sin is apparent from Pitcairn to Portland.

## SAFEGUARD—1970

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, an excellent paper on the present range of arguments concerning the Safeguard ABM system has been prepared by George W. Rathjens, Ph. D., and Herbert F. York, Ph. D., Drs. Rathjens and York have long experience within the Government as well as in private life in defense armaments and technology. I believe it is the most succinct synopsis and analysis of the current arguments seeking to justify deployment of the Safeguard ABM.

I ask unanimous consent that the paper be printed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection the paper was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

## COMMENTS ON SAFEGUARD—1970

(By George W. Rathjens and Herbert F. York, April 5, 1970)

## SUMMARY

The Administration's case for Safeguard as a defense for Minuteman is far weaker than it was a year ago. The actual technical situation has not changed materially but it is now conceded that if Soviet missile forces grow as projected in intelligence estimates, even the full Phase II of Safeguard would be inadequate to defend our Minuteman force against a pre-emptive attack. The defense would be effective only if the Soviet Union were to tailor its threat to match Safeguard's limited capabilities. Safeguard as a defense of Minuteman now looks so bad on cost effectiveness grounds, even to the Administration, that it can not be defended on its own merits. It is now being rationalized on the grounds that since we need an anti-Chinese defense anyway, the defense of Minuteman can be justified as an addition.

There is no need to go ahead with Minuteman defense at this time. We could safely wait a year to see how the "threat" is develop-

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ing, and then make decisions, if necessary, to buttress our retaliatory strength. Options other than Safeguard would be less costly, more effective, and, even with a year's delay, available on a shorter time scale than Safeguard. Cancelling Safeguard (and deferral for a year or so of decisions to go ahead with additional offensive forces as well) would be highly desirable both because of dollar savings and because the prospects for a successful SALT outcome would be enhanced.

The arguments that Safeguard is needed to cope with a possible Chinese attack and that it could do so infallibly are both wrong. We can and should rely on deterrence vis-à-vis China (while at the same time trying to bring China into the world community). Safeguard is unlikely to be available by the time the Chinese have their first ICBM's. When it is available, the Chinese are likely to have capabilities for penetrating it. Certainly it would be foolhardy for the United States, in a belief in Safeguard's infallibility, to take actions some years hence that might lead to a Chinese attack.

Any attempt to maintain even a moderately effective defense in the face of an evolving Chinese "threat" is to commit ourselves to a program that will require continuous improvement and massive expansion. The money being asked for this year should be recognized as but the ante in a program that will involve the expenditure of billions each year with no end in sight and no increase in our security.

Not only should there be no expansion of Safeguard, the program should be cancelled forthwith. With Safeguard having been approved last year by a single vote it is clear that the collective view of the Senate was that the case for even Phase I was very marginal. Those Senators who had doubts about the proposal last year, but who voted for it, will find many of their doubts resolved this year in favor of cancellation. The Administration has now gone most of the way in conceding the validity of the opposition's arguments of a year ago. This is apparent from a careful reading of Defense Department statements of this year. It will become more apparent with questioning of Administration witnesses.

## (1) DEFENSE OF MINUTEMAN

*The Administration now recognizes that the radars are the Achilles' heel of the Safeguard defense of Minuteman.*

There are two problems with the radars: they are relatively soft targets (perhaps able to withstand 1/10 the blast overpressure that Minuteman missile sites can withstand); and they are very expensive (of the order of \$200 million each).

Because they are so soft, weapons with relatively poor yield-accuracy combinations will be able to destroy them. This means that the Soviet SS-11 missiles, of which there are very large numbers, would suffice. Also, if the Soviet Union should develop a MIRV capability for its SS-9 missile, that missile could carry large numbers of warheads of yield adequate to destroy the Safeguard radars. The defense cannot function at all if the Missile Site Radars (MSR's) are destroyed. Therefore, a large fraction of the defensive interceptors must be deployed so they can protect the MSR's. Because the range of the Sprint interceptor missiles is only about 25 miles, interceptors that are deployed so that they can defend the MSR's will be unable to defend many of the Minutemen in any given complex (the complex at Great Falls is about 200 miles across). Interceptors deployed to defend the more remote Minutemen would be unable to protect the MSR's. In addition, controlling the

interceptors remote from the radar could be something of a problem.<sup>1</sup>

These problems could be very largely alleviated if it were feasible to employ a number of redundant radars at each Minuteman base. However, the very high cost of the radars makes this unattractive. Opposition witnesses suggested that the system might be greatly improved by developing and utilizing a radar specifically engineered for hard-point defense. However, the Administration brushed aside such suggestions. Thus, Dr. Foster, the Director of Defense Research and Engineering said:

"Each year we have looked for a cheap radar that could defend hard sites, and each year we have tried to think of a way of having a lot of radars that could do the job. And then we have come down on the decision that you really have to have a radar that can cope with all of the kinds of things that the enemy might throw at those hard points that you are trying to defend, and that is not a cheap radar. It is a rather expensive radar."

"This radar, from Raytheon, costs about \$40 million.<sup>2</sup> Now you could get a radar for \$10 million, but it would not do the kind of things that we think the radar has to do if it is to accomplish this mission." (ref. 3, p. 194)

and Secretary Packard:

"There has been talk about the possibility of using smaller harder radars for the defense of Minuteman. There are some areas where smaller and harder radars might be utilized, but this question has in fact been investigated. It is our conclusion, after looking at all aspects of the matter, that we need the kind of capability that the Missile Site Radar we are recommending here has, and we need the size in order to achieve that capability." (ref. 3, p. 1681-1682)

The Administration is now actively facing up to the fact that an effective defense against a heavy threat cannot be based on the MSR.

Thus this year we have Dr. Foster saying:

<sup>1</sup> The problems of the defense of remote Minutemen were not well developed in last year's debate. In March Secretary Laird claimed with reference to Safeguard Phase I, "A heavy cover would be provided to roughly one-third of our Minutemen missile force" (ref. 1, p. 180). The use of the figure 1/3 implied that virtually all of the Minutemen at Grand Forks and Malstrom would be defended. Opposition witnesses pointed out that if the remote missiles were defended the same interceptors could not be used to defend the MSR's. There is an additional problem in that the MSR would be unable to "see" the remote Sprint missiles until they were well above the ground (for those as far as 80 miles away the altitude would be several miles above the horizon). This problem arises because of the earth's curvature and because radars do not work well against targets that are only a degree or two above the horizon.

Presumably in recognition of these problems Mr. Laird changed his position regarding the coverage for Minuteman that could be provided by Safeguard. Thus he said in May "We would have heavier protection for at least 10 to 20% of our Minuteman force". (ref. 2, p. 46)

There is no admission in the record that with this reduction in the number of missiles defended by Sprints there would be a reduction in Safeguard effectiveness.

<sup>2</sup> The cost of an MSR installed with the associated data processing equipment is now estimated at \$150-200 million.

"If the Soviet threat to Minuteman should increase beyond levels that could be handled by the Phase II Safeguard multi-purpose defense, we might wish to augment the system by deploying several terminal defense radars in each Minuteman field. For this reason we have budgeted for development of a new radar, smaller and less expensive than the MSR. The new radar, although less capable than the MSR, could be deployed in greater numbers to improve defense survivability." (ref. 4, p. 2)

*The Administration now concedes that Safeguard, including the full Phase II deployment, will be quite inadequate if Soviet forces grow as projected.*

Secretary Laird now says:

"We are now faced with the following possibilities concerning Minuteman:

"(a) That the Soviets do not increase the deployment of the SS-9 and the SS-11, do not develop a MIRV for the SS-9, and do not improve ICBM accuracy. Under these circumstances there is no need for a defense of the Minuteman force.

"(b) That the Soviets stop building ICBM's beyond those now operational or started; they do not develop a MIRV for the SS-9; but they do improve the accuracy of their entire ICBM force. Under these circumstances, the force could constitute a threat to the Minuteman force and Safeguard would be quite effective against that threat.

"(c) That the Soviets deploy a MIRV on the SS-9, improve their ICBM accuracy, and do not stop building ICBM's at this time, but continue building them at their present rate. We would then be faced in the mid-70's with a threat which is much too large to be handled by the level of defense envisioned in the Safeguard system without substantial improvement and modification. (ref. 5, p. 48)

"To be perfectly candid, Mr. Chairman, it must be recognized that the threat could actually turn out to be considerably larger than the Safeguard defense is designed to handle. That is one reason we have decided to pursue several courses which should lead to less expensive options for the solution to this problem than expanding Safeguard to meet the highest threat level." (ref. 5, p. 49)

The contingency suggested in paragraph b of the quotation above implies a less active Soviet program than even the "Low-Force-Low Technology" estimate of the intelligence community. That estimate, according to Secretary Laird, credits the Soviet Union with possibly "hard target multiple RV's as early as mid-1972", and with a "hard target kill capability [that] would be considerable" (ref. 5, p. 104). It is not much of an exaggeration to say that the only circumstance, by the Administration's own admission, under which Safeguard would be effective would be one where the Soviet Union could be induced to tailor its strategic force to match the meager capabilities of Safeguard! Such a Soviet force posture might result if the SALT negotiations were successful, but otherwise seems exceedingly unlikely. Contrast this situation to that of a year ago when the Administration was claiming that Safeguard was needed in case the SALT negotiations failed. Secretary Packard: "It provides a hedge against failure of arms control. If the Soviets refuse a workable agreement, then this country will be able to move to a protection of its second-strike force, if the Soviets continue to install more effective weapons." (ref. 1, p. 263)

Also contrast this with the Administration contention that Safeguard would be effective against a Soviet missile threat including one that involved not only increased accuracy but also MIRV's and increased numbers of SS-9's. Secretary Laird last year:

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The relative effectiveness of Safeguard option 2A in defending our Minuteman force can be measured in terms of the threat I mentioned earlier; namely, the large Soviet SS-9 type missile equipped with three independently targetable 5-megaton warheads with an accuracy of one-quarter of a mile. With a force of 420 of these missiles on launchers and an assumed failure rate of 20 percent, the Soviets could place over the Minuteman fields about 1,000 warheads. Without any ABM defense, it is possible that only about 50 Minutemen would survive. (A mixed force made up of fewer large missiles but including a number of highly accurate small missiles could produce similar results.) With Safeguard Phase I, perhaps two or three times as many Minutemen would survive and with Safeguard option 2A perhaps five or six times as many." (ref. 2, p. 27-28) and Dr. John Foster:

"We think on the basis of those kinds of calculations that we can on an economic and practical basis, defend the Minuteman field against anything the Soviets will throw at us." (ref. 3, p. 225)

*Because Safeguard is patently an uneconomic approach to defense of Minuteman, the Administration is now rationalizing its deployment as a desirable add-on to a nationwide defense that should be deployed against China anyway.*

Secretary Laird:

"We have further decided to continue deployment of Safeguard because the additional cost needed to defend a portion of Minuteman is small if the full area defense is bought." (ref. 5, p. 49)

Secretary Packard has estimated the costs for Safeguard Phase I to be \$4.5 billion and for the modified Phase II (i.e. adding more interceptors and the defense at Whiteman Air Force Base) to be \$5.9 billion (ref. 6, p. 16). From Secretary Laird's statement that with Phase I at least 10-20% of the Minutemen would have a heavy defense (ref. 2, p. 46) one might reasonably infer that at most 150 to 225 would be defended by Sprints in the case of Phase I. These figures are obviously an upper limit on the number that could be saved no matter what the weight of attack (provided it is of a quality such that it can penetrate the Spartan defenses). Thus, the minimum cost per Minuteman saved will be \$20-30 million with the Phase I deployment. Perhaps 50% more Minutemen could be saved as an upper limit with the expansion to include Whiteman. In that case the minimum costs would run about \$20-25 million per Minuteman. Compare these costs with those for buying additional Minutemen (6 or 7 million each for super-hard silos [ref. 2, p. 48] plus perhaps 2 million for missile), or with the cost of additional Polaris boats. (The whole Polaris force cost only about twice the cost of Safeguard Phase I.)

Looked at another way the Soviet problem of overwhelming Safeguard would be simple indeed, particularly if they have MIRV's. The SS-9 should be able to carry a dozen or so warheads of yield adequate, even without accuracy improvement, to destroy the MSR. A few month's production of SS-9's would suffice to exhaust the Phase I defenses and probably less than a year's production would exhaust the modified Phase II defenses.

This rationalization is fantastic particularly considering that there is not now a commitment to the full 12 site program, and there may never be. As will be apparent subsequently, the rationalization for a nationwide Safeguard, i.e. full Phase II, is about as weak as that for defense of Minuteman. If one truly regarded the Chinese rationale as primary, the order of implementation of the Safeguard program would be far different

than the Administration plans. The first two sites deployed will provide coverage over only about 7% of the population and will be the least effective of the twelve in defending U.S. population. Two sites deployed for optimum defense of population would provide coverage over an area containing ten times as many people. Grand Forks and Malstrom would be the last sites deployed if we were primarily interested in population defense against China. Considering that, and the fact that there is considerable likelihood that we will never go through with a full Phase II deployment, virtually the full cost of the first two sites, and Whiteman as well, must be charged to defense of Minuteman.

*Secretary Laird now concedes that we could have much greater confidence in the deterrent capability of the Polaris-Poseidon fleet alone than he was prepared to admit a year ago.*

In the Administration's first rationalization of Safeguard they were scarcely willing to admit the deterrent role of Polaris. With criticism and under questioning, they eventually did so. Even then, however, they suggested that Polaris might be vulnerable to Soviet ASW effort to a degree inconsistent with reasonable technical judgment. Following further criticism they now take a more realistic view. The technical situation remains essentially as it was a year ago, but there is considerable difference in Administration statements as the following examples illustrate. Note particularly in 1969 Secretary Laird indicated serious concern after 1972-73, but that this year he suggests some increase in Polaris vulnerability after the mid-1970's. March 30, 1969 Secretary Laird:

"The next question: Is there any reason to believe that our Poseidon force will be vulnerable to preemptive attack during the early 1970's?

"If this particular question is limited to the period through 1972-73, I would say I believe that our force will remain very free from attack. If you go beyond that time period, I would have to question that seriously. . . ." (ref. 3, p. 192)

February 20, 1970 Secretary Laird:

"According to our best current estimates, we believe that our Polaris and Poseidon submarines at sea can be considered virtually invulnerable today. With a highly concentrated effort, the Soviet Navy today might be able to localize and destroy at sea one or two Polaris submarines. But the massive and expensive undertaking that would be required to extend such a capability using any currently known ASW techniques would take time and would certainly be evident.

"However, a combination of technological developments and the decision by the Soviets to undertake a worldwide ASW effort might result in some increased degree of Polaris/Poseidon vulnerability beyond the mid-1970's. I would hope that Polaris would remain invulnerable at least through the 1970's. But, as a defense planner, I would never guarantee the invulnerability of any strategic system beyond the reasonably foreseeable future, say 5-7 years." (ref. 5, p. 40)

*The Administration suggests that the alternative to expanding the Safeguard deployment is to decide now to build new offensive systems thereby exacerbating the arms race. The argument is inconsistent with lead time realities.*

We need not make decisions at this time to deploy any new offensive systems if Safeguard is held to Phase II or cancelled. The defense at Whiteman Air Force Base will not be operational until 1975 at the earliest (and the other sites probably won't be either). Additional Minutemen could be deployed in considerably less time. This, Secretary Packard concedes:

"We think it (deployment of additional Minutemen) would take three or four years, including all of the administrative lead time." (ref. 3, p. 1741)

The deployment of additional Minutemen at a time when they may be obsolescent because of MIRV development is hardly very attractive, but neither is spending billions on an ineffective defense of those we have. However, if one insists on increasing the number of Minutemen that would survive a Soviet first strike in the second half of the decade, clearly deploying more is an option that is preferable to defense. It would be considerably cheaper. It would be considerably more effective in increasing the number of surviving Minutemen we would have in the event of an attack against the force. This would be particularly so if they could be superhardened as may well be possible. And, what is most important, no decision would have to be made now. We could wait at least a year, and more likely two, while we tried to negotiate an end to the arms race. If at that time the construction of more Minutemen was indicated, we could begin and they would be operational as soon as Safeguard would be.

Realistically, we could also wait a year or so and then build more Poseidon submarines if it appeared necessary. They too would be more cost-effective, and they could probably also be operational by the time Safeguard would be.

Thus, Secretary Laird is being disingenuous when he says:

"In summary, our decision now to proceed with further deployment of Safeguard gives us another year in which to pursue SALT without ourselves exacerbating the arms control environment through actions on offensive systems." (ref. 5, p. 50)

## (2) DEFENSE AGAINST CHINA

*Safeguard is unlikely to be operational by the time a "Chinese Threat" develops.*

According to Secretary Laird the Chinese may have an initial operational capability (IOC) with ICBM's by early 1973 though more likely in 1975 or 1976 (ref. 5, p. 109). The last of the twelve Safeguard sites could be installed by the late 1970's (ref. 6, p. 17).<sup>4</sup> Obviously as a defense against China Safeguard won't be much good until completed since if a few large cities are undefended they could be attacked even if the remainder of the defense were operational. If present plans are implemented there would be at least several years during which the Chinese would have an operational ICBM force when the large cities of California and those of the south would be undefended. *The President's statement that Safeguard could provide a "virtually infallible" defense against China (ref. 7) is technically unrealistic and dangerous.*

A single Chinese weapon of the yield they have already tested, 3 megatons, and which is suitable for their ICBM's (ref. 4, p. 4) could inflict well over a million fatalities if delivered on a large American city and a force of 25, even if only 40% reliable could inflict 11-12 million fatalities (ref. 5, p. 43). A defense might well reduce the number of Chinese weapons that could be delivered but it is totally unrealistic to expect none to get through, and it is quite likely that several will. There are a number of reasons for this: the radars might be blacked out, the Chinese might concentrate their attack against one or two areas, they might use penetration aids that would be highly effective, and the defense might just fail catastrophically.

The President's statement is a dangerous one in four respects:

(1) It was claimed that the anti-Chinese defense was needed so that we could credibly deter China from aggressive behavior vis-a-

<sup>4</sup>Last year Secretary Laird suggested that the full Safeguard deployment could be completed by mid-1976 (ref. 2, p. 28, 85). Secretary Packard more cautiously suggested 1977 (ref. 1, p. 295).

<sup>1</sup>Just how practical and economic the presently proposed defense is likely to be can be illustrated by some simple calculations.



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vis its neighbors. The clear implication is that with Safeguard in place the United States might take actions that it could not prudently take in the absence of defense. This suggests that millions of American lives might be lost if a future president, in an unwarranted belief in Safeguard's "infallibility", should take actions which might trigger a Chinese nuclear attack against us.

(2) The statement suggests an aggressive approach to dealing with China, not consistent with the Administration's otherwise constructive moves in this area.

(3) The statement, like the whole Safeguard proposal, will cause a reduction in confidence of the American public and the world in the U.S. Government as the incredibility of the argument becomes apparent.

(4) The statement suggests that the President is being dangerously isolated from responsible technical opinion on questions that seriously affect the security of the nation.

*The Administration's attempt to buttress its case for an anti-Chinese defense by arguing that deterrence may not work vis-a-vis China is unconvincing.*

Secretary Laird has argued (ref. 5, p. 43-45) that deterring China may not be feasible because such a large fraction of Chinese population is rural and because we must have enough weapons after war with China to deter the Soviet Union.

It is true that only a small percentage of Chinese population is in large cities but most of the industry and the technical and political leadership is concentrated there. A modest number of weapons delivered against the large cities would, therefore, probably destroy the government if not a large percentage of the people. But even aside from that, rural China is very vulnerable and this the Secretary has not recognized. Some 3/4 of China's population is concentrated in only about 1/4 of its area. Considering that, China would be very vulnerable to a fall-out attack. This will be especially so since outside the cities fall-out shelter potentialities are likely to be poor and stockpiles of food and medical supplies inadequate. A few hundred B-52's if loaded with high yield, surface burst weapons could probably destroy both China's urban and rural population. Thus, we can deter China without compromising in any way our missile capabilities. Moreover, considering China's poor air defenses virtually all our bombers would probably survive a single attack or even several round trips against China. Thus, our bomber capabilities vis-a-vis the USSR would be reduced only slightly should we ever execute a strike against China designed to destroy her totally.

*The Administration's claim that the Chinese are unlikely to develop effective penetration aids by the time Safeguard is fully deployed or soon thereafter (ref. 6, p. 9) is unrealistic.*

Secretary Packard argues that the Chinese lack complex range instrumentation and skilled technical people that would be required to design and test penetration aids in which they could have confidence (op. cit.). In making the argument he totally misses the point that it is we who must have confidence that Chinese penetration aids will not work if we are to behave as if our defenses were "infallible"—not China, that must have confidence that they will work. The Chinese could not attack the United States whether they had effective penetration aids or not without inviting the total destruction of China. Thus, the only rational purpose that a Chinese ICBM capability can serve vis-a-vis the U.S. is as a deterrent to us. For that purpose it is our view of Chinese penetration aid effectiveness that will be relevant. We cannot be sure they will not work.

In denigrating Chinese penetration aid potentialities Secretary Packard is probably wrong on technical grounds as well. He cites the fact that it has taken us ten years to develop high-confidence penetration aids,

and uses this to buttress his argument that "Safeguard Phase II is expected to have a capability more than adequate to cope with the Chinese threat in the late 1970's" (ref. 5, p. 9). In so arguing, he completely misreads the history of technological emulation, and that is that once a new device or technology has been developed somewhere in the world others can repeat the development at much less cost and in a much shorter time than the original pioneers. There are countless examples of this but perhaps few that are as relevant and dramatic as the development of thermonuclear weapons. The intervals between a first nuclear explosion and a first thermo-nuclear explosion were 7.3 and 2.7 years for the United States and China respectively. Belief that the Chinese cannot develop high quality penetration aids in a much shorter time than it has taken us is wishful thinking. If they test their first ICBM in, say, 1974, we must expect them, by the time Safeguard is fully deployed, to have penetration aids as effective as those we now have; and against such penetration aids the Safeguard area defense would be ineffective.

While the weapons enthusiasts may have schemes in mind for upgrading Safeguard so that it would be effective against an evolving Chinese capability, there is no realistic basis for Secretary Packard's contention that we could do so without a general thickening of the system (ref. 6, p. 10). The best hope of providing a reasonably effective defense against a late 1970 Chinese capability, and it would not be "infallible" would be to begin building now a defense very much like the kinds we have considered for defense of population and industry against the Soviet Union, i.e. terminal type defenses for all large American cities, and a nationwide fall-out shelter program. A realistic anti-Chinese defense implies an unending program requiring the expenditure of probably five to ten times the amounts projected for Safeguard and it implies a defense to which the Soviet Union would probably react by further expanding its strategic offensive forces.

## (3) DEFENSE OF BOMBERS

*With the erosion of its Minuteman and anti-Chinese rationales for Safeguard, the Administration is likely to play up the defense of bombers, but it has yet to explain why such a defense is necessary.*

Leaving aside entirely the extreme unlikelihood of the Soviet Union being able to destroy the Polaris force simultaneously with an attack against our ICBM's and bombers, the Administration still has not explained how the Soviet Union could confidently attack the latter two forces. If an attack were designed so that Soviet missiles would impact simultaneously on both our missile and bomber bases, we would have 15 to 30 minutes warning of the launch of Soviet ICBM's before impact. If the bombers are in a reasonable alert status a very large fraction should be air borne before the arrival of either Soviet ICBM's or SLBM's over the bomber bases. On the other hand, the Soviet Union could hardly defer launching its ICBM's against our Minuteman bases in an attempt to deliver a surprise SLBM attack against the bombers. Were they to do so, they would have to expect that the bulk of the Minuteman force would be launched between the time they destroyed our bombers and the time their ICBM's would arrive over our Minuteman bases.

*Even if fully implemented Safeguard Phase II will provide very little defense for bombers against a Soviet SLBM attack.*

While there has been little if any discussion of a possible MIRV program for Soviet SLBM's, it would be surprising if such a program did not develop if other MIRV programs continue. If the Soviet SLBM's use either MIRV's or high quality penetration aids, the Safeguard area defenses may be quite inadequate. Those air bases not defended by Sprints will have very little pro-

tection. The Administration has indeed proposed terminal defenses at the bomber bases (ref. 2, p. 78). Yet, MSR's and Sprints will be located near at most 1/4 of the main operating bomber bases (ref. 3, p. 1749) that are near enough to our coasts to make a surprise SLBM attack feasible. To provide even a moderately effective defense for bombers would require increasing greatly the planned numbers of MRS's and Sprints.

## (4) DEFENSE AGAINST ACCIDENTS

*The Administration still argues that Safeguard would be useful in coping with the arrival over the U.S. of one or a few accidentally launched missiles. Yet, it does not explain how the command and control problem would be solved.*

If Safeguard is to be effective in dealing with accidents, it must be usable at all times. This almost certainly implies delegation to launch down to very low command echelons including possibly even to the computers. Administration spokesmen continue to be obscure about this point, presumably either because they do not want to upset the public or because they have not yet decided on the command and control philosophy that will prevail.

## (5) COSTS AND SCHEDULES

*Not surprisingly Safeguard costs have escalated and the deployment schedules have slipped during the last year.*

Last year it was claimed that the full Safeguard Phase II (including RDT & E but excluding AEC costs and annual operating costs) would be \$9.1 billion (ref. 2, p. 29). Ten months later the corresponding figure is \$10.7 billion (ref. 6, p. 17), an increase of over 17%.<sup>4</sup> And the program has slipped somewhere between 6 months and 10 months during the last year. (Secretary Laird admits to six or seven months slippage [ref. 8, p. 8] but Secretary Packard admits to 8 to 10 months [ref. 6, p. 6].)

The latter's explanations regarding slippage and increases in costs are interesting. He attributes 3 months' slippage to delay in getting Congressional approval for the Safeguard last year, but asserts that the remainder is "deliberate, to allow a more economical and less compressed construction schedule (5 to 7 months)" (ref. 6, p. 6). Curiously, later on Secretary Packard attributes 6% of the 17% increase in costs to the stretch-out of deployment (ref. 6, p. 18). (Of the remaining 11%, 4% he claims is due to inflation and 7% to design changes and more detailed estimates.)

We stretch out programs so that they will be more economical, but they cost more because we stretch them out!

## (6) SAFEGUARD—SOVIET REACTIONS AND SALT

*Now that expansion beyond Phase I is contemplated, the Administration's contention that Safeguard is unlikely to lead to an expansion in Soviet Strategic capabilities is even less convincing this year than it was last year.*

If we are to have a defense that will be significantly effective in coping with an evolving Chinese ICBM force, the defense too must evolve. Unless that is contemplated there would be no sense whatever in starting on an anti-Chinese defense program. Yet, if we do try to build a defense that will be effective a decade hence, it will almost necessarily have to be a "thick" one, and deployment of large numbers of MSR or similar type radars will have to begin soon. With such moves, the Soviet Union is likely to further expand its offenses to offset its extrapolations of what that deployment may portend in the way of a large-scale nationwide ABM system. That would certainly be the

<sup>4</sup>If costs continue to rise at this rate we will be at the \$25-\$40 billion level by the time the full Phase II deployment could be implemented.

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American reaction were we to see a similar deployment in the Soviet Union.

A similar reaction is likely to follow a serious effort to defend bomber bases. A number are near enough to larger cities so that MSR's are used for defense of the base could also be used to defend a city, and in some cases the bases and cities are so close to each other that the same Spirit interceptors could be used to defend both. If we don't put in MSR's and Sprints near the bases we won't have much of a defense. If we do, the Soviet Union is likely to perceive a need to expand its offenses to offset the implied city defense capability.

Defense of Washington will almost certainly lead to whatever Soviet targeting they feel is required, and if need be to increases in overall force levels, just as the Soviet defenses of Moscow have resulted in heavier American targeting of that city.

The Administration has argued that a full-scale Safeguard will be less likely to stimulate a Soviet response than Sentinel would have been because the radars will be more remote from large cities. However, if the map prepared by the Administration is even approximately correct MSR's will be deployed within 50 or 100 miles of a number of large American cities: Seattle, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Dallas, Kansas City, Detroit, Washington, Baltimore, and Boston. Sprints 50 miles from such cities could not defend them. However, the Sprints can be added relatively quickly if the radars are available and close enough to control them. Again, a Soviet reaction is likely. We may believe we have deployed the radars too far from cities to be useful for terminal defense, but will they? Would we discount MSR's 50 or 100 miles from large Soviet cities? Not likely.

*The argument that we need Safeguard so that we will have a strong hand in the SALT negotiations is far weaker this year than last.*

It is now admitted that Safeguard cannot cope with the kind of Soviet threat that is to be expected if the SALT talks fail, and it is rationalized on economic grounds as an add-on to a nationwide anti-Chinese defense. Under the circumstances, neither the anti-Chinese part of Safeguard nor the Minuteman defense is a very impressive card in the SALT negotiations. The former is hardly negotiable with the Russians; and the latter is so ineffective that it is hardly likely to impress the Soviet Union as something which they should pay a price to have us forego.

## REFERENCES

(1) Strategic and Foreign Policy Implications of ABM Systems, Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Organization and Disarmament Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Ninety-first Congress, First Session, March 6, 11, 13, 21, 16, and 28, 1969.

(2) Safeguard Antiballistic Missile System, Hearings before Subcommittees of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, Ninety-first Congress, First Session, May 22, 1969.

(3) Authorization for Military Procurement, Research and Development, Fiscal Year 1970, and Reserve Strength. Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, Ninety-first Congress, First Session, March 19, 20, 25, 26, 27; April 1, 2, 3, 15, 16, 17, 22, 23, 29, 30; May 13, 14, 15; June 3, 4, 1969.

(4) Statement by Dr. John Foster, Director, Defense Research and Engineering, on FY 71 Modified Phase II Safeguard Program, 24 February 1970.

(5) Statement of Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird before a Joint Session of the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Senate Subcommittee on Department of Defense Appropriations on the Fiscal Year 1971 Defense Program and Budget, February 20, 1970.

(6) Statement of Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard to Committee on Armed

Services, United States House of Representatives, March 9, 1970.

(7) President Nixon's News Conference of January 30, 1970.

(8) Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird's News Conference of February 24, 1970.

## EXECUTIVE SESSION

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate go into executive session to consider nominations for the U.S. circuit court, the U.S. district court, U.S. attorneys, and U.S. marshals. I do so with the understanding that they were reported unanimously by the committee earlier today, and they have been cleared on both sides.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. SPONG). Without objection, it is so ordered.

## U.S. CIRCUIT COURT

The assistant legislative clerk read the nomination of Wilbur F. Pell, Jr., of Indiana, to be a U.S. circuit judge, seventh circuit.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the nomination is considered and confirmed.

## U.S. DISTRICT COURT

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to read sundry nominations to the U.S. district court.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the nominations be considered en bloc.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the nominations are considered and confirmed en bloc.

## U.S. ATTORNEYS

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to read sundry nominations of U.S. attorneys.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the nominations be considered en bloc.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the nominations are considered and confirmed en bloc.

## U.S. MARSHALS

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to read sundry nominations of U.S. marshals.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the nominations be considered en bloc.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the nominations are considered and confirmed en bloc.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the President be immediately notified of the confirmation of these nominations.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

## LEGISLATIVE SESSION

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I move that the Senate resume the consideration of legislative business.

The motion was agreed to; and the

Senate resumed the consideration of legislative business.

## NAMING OF FEDERAL OFFICE BUILDING AND U.S. COURTHOUSE IN CHICAGO, ILL.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask the Chair to lay before the Senate a message from the House of Representatives on S. 3253.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. SPONG) laid before the Senate the amendments of the House of Representatives to the bill (S. 3253) to provide that the Federal Office Building and U.S. Courthouse in Chicago, Ill., shall be named the "Everett McKinley Dirksen Building East" and that the Federal office building to be constructed in Chicago, Ill., shall be named the "Everett McKinley Dirksen Building West" in memory of the late Everett McKinley Dirksen, a Member of Congress of the United States from the State of Illinois from 1933 to 1969, which were to strike out all after the enacting clause and insert:

That the Federal Office Building and United States Courthouse at 219 South Dearborn Street in Chicago, Illinois, shall be renamed the "Everett McKinley Dirksen Building" in memory of the late Everett McKinley Dirksen, a distinguished Member of the United States House of Representatives from the State of Illinois from 1933 to 1949 and of the United States Senate from 1950 to 1969. Any reference to the Federal Office Building and United States Courthouse at 219 South Dearborn Street in Chicago, Illinois, in any law, regulation, document, record, map, or other paper of the United States shall be deemed a reference to such building as the "Everett McKinley Dirksen Building".

And amend the title so as to read: "An act to provide that the Federal Office Building and U.S. Courthouse in Chicago, Ill., shall be named the 'Everett McKinley Dirksen Building'."

Mr. YOUNG of North Dakota. Mr. President, I move that the Senate concur in the amendments of the House with an amendment which I send to the desk on behalf of myself and Senators HRUSKA, MANSFIELD, SCOTT, MUNDT, BURDICK, and CURTIS.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. SPONG). The amendment will be stated.

The ASSISTANT LEGISLATIVE CLERK read as follows:

SEC. 2. Upon a determination that a local educational agency lacks the fiscal capacity to provide an adequate free public education for children of persons who live and work on Federal property, and if such children constitute not less than 25 percent of the total enrollment, the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare shall from sums already available make emergency payments for the current school year to such local educational agency as may be necessary to provide a free public education for such children: *Provided*, That the total of such payments shall not exceed \$2,500,000 and shall not exceed the average per-pupil cost to such agency for all children eligible to receive a free public education from such agency, less Federal and State payments to such agency for free public education.

Mr. YOUNG of North Dakota. Mr. President, this amendment has been cleared by the leadership, the distinguished Senator from Montana (Mr.

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Mr. YOUNG of North Dakota. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. HRUSKA. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

# NINETY-EIGHTH ANNUAL ARBOR DAY

Mr. HRUSKA. Mr. President, in the tremendous outpouring of public response and cooperation on Earth Day yesterday, another venerable observance of equal importance may have been overlooked by some who are interested in conserving the Nation's great natural heritage.

The observance of which I speak is the 98th annual Arbor Day. While Arbor Day is observed in every State in the Union and in many foreign countries, it is a most important celebration to Nebraska because Nebraska is the State in which it originated.

Nebraska statute has established Arbor Day on April 22 and decreed it a legal holiday. It is celebrated no less vigorously in Florida and West Virginia, which have two Arbor Days each year, and in Utah.

Whether Arbor Day is officially observed on April 22, or on other dates as it may be in other States, I think it is important to remind this body that millions of people do observe this occasion every year.

It is also important to point out that in an age when we are increasingly concerned about the dissipation of our natural resources, we would do well as a Nation to reemphasize the basic values which motivated J. Sterling Morton to establish the first Arbor Day in 1872 in Nebraska.

Mr. Morton, newspaper publisher, horticulturist, and public servant, conceived the idea of Arbor Day in Nebraska City, Nebr., where he had moved from Michigan. Disturbed by Nebraska's miles of treeless plains, he inspired fellow Nebraskans to devote one day each spring to mass tree-planting.

Within 16 years after his mass tree-planting day had become an official State observance, more than 600 million trees had been planted and 100,000 acres of forest had been created on the once-barren Nebraska prairies.

The idea of Arbor Day spread quickly and within a few years, more than 35 States conducted their own observance. Today, every State observes the holiday, and in addition it is commemorated in England, Canada, Australia, British West Indies, South Africa, New Zealand, France, Mexico, Norway, Russia, Japan, and China.

J. Sterling Morton went on to serve his State as secretary of the Nebraska Territory and president of the State board of agriculture, and his Nation as Secretary of Agriculture under President Grover Cleveland. But, with all his excel-

lent contributions to his State and Nation, he is best remembered for the conservation instincts which he instilled into a Nation of abundance in its early years.

Nebraska City, Nebr., the home of Arbor Day, is planning a massive celebration May 1-3 for this year's observance. Among the many events scheduled will be a tree planting by the National Guard in memory of the late Ray Thurman, a former Guard company commander. A similar planting at the VFW Home will honor each veteran killed in a war.

It will be my honor to attend the Nebraska City celebration, along with many other State officials and dignitaries from all over the State.

I am pleased to report, Mr. President, that the Senate Judiciary Committee today has reported to the floor House Joint Resolution 251, which authorizes the President to proclaim the last Friday of April each year as National Arbor Day. I urge the Senate to approve this resolution, enabling the President to elevate this important Arbor Day function to the national status which it so well deserves.

We, in Nebraska, are proud of Arbor Day and we observe it vigorously. Several other States follow suit. But, too often, the observances have fallen into a status of a formality which cannot be ignored but is not actively observed.

We are now in a period in this Nation when we are more and more concerned that our resources will be drained off and lost to future generations. I commend to those who are so concerned, the example of J. Sterling Morton. If more of us would take his positive approach to solving our resource problems, we might soon discover that we were indeed beginning to solve them.

Two fine newspapers, The New York Times and the Lincoln, Nebr., Sunday Journal & Star, last weekend took note of the importance of Arbor Day. I ask unanimous consent to have the articles printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

[From the Lincoln (Nebr.) Journal and Star, Apr. 19, 1970]

J. STERLING MORTON'S IDEA AN ECOLOGICAL STEP—ARBOR DAY ROOTS DEEP IN STATE  
(By Opal Y. Palmer)

Arbor Day is observed around the world by millions each year.

To many J. Sterling Morton's Arbor Lodge is synonymous with the concept. Today the lodge is a state park with its own arboretum, the family stables, a formal garden and a 2,000-tree pine grove planted by Morton in 1892.

This park contains a three-room cabin grown into a 52-room mansion on the site of his original squatter's claim.

... When the noted agriculturalist brought his bride, Caroline Joy, from Michigan to Nebraska in 1855 their destination was a 160-acre claim in the Nebraska Territory near the brawling river bluffs town of Nebraska City.

Morton's land was fertile but practically treeless although many trees grew on the river bluffs. After building an L-shaped house, he began planting trees. His site was probably the first in any prairie state to be landscaped. He set shade trees, planted an orchard and later landscaped with vines, shrubs and flower beds.

J. Sterling Morton emphasized tree planting through oratory, journalism and politics. He spoke on the subject at the First Territorial Fair in 1859 and at the dedication of the University of Nebraska in 1871. He used his pen in a tree campaign in the Nebraska City News.

After Nebraska statehood in 1867, Morton encouraged farmers—through publications and personal contact—to plant orchards. He employed political influence to get trees planted in honor of notables visiting the state.

At the 1872 annual meeting of the Nebraska Board of Agriculture of which he was a member, Morton presented a resolution that April 10 be set aside for tree planting and that it be called Arbor Day.

The resolution was adopted. But in 1885 the state legislature made Arbor Day a legal holiday and set the official date on April 22, J. Sterling Morton's birthday.

Other states followed Nebraska's example. It was almost as though an old Indian legend were in operation, where one tree whispered the message to another. For today, every state except Alaska observes a tree-planting day.

Nebraska's act inspired Illinois to proclaim an Arbor Day in 1888.

When the white man arrived, half of the area which is now Illinois was wooded. Early settlers permitted forests to burn unchecked and ravaged trees for industry. Conservationists seized on Morton's Arbor Day idea in an attempt to repair the damage with systematic planting.

C. A. Hammond, secretary of the Illinois State Horticultural Society, encouraged citizens in a public statement to plant "one or more specimens of all our native trees" in a public park for every town and village. He recommended special trees for Arbor Day planting "for school and church yards, along roadsides, and in cemeteries."

As is true with many good causes, there was some dissension. Citizens objected to roadside plantings on the grounds that the shade would prevent the rapid drying up of mud after rains.

Jabez Webster of Centralia, Illinois, welcomed Arbor Day because: "In our great country, in the scramble for the almighty dollar, we have almost lost sight of the beautiful in nature."

The 1,200-acre Morton Arboretum is situated at Lisle, Ill., west of Chicago. The arboretum, which contains about 4,800 species and varieties of plants and trees, is open to the public year round.

## MORTON AG SECRETARY

Other countries have adopted the Arbor Day practice. By 1961, a tree-planting day had been set aside in England, Canada, Australia, British West Indies, South Africa, New Zealand, France, Mexico, Norway, Russia, Japan and China.

Morton was defeated for governor three times. However he served his state in many official capacities and was secretary of agriculture under president Grover Cleveland beginning in 1893.

Joy Morton, J. Sterling Morton's son, died sixty-five of the original acres to the state in 1923 as a memorial.

Thousands of nature lovers stop each year at Arbor Lodge to delight in the blossoms and pattern gardens, the heritage of a pioneer generation.

[From the New York Times, Apr. 19, 1970]

## WHAT BECAME OF ARBOR DAY?

(By Richard Reinhardt)

Two great holidays of American origin outshine all others in their freedom from chauvinism, sectarianism and commercial exploitation.

One is Thanksgiving, a feast of brotherhood and gratitude based upon a long and honorable historic tradition. The other is a

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neglected, ridiculed, almost forgotten festival called Arbor Day, which celebrates human kinship with the living earth. Of all our major anniversaries, Arbor Day is the least known and least respected, although it probably is the most significant of all holidays in an era of destructive technology, irretrievable waste and the dark stain of poisons in the air and water.

Unlike the general run of civic and religious celebrations, Arbor Day was the deliberate creation of one man, a Nebraska newspaper publisher named Julius Sterling Morton. It was Morton's happy notion, inspired by ancient European and Middle Eastern folkways, to devote a day each spring to mass treeplanting. During his long career as a horticulturist, editorial writer and politician, he succeeded in spreading this idea to several dozen states and a handful of foreign countries.

Morton first gave evidence of his zeal for forestry in 1854, when he moved from his boyhood home in Michigan to the treeless prairies of Nebraska. Taking squatter's rights on 160 acres of naked loam on the west bank of the Missouri River, he built a four-room house for his young wife and almost immediately began planting slips and seeds. Within a few years he had surrounded the cottage with a jungle of shade trees, shrubbery and vines and was using the columns of his Nebraska City News to urge his neighbors to get busy with their own landscaping projects.

With his friend, Robert W. Furnas, who had started a large orchard in nearby Brownville, Morton toured eastern Nebraska to encourage farmers to plant fruit trees. It was largely to the credit of these two men that the area became an important fruit-growing region.

But Morton's enthusiasm for vegetation went far beyond uses of commercial agriculture. He saw by treeplanting as a communal function with social and educational values. He hounded churches, schools and clubs to undertake planting projects, and he came up with the suggestion that Nebraska towns should set out young trees to commemorate such notable events as the visit of a distinguished guest, the dedication of a public building, or the anniversary of a respected leader.

For four years—1858 to 1861—as secretary of the Nebraska Territory, and later as president of the State Board of Agriculture, Morton had frequent occasion to promulgate both his simple, Jeffersonian faith in the nobility of small farmers and his love of trees. He seldom passed up an opportunity to state the case:

"If every farmer in Nebraska will plant out and cultivate an orchard and a flower garden, together with a few forest trees, this will become mentally and morally the best agricultural state in the Union."

This message with its calm faith in the ultimate virtue of hugging close to the earth was balm to the homesteaders of that raw territory, where nature was harsh, tillage was difficult and failure was common. When Morton published a resolution in 1872, calling on this courageous fellowship of farmers to conduct a state-wide day of treeplanting in early April, the Nebraskans responded by planting something over a million trees.

Two years later Morton's friend, Robert Furnas, who had been elected Governor of the state, proclaimed April 8 the official Arbor Day. With this authoritative blessing, the holiday blossomed into Nebraska's favorite public event. Over the next 16 years, the people of the state planted more than 600 million trees and created 100,000 acres of forest on the once-open plains. The Nebraska legislature in 1885 made Arbor Day a legal holiday, setting it on the date of Sterling Morton's birthday, April 22.

Arbor Day spread with marvelous speed. Kansas, Tennessee, Minnesota and Ohio quickly adopted the idea. By 1890, 35 states had established some kind of Arbor Day, each one picking a date that was appropriate to the local climate.

Few states kept Arbor Day with as much enthusiasm as did Nebraska, but few dared to ignore the occasion. Then as now, the word "conservation" was a shibboleth. The United States rapidly was changing from a rural nation of small farmers into an urban nation of factory workers, and this sentimental rural, earth-centered ceremony seemed to provide a link with the past and a promise for the future. Cynical legislators saw this harmless holiday as a sop for the worriers who were already complaining about disappearing forests and lost wilderness. Arbor Day? Why not? How much easier it would be to plant a few new trees once a year than to forbid the wanton cutting of virgin timber.

What has happened to Arbor Day? On paper it is flourishing. Every state in the union gives it some form of official sanction. Two states (Nebraska and Utah) make it a legal holiday, and two other states (Florida and West Virginia) celebrate it twice a year. Elementary school classes everywhere set out arborvitae trees along the parking strip. Ladies clubs adorn the facades of telephone exchanges and state and Federal tree nurseries ship out millions of seedlings to be planted in windbreaks, woodlots and erosion barriers.

But these demonstrations of amateur agriculture do not add up to a great national sentiment for the stewardship of the earth. They are only ludicrous parodies of a pioneer ritual that was intended to seal a yearly covenant with nature and to inculcate in young and old a reverence for the earth and a sense of personal responsibility for its perpetual renewal.

The spirit is gone dormant. Arbor Day is a sham. It goes on, year after year, but it no longer seems important.

Part of the trouble is that Arbor Day began in a struggling, frontier society that has disappeared. Once the buffalo grass had been plowed under and "village adornment societies" had done their work of planting cotton woods and elms on the residential streets of the Great American Desert, Arbor Day lost its compelling urgency.

Then, too, America has become an urban nation. Our tastes are more sophisticated. Family picnics at the country fairgrounds no longer amuse us. On holidays we drive 300 to 400 miles to go waterskiing. Arbor Day smacks of the rural past. It reminds us of lukewarm lemonade, speeches on the courthouse steps, Main Street, outhouses, dialect jokes and other crudities we have outgrown.

The saddest reason for the decline of Arbor Day is that many Americans have lost their easy confidence in the positivist principles that guided Sterling Morton and thousands of tree-planting committees since his time. Recent history has given ample evidence that the good, the true and the beautiful do not inevitably triumph. The faith of a Nebraska editor in the ultimate progress of civilization through the promulgation of shade trees and flower gardens now seems blissfully naive. We have learned that trees grow in slums and in concentration camps and on battlefields. How can we pretend that planting trees will guarantee a general improvement in the moral quality of mankind?

The question is why do we bother to keep Arbor Day on the calendar? In its present form, it is a mockery of the very principles it espouses. It would be worth keeping only if it could be revived and reestablished as a national day of homage to the earth. If that should happen, Arbor Day could become the most important holiday in the year.

There are reasons to think this observance would be welcomed by most Americans. The harshness of frontier life has, in a sense, returned to this richly favored continent. In the midst of luxuriant technological development, we find ourselves looking forward into a wasteland as dark and dry as any that confronted a starving immigrant on the Great Plains. Once again, we are confronted by the frailty and finite limits of the natural environment.

It would do us spiritual and practical good to have a day in which to demonstrate that we are not helpless to save ourselves from this crisis, to show that, as a nation, we are capable of owing as well as reaping, of healing as well as hurting, of creating as well as destroying. Arbor Day would be a pledge to our children that we will not let the world go to waste; that there will, indeed, be blue skies, greenery and clear water, and that trees will endure.

To serve this object, Arbor Day must become a legal, national holiday. Past efforts to accomplish this have failed, but it is time to make the effort again. Even if it is impossible to find a date to suit all climates, a date could be chosen that will satisfy a majority of states. April 22, Morton's birthday, might well be as suitable as any.

When a date has been chosen, Arbor Day could be called each year by Presidential proclamation, as is Thanksgiving. The President could appoint a national committee to advise him on programs of environmental concern that can be undertaken as Arbor Day projects. The committee could coordinate state and local projects so that the impact of Arbor Day would be immediate, conspicuous and exemplary.

Above all, the pattern of Arbor Day activities must change to suit the mood and manners of today. This holiday is too important to be laid out and embalmed in a 19th-century costume. Arbor Day needs a fresh array of ceremonial symbols, an infusion of new ideas.

## ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. HRUSKA. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Young of Ohio). The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

*SAC T*

## PRESIDENT NIXON MAKES MAJOR CONTRIBUTION TO STRATEGIC RESTRAINT

Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, the beginning of the strategic arms limitation talks is an event of utmost importance. The success of these vital negotiations will depend on the willingness of both the Soviet Union and the United States to accept certain mutual restraints in the interest of their common security. It is important for both Americans and Soviets to develop greater appreciation of each other's purposes. And in our quest for joint limitations on strategic arms, we need to couple a heightened sense of urgency with a sober understanding that there is still time to ward off a new spiral in the nuclear competition.

The Soviet Union, speaking through



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an historic Pravda article of March 7, struck precisely this balance.

Despite the difficulties—

Wrote Pravda—

It is obvious that there is still time and there are still possibilities for reaching an understanding which all states await and by which they will gain . . . If both sides intend to hold honest talks without striving to obtain any unilateral military advantages and if the negotiations proceed from the need to insure equal security for both sides . . . then one can count on achieving agreed solutions.

Much the same tone was sounded by the Soviet Party leader, Mr. Brezhnev, on the eve of the Vienna talks:

If the U.S. government really wants a strategic arms limitation treaty, . . . prospects for the negotiations may be viewed positively. The Soviet Union in any case, will do all within its power to see that these talks prove useful.

These observations are a constructive prelude to the substantive discussions now getting underway.

All of us know the deep suspicion with which each country has come to view the other. Just as Americans have been apprehensive about the Soviet Union's true purposes, so the Soviet Union has been prone to doubt America's genuine interest in arms control.

It is essential that Moscow understand that the United States is indeed dedicated to agreed and verifiable arms limitations which will serve the interests of both our peoples. By now I hope the Soviet negotiators in Vienna are already reporting to their Government the obvious fact that the United States has prepared for these negotiations in the most comprehensive and serious manner. The intensive work and evident good will of the American delegation will, I trust, have impressed itself upon Deputy Foreign Minister Semenov and his colleagues.

In this connection the United States has undertaken a major act of strategic restraint which should be emphasized. It is an act grounded on President Nixon's admirable and decisive commitment to mutual deterrence as the fundamental rationale for American strategic forces. Over a year ago, the President set forth his awareness that, in today's world, mutual security depends on mutual deterrence. He made clear that neither the Soviet Union nor the United States could safely attempt to deny the other the capacity to retaliate. Any such effort would be futile, since both countries will take whatever action is required to maintain a confident second-strike capability. Thus, programs which seem to jeopardize either side's retaliatory forces are guaranteed to stimulate compensating changes or increases in those forces.

On this central insight President Nixon has based his search for mutual arms control. It required the reorientation of America's planned ABM program toward a principal focus on defense of the U.S. deterrent forces, recognizing that no defense of American cities was feasible against the size and character of nuclear attack which the Soviet Union can mount. Whatever our views of the proposed Safeguard deployment, we should

not lose sight of this important shift in the program.

Of still greater significance has been an unpublicized change in the plans for the U.S. MIRV program. Those of us who have worked for many months to support a mutual ban on MIRV testing and deployment have stressed the hazard that such systems pose for mutual deterrence. We have stressed that such weapons could ultimately destabilize the balance of power by posing an intolerable threat to hardened missile sites. At the same time, however, it has been stressed that the first generation U.S. MIRV systems are too inaccurate and too low yield to pose a threat to hard targets.

To perfect highly precise MIRV systems with adequate yield to destroy hardened missile silos would require a concentrated development program over a period of several years and costing tens of millions of dollars. Unfortunately, from the very beginning, discussions of the U.S. MIRV program have been ambiguous. While primary attention has been given to the function of ABM penetration for retaliatory purposes, there have been frequent allusions to possible applications of MIRV against hard targets. Preliminary studies of such applications were in fact begun some years ago, before President Nixon explicitly defined American strategic policy as one of mutual deterrence.

These studies account for much of the anxiety over MIRV deployment. For example, on January 16, 1968, the Department of Defense publicly indicated that—

Each new MIRV missile warhead will be far more accurate than any previous or existing warheads. They will be far better suited for destruction of hardened enemy missiles than any existing warhead.

As recently as last October 7, the Air Force Chief of Staff, Gen. John Ryan, alluded to such advanced MIRV systems in testimony before the House Appropriations Committee:

We have a program we are pushing to increase the yield of our warheads and decrease the circular error probable so that we have what we call a hard target killer which we do not have in the inventory at the present time.

It is wholly understandable that such statements would alarm those responsible for the protection of Soviet strategic forces. It is also quite clear that such programs would be incompatible with the judicious strategic policy adopted by President Nixon. It is for that reason essential to make absolutely clear a far-reaching commitment which the President has now undertaken.

In the course of numerous exchanges which the President and I have had on the dangerous implications of MIRV technology, Mr. Nixon has indicated his specific decision not to pursue the program to which General Ryan referred.

In a letter of December 29, 1969, the President reiterated his basic commitment to maintain our deterrent, but not to engage in programs which threaten any nation with a first strike. The President indicated:

There is no current U.S. program to develop a so-called hard-target MIRV capability. The

particular program to which General Ryan referred did not receive Department of Defense approval for funding in the forthcoming Defense budget.

I cannot exaggerate the importance of the President's decision to abandon the proposed program to perfect a hard-target MIRV capability. The scope of this commitment to avoid destabilizing technology is underscored by the parallel decision not to press forward with a program to improve the guidance and accuracy of the Poseidon missile system.

Mr. President, certainly these measures of restraint do not mean that we should proceed with the planned deployment of less accurate MIRV systems in the coming years. In my opinion, such weapons are not yet required and will not be until there is a substantial expansion of Soviet ABM capabilities. Much to be preferred would be a joint arrangement in SALT by which both countries refrain from proliferating ABM systems and introducing multiple-target capabilities into their offensive missile forces. We must continue to seek a ban on MIRV testing and deployment.

But I believe it is of critical importance that the United States is exercising restraint on advanced development of even more dangerous MIRV weapons. It is another indication of Mr. Nixon's earnest desire to find a mutually acceptable basis for stabilizing the strategic balance and for enhancing the security of both our nations.

My purpose in making these comments today is to highlight a hopeful and forward-looking action by the American Government. In the initial days of the SALT discussions in Vienna, this signal contribution to mutual security should be reassuring to the Soviet Union. The Soviet leaders can be confident that their forces are not in imminent danger from the relatively crude American MIRV systems which are being developed. They should also find assurance in the knowledge that any specific development program to produce a true hard-target capability in the U.S. MIRV systems would take years and would be highly visible through the elaborate test programs required, not to mention the congressional and public reviews which such a proposal would arouse. I do not believe that, on present evidence, the Congress would authorize such a dangerous and unwarranted development.

By the same token, this act of restraint is an invitation to the Soviet Union. The United States is profoundly concerned about potential hard-target applications of the Soviet SS-9 missiles, which already are deployed in substantial numbers. It would be most conducive to progress in the SALT negotiations if the Soviets were equally prepared to provide credible assurances that the SS-9 and other Soviet weapons were not being refined for possible use against U.S. missile sites. I remain convinced that the most promising approach to such mutual guarantees would be an end to MIRV testing and a prompt suspension of further deployments of offensive and defensive missiles on both sides, as the Senate recommended in its overwhelm-

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ing approval of Senate Resolution 211 2 weeks ago.

Surely the Soviet Union must share our perception that security can only suffer from a continued arms race. And surely a comparable Soviet willingness to undertake concrete acts of restraint would be the most hopeful augury for rapid progress in Vienna.

## COMMUNICATIONS FROM EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS, ETC.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore (Mr. HOLLAND) laid before the Senate the following letters, which were referred as indicated:

## PROPOSED LEGISLATION TO PROVIDE FOR REIMBURSEMENT OF THE TREASURY BY THE PANAMA CANAL COMPANY

A letter from the President, Panama Canal Company, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to provide for reimbursement of the Treasury by the Panama Canal Company for the annuity paid to the Republic of Panama (with an accompanying paper); to the Committee on Armed Services.

## PROPOSED LEGISLATION TO REVISE THE PROMOTION SYSTEM FOR CERTAIN OFFICERS OF THE RESERVE COMPONENTS OF THE ARMY

A letter from the Secretary of the Army, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to amend titles 10 and 32, United States Code, to revise the promotion system for certain officers of the Reserve components of the Army (with accompanying papers); to the Committee on Armed Services.

## REPORT ON PROPOSED FACILITIES PROJECTS FOR AIR NATIONAL GUARD AND AIR FORCE RESERVE

A letter from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Housing), transmitting, pursuant to law, a report on the location, nature, and estimated cost of certain facilities projects proposed to be undertaken for the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve subsequent to 30 June 1970 (with an accompanying report); to the Committee on Armed Services.

## REPORT OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

A letter from the Secretary of Defense, transmitting, pursuant to law, a secret report relating to funds obligated in the chemical warfare and biological research program (with an accompanying report); to the Committee on Armed Services.

## PROPOSED LEGISLATION TO AMEND THE MILITARY SELECTIVE SERVICE ACT OF 1967

A letter from the Director, National Headquarters, Selective Service System, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to amend the Military Selective Service Act of 1967 to provide authority for the President to phase out undergraduate student deferments, and to modify the method of allocating quotas and calls (with an accompanying paper); to the Committee on Armed Services.

## PROPOSED LEGISLATION TO FURTHER THE REDUCTION OF DRAFT CALLS IN THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES

A letter from the Secretary of Defense, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to amend title 37, United States Code, to further the reduction of draft calls in the armed forces of the United States by increasing the pay rates of certain enlisted members of the uniformed services (with an accompanying paper); to the Committee on Armed Services.

## REPORT OF FEDERAL CONTRIBUTIONS PROGRAM: EQUIPMENT AND FACILITIES

A letter from the Director of Civil Defense, transmitting, pursuant to law, the report of Federal contributions program equipment and facilities for the quarter ended March

31, 1970 (with an accompanying report); to the Committee on Armed Services.

## REPORT OF DEPARTMENT OF ARMY CONTRACTS FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION AWARDED WITHOUT FORMAL ADVERTISEMENT

A letter from the Secretary of the Army, transmitting, pursuant to law, a report of Department of Army contracts for military construction awarded without formal advertisement for the period July 1 through December 31, 1969 (with an accompanying report); to the Committee on Armed Services.

## REPORT OF U.S. SOLDIERS' HOME

A letter from the Secretary of the Army, transmitting, pursuant to law, the annual report of the U.S. Soldiers' Home for fiscal year 1969 (with an accompanying report); to the Committee on Armed Services.

## PROPOSED LEGISLATION AUTHORIZING DIRECT LOANS TO VETERANS FOR SPECIALLY ADAPTED HOUSING

A letter from the Administrator, Veterans' Administration, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to amend section 1811 of title 38, United States Code, to authorize the Veterans' Administration to make direct loans to any veteran who is determined to be eligible for assistance in acquiring specially adapted housing under chapter 21 of title 38, United States Code (with an accompanying paper); to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

## PROPOSED LEGISLATION TO INCREASE TAX ON MOTOR VEHICLE FUELS SOLD IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

A letter from the assistant to the Commissioner, Executive Office, Government of the District of Columbia, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to amend the act entitled "An act to provide for a tax on motor vehicle fuels sold within the District of Columbia, and for other purposes" (with an accompanying paper); to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

## PROPOSED SMALL BUSINESS TAXATION ACT OF 1970

A letter from the Acting Secretary of the Treasury, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to ease the tax burdens of small businesses, and for other purposes (with accompanying papers); to the Committee on Finance.

## REPORTS OF THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL

A letter from the Comptroller General of the United States, transmitting, pursuant to law, a report on the need to improve military supply systems in the Far East, Department of Defense, dated April 21, 1970 (with an accompanying report); to the Committee on Government Operations.

A letter from the Comptroller General of the United States, transmitting, pursuant to law, a report on further improvement needed in the management of magnetic tapes by Goddard Space Flight Center, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, dated April 22, 1970 (with an accompanying report); to the Committee on Government Operations.

## PROPOSED LEGISLATION FOR THE PROTECTION OF PUBLIC LANDS FROM FIRES

A letter from the Assistant Secretary of the Interior, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to enter into contracts for the protection of public lands from fires, in advance of appropriations therefor, and to twice renew such contracts (with an accompanying paper); to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

## ADMISSION INTO THE UNITED STATES OF CERTAIN ALIENS—WITHDRAWAL OF NAME

A letter from the Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Department of Justice, withdrawing the name of Mr. Howe Fook Tang from a report relat-

ing to aliens whose deportation has been suspended, transmitted to the Senate on September 1, 1969; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

## WILLIAM B. RICHARDSON V. DAVID M. KENNEDY

A letter from the Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice, transmitting, for the information of the Senate, the fact that a citizen taxpayer has instituted an action in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, challenging the constitutionality of Public Law 90-206, under which the rate of payment of compensation to Members of Congress has been determined; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

## PROSPECTUS TO AMEND CERTAIN PUBLIC BUILDING PROJECTS

A letter from the Administrator, General Services Administration, transmitting, pursuant to law, a prospectus which contains proposed amendments to 15 authorized public buildings projects (with accompanying papers); to the Committee on Public Works.

## REPORT ON REVISED ESTIMATE OF COST OF COMPLETING THE NATIONAL SYSTEM OF INTERSTATE AND DEFENSE HIGHWAYS

A letter from the Secretary of Transportation, transmitting, pursuant to law, a report on a revised estimate of the cost of completing the National System of Interstate and Defense Highways prepared for the purpose of apportioning Interstate System funds authorized for the fiscal years ending June 30, 1972, June 30, 1973, and June 30, 1974 (with an accompanying report); to the Committee on Public Works.

## PROPOSED DISASTER ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1970

A letter from the Director, Office of Emergency Preparedness, Executive Office of the President, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to amend existing Federal disaster assistance legislation, and for other purposes (with accompanying papers); to the Committee on Public Works.

## PETITIONS

Petitions were laid before the Senate and referred as indicated.

By the ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore (Mr. HOLLAND):

A concurrent resolution of the Legislature of the State of Oklahoma; to the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry:

## "H. CON. RES. 1057

"A concurrent resolution memorializing the Congress of the United States to provide that Federal statutory and other regulations over small meat slaughterers shall not be such as would preclude their continuing in the operation of their business; and directing distribution

"Whereas, recent federal legislation has threatened the continued existence of many small meat slaughtering businesses across the State of Oklahoma; and

"Whereas, such legislation by exempting from antemortem and postmortem examinations for each animal only those custom slaughtering businesses which do not sell or buy carcasses or meat food products places an undue burden on such businesses; and

"Whereas, many custom slaughtering businesses must, in order to stay in business, operate the logical auxiliary business, that of a meat market; and

"Whereas, such legislation could be interpreted to require such additional facilities or modification of existing facilities of the small slaughtering businesses as would not be economically feasible for such businesses; and

"Whereas, the small slaughtering businesses of this state perform a vital and important service to many of the citizens of this state; and

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The budget squeeze came as oceanographers were on the verge of unprecedented opportunities to develop and use new undersea technology, to replace ships of World War II vintage, and to launch ambitious new research efforts. "In developing technology, we are now—by comparison—roughly where the development of the airplane was in 1910 or 1915," said H. Crane Miller, counsel for Hollings' subcommittee and a former Stratton Commission staff member. The funding of ocean programs increased dramatically in the middle 1960's, but the level of support has virtually frozen. For example, the annual growth rate of academic marine science programs funded by the National Science Foundation and the Office of Naval Research was 7.3 percent from 1963 to 1966 but declined to 2.2 percent from 1966 to 1968, not even covering rising costs.

The Navy, with a marine science budget of some \$239 million this year, continues to dominate U.S. oceanography. But even the Navy's funds are down by \$24 million from last year, requiring deactivation of some research ships and postponement of new projects. "We have had our share of the cuts, but only our fair share," said Rear Admiral O. D. Waters, Jr., the Oceanographer of the Navy. "We have had to slow down, but nothing vital has been dropped." The Administration's request for fiscal 1971, however, would cut the Navy programs by another \$19 million and increase the civilian oceanography budget by \$40 million.

The Navy cooperates extensively with civilian ocean agencies, especially through the Instrumentation Center. For example, Navy data on water temperature is fed to the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries to guide fishing vessels to favorable waters. But, as Admiral Waters points out, "It is only happenstance, really, when our programs benefit the civilian sector. . . . Our purpose is always military."

On the NOAA proposal, the Navy has taken no formal position except to request that, whatever is done, the Coast Guard retain its semimilitary role. It is known, however, that many Navy oceanographers are unenthusiastic about a NOAA, viewing it as a potentially serious competitor for money and programs.

If effectively promoted, civilian oceanography could indeed win formidable support in Congress. There are, after all 30 coastal and Great Lakes states with a direct interest, and the nation is increasingly resource-conscious. In hopes of tapping this potential support, oceanography lobbying groups and newsletters are proliferating. For example, the Washington-based National Oceanography Association added 700 new corporate and individual members in 1969, for a total of 2100. (In a poll, the membership heavily favored creation of a NOAA.) Sea-related industries are badly in need of new federal initiatives in developing technology.

Should civilian oceanography develop its own effective lobby, the marine science programs might be more than able to hold their own in a new Department of Environmental Affairs. Even NOAA champions such as Lennon and Hollings concede that such a department makes sense. But they contend that a single ocean agency is needed first, to reorganize existing programs, establish goals, and attract the necessary public and congressional support.

**SALT**

#### AMERICAN ASSEMBLY ON ARMS LIMITATION

Mr. CASE. Mr. President, early this month a group of Americans meeting under the aegis of the American Assembly in New York State produced a generally agreed document of great interest to the debate about American strategic weapons policy and the strategic arms

limitation talks that began yesterday in Vienna.

This document, very much in line with Senate Resolution 211, which the Senate passed recently by a vote of 72 to 6, calls on the President of the United States to propose "on a reciprocal basis an immediate interim halt in the deployment of strategic offensive and defensive weapons of the tests of multiple warheads."

Additionally, this group of especially well-informed fellow citizens asked the President to defer for 6 months the impending deployment of American multiple warheads or MIRVs.

Their reason was that uniquely favorable strategic and political conditions exist at the present for such a move. They feared that unless the United States and, of course, the Soviet Union, seized this opportunity, the success of the SALT talks could be jeopardized. And I would add my own view that the failure of the arms limitation talks would be a serious setback in our search for a more stable world.

The American Assembly, as many of us will recall, was established by Dwight Eisenhower at Columbia University in 1950. It is a nonpartisan organization dedicated to providing information, stimulating discussion, and evoking independent conclusions on matters of vital public interest.

I ask unanimous consent that this thoughtful effort be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the report was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### THE AMERICAN ASSEMBLY ON ARMS LIMITATION

These pages contain the views of a group of Americans who met March 31-April 2, 1970, at Arden House, Harriman, New York, to consider the outlook for arms limitation. The meeting was held with immediate and timely reference to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, scheduled to resume in Vienna, April 18. Reference was also made to the broader problem of slowing down the arms race and to the effect of military expenditures on national resources.

The meeting was held under the auspices of The American Assembly of Columbia University, which regularly convenes for the purpose of focusing attention on issues of public importance. The recommendations of this Assembly were adopted in the plenary session of April 2, after two previous days of discussions as a committee of the whole. (Because of the urgency of the topic, standard American Assembly procedures were modified somewhat for the occasion, and the number of participants was reduced accordingly. Many had taken part in earlier American Assembly programs on arms: Arms Control, 1969, and Nuclear Weapons, 1966.)

Adrian S. Fisher, dean of the Georgetown Law School and former deputy director of the U.S. Control and Disarmament Agency, prepared a background paper as the basis of discussion.

As a non-partisan educational institution The American Assembly takes no official stand on the opinions herein, which belong to the participants in their private capacities. They represented themselves and not necessarily the institutions or persons with whom they are associated. (Clifford C. Nelson, President, The American Assembly)

#### FINAL REPORT OF THE AMERICAN ASSEMBLY ON ARMS LIMITATION—1970

(At the close of their discussions the participants in The American Assembly on Arms

Limitation—1970 reviewed as a group the following statement. Although it represents general agreement, no one was asked to sign it, and it should not be assumed that every participant necessarily subscribes to every recommendation.)

We call upon the President of the United States to propose to the Soviet Union, on a reciprocal basis, an immediate interim halt in the deployment of strategic offensive and defensive weapons and of tests of multiple warheads. To give this proposal a chance of success, we ask the President to defer for six months the impending deployment of Multiple Independently Targetable Re-Entry Vehicles (MIRVs).

The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks are resuming in Vienna at a time when mankind has a unique opportunity to end the nuclear arms race. At present there exists a roughly equal and relatively stable nuclear balance between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. A rare coincidence of favorable political and strategic conditions provides a real but fleeting opportunity for agreement between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. to halt the arms race in both quantity and quality of weapons, and then to diminish the threat to mankind posed by existing weapons. Whether agreement can be reached we do not know, but wisdom and common sense require every plausible effort to exploit the present promise.

This opportunity will be put in jeopardy if the U.S. soon deploys Multiple Independently Targetable Re-Entry Vehicles (MIRVs), or proceeds with plans for a modified Phase II Safeguard Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM), or if the Soviet Union extensively tests large ICBMs (SS-9) with multiple warheads (which may not themselves be independently targetable but may well be steps in the development of a Soviet multiple independently targetable delivery system).

The introduction of MIRVs into the present nuclear relationship would have the initial effect of substantially increasing the number of deliverable nuclear warheads available to each side. MIRV program will take on new dimensions as missile accuracy increases. When this occurs, it becomes possible for one side if it strikes first with missiles armed with MIRVs to take out more than one missile site with a single attacking missile. The obverse of this frightening coin is that each side may fear that, unless it strikes first, the MIRVed missiles of the other side may be able substantially to eliminate its own land-based ICBM force, with the other side still having substantial ICBM force left in reserve.

New and worrisome uncertainties would enter the strategic calculations. For example, Secretary Laird has testified that 420 Soviet SS-9s with three warheads of five megatons each and an accuracy of one quarter of a mile could eliminate all but 50 of our Minutemen. Similar calculations by the Soviet Union would show that if the U.S. were to MIRV its Minutemen with three warheads, with yields approximating a quarter of a megaton each and having an accuracy of one-tenth of a mile, it could by using 580 Minutemen, eliminate all but 70 or so of the Soviet missile force.

Whatever their validity such calculations make it clear that both sides would feel more secure if neither one had a MIRV. The U.S. plan to deploy MIRVed Minuteman III in June of this year, within two months after the beginning of the talks, may well close the door on this possibility. Although the generation of MIRVs which would be deployed would not be capable of a first strike, this step would cast serious doubts on our seriousness in pursuing SALT. This would present the U.S.S.R. with a *fait accompli*. One of the most important things that the SALT talks could accomplish is to prevent the deployment of MIRVs. This opportunity should not be lost.

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We in the American Assembly therefore call on the President to postpone this deployment for six months. Such deployment at this time would not contribute to our security. Far from improving our bargaining strength at SALT proceeding with that deployment would make negotiations more difficult, and would invite the Soviet Union in turn to present us with *fais accomplis*. No harm can result to our strategic posture by such delay, which will involve only a handful of land-based missiles in a MIRV program that is already being widely questioned as unnecessary, wasteful, and certainly premature, since the large Soviet ABM program it was designed to penetrate does not exist.

We also suggest that current U.S. and Soviet testing of multiple warheads complicates the political and strategic climate on which these negotiations depend. We urge mutual restraint in this regard.

We also urge postponement in implementing the proposed modified Phase II of the Safeguard System. The argument that going ahead with this program would strengthen our bargaining position at Vienna is not persuasive; authorizing armaments so that they can be included in a disarmament program soon reaches the point of diminishing returns. If both sides play this game, SALT will result in an increase in the arms race. Going ahead with modified Phase II Safeguards so soon after Phase I had been made a separate program would belie the promise and deliberate consideration upon which that separation was in part based. It would more likely give the Soviets the impression that the U.S. was determined to push the complete Safeguards program to a finish, come what may. This would make success in SALT less rather than more likely.

These measures of restraint will give our negotiators a chance. But the negotiations of a treaty at the SALT talks will be difficult and complex and may take years. To keep the present opportunity from eroding during this period, an interim halt is necessary to prevent any substantial changes in the rough strategic balance which now makes such an agreement possible.

We therefore urge the President of the Soviet Union, on a reciprocal basis, an immediate two-year suspension of the deployment of strategic offensive and defensive weapons and of the tests of multiple warheads. Specifically we propose that during this two-year period interim halt there would be:

1. No testing of any multiple warheads, whether MRV or MIRV;
2. No deployment of multiple warheads;
3. No new deployment of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles;
4. No construction of Anti-Ballistic Missile radars or deployment of anti-ballistic missile interceptors;
5. No new "starts" on constructing submarines for launching ballistic missiles.

In such an interim agreement we see no necessity for limits on air defenses or on new bomber construction because developments in these areas do not carry an immediate potential for upsetting the present strategic balance.

The short term of the agreement and its comprehensive quality would simplify the requirement for inspection. From the standpoint of the U.S. security, compliance with these provisions can be adequately determined by national means of verification. In particular, the halt in Soviet buildup of ICBMs and SLBMs, including the SS-9, could be verified. With regard to the restrictions on multiple warhead testing, however, to enhance confidence during the interim halt, an understanding that missile tests will be preannounced and restricted to designated areas may be desirable.

The restraints that we propose and an agreed interim halt would create an environ-

ment of stability and mutual confidence. In such an improved climate more lasting agreements, taking account of new technological and political developments, could be achieved.

We have not attempted to blueprint the details of a more permanent agreement; planning for it should take account of what is learned during the interim halt. Some of the major issues which would need to be taken into account during the negotiations of a treaty are:

1. *ABM levels.* A key question appears to be whether some level of ABMs is necessary for the U.S. in light of the developing Chinese nuclear capability. We believe that an area ABM is not vital to protecting U.S. interests in Asia and that we should be prepared to accept a mutually agreed zero ABM level if it improves the prospects for obtaining an effective agreement with the Soviet Union. Without an ABM, deterrence is as effective against China as against others; and a Safeguard system designed for area defense against the Chinese may, in the eyes of Soviet planners, pose a threat to their deterrent.

2. *Control on Missile Testing.* A ban on MIRVs would require a prohibition on all multiple warhead tests and limits on a number and location of all missile tests. We believe that such controls would be feasible and desirable.

3. *Reduction.* We believe that the U.S. should seek agreement on reduction in numbers of strategic systems. In particular the U.S. should consider proposing the phasing out of fixed land-based missiles which will become increasingly vulnerable even if MIRVs are banned.

Depending on how these and related issues are resolved, a whole range of agreements is possible. One type of agreement which most of us would favor would seek to freeze the existing situation by banning MIRVs and ABMs. A second type would concentrate on banning ABMs and phasing out fixed land-based missiles if it does not prove possible to ban MIRVs. A third type would focus on freezing numbers of offensive missiles and limiting ABMs if it is not possible to ban MIRVs and if the judgment is reached that an area ABM against China is needed. On our current understanding of the issues most of us favored the first type of agreement.

We believe that the initiatives and agreements we propose will enhance U.S. security by improving the prospects for peace. These efforts can also lead to the wise and prudent use of our national resources. The expenditures thus avoided would amount to at least several billion dollars a year in the short run and much more in the long run if the U.S. and U.S.S.R. enter into a new and costlier phase of the arms race. The SALT talks, and the clearer assessment of our real security requirements which may result from those talks, may prevent these expenditures. More of our resources can then be devoted to human needs, both at home and abroad. This is an important aspect of our national security. Unless urgent social needs are met, our national security may be progressively undermined, not by external threats but by failure to meet internal and justifiable social needs.

The negotiation of a treaty to end the arms race will involve many complex technical details. But the overriding considerations are not technical; they are deeply political. They require a fresh and clear reassessment of the fundamentals of U.S. security.

We must recognize that it is at least as dangerous to focus on "worst cases" as it is to overlook significant threats to our deterrent. If one proceeds from the most pessimistic view of U.S. capabilities, and the most generous view of the Soviet capabilities, one arrives at a U.S. second-strike posture that

may look to the Soviets so much like a first-strike posture that they will be inclined to increase their own forces, thereby continuing the arms race and increasing the danger of nuclear war. In fact, the proper test for the adequacy of U.S. nuclear retaliatory power is not the U.S. worst estimate of its effectiveness, but the Soviet estimate of the damage it would suffer in a nuclear exchange. That estimate will not be based on assumptions that take the Soviet performance at its best possible level and the U.S. performance at its worst. If we arm against a "parade of imaginary horrors" on the part of an adversary, the adversary will do the same, and we will have devised a sure prescription for a dangerous and wasteful arms race.

We have made this mistake in the past, from a misdirected sense of caution. In the interests of our own security we must not make this mistake again. We must end the nuclear arms race.

#### PARTICIPANTS IN THE AMERICAN ASSEMBLY ON ARMS LIMITATION—1970

Adrian S. Fisher, Dean, Georgetown University Law School (Discussion Leader and Director of Drafting).

Alexander, Archibald S., Bernardsville, New Jersey.

Bader, William B., New York.

Bloomfield, Lincoln P., Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Brown, Courtney C., Editor, Columbia Journal of World Business.

Daniloff, Nicholas, United Press International, Washington, D.C.

Dudman, Richard, St. Louis Post Dispatch, Washington, D.C.

Finkelstein, Lawrence S., Center for International Affairs, Harvard University.

Fischer, Benjamin B., Harriman Scholar, Columbia University.

Fitzgerald, Ernest, Businessmen's Educational Fund, Washington, D.C.

Gulick, Lewis, The Associated Press, Washington, D.C.

Halperin, Morton H., The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C.

Henkin, Louis, Hamilton Fish Professor of International Law & Diplomacy, Columbia University.

Herzfeld, Charles M., Technical Director, Defense-Space Group, ITT, Nutley, New Jersey.

Knorr, Klaus, Center for International Studies, Princeton University.

Manton, Thomas B., United Church of Christ, New York.

McDermott, Rev. Patrick P., S.J., Assistant Director, Division of World Justice & Peace, United States Catholic Conference, Washington, D.C.

Paffrath, Leslie, President, The Johnson Foundation, Racine.

Palfrey, John G., Professor of Law, Columbia University.

Parrent, Rev. Allan, Department of International Affairs, National Council of Churches, Washington, D.C.

Persinger, Mrs. Richard, Chairman, Committee on Public Affairs, National Board of the Y.W.C.A., New York.

Posvar, Wesley W., Chancellor, University of Pittsburgh.

Rathjens, George W., Professor of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Scoville, Herbert, Jr., Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C.

Shulman, Marshall D., Director, The Russian Institute, Columbia University.

Stone, Jeremy J., International Affairs Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations, New York.

Stuhler, Barbara, Associate Director, Minnesota World Affairs Council, Minneapolis.

Yarmolinsky, Adam, Professor of Law, Harvard University.



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## FIVE STATEMENTS ON ARMS CONTROL

Mr. CASE. Mr. President, I also draw the Senate's attention to five remarkable statements made before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Law and Organization of the Foreign Relations Committee, which has been holding hearings on America's strategic weapons policy in relation to the strategic arms limitation talks and our national security.

These statements seem to me to be unusual in their clarity, rigorous logic, and insight into one of the greatest issues of our time; the maintenance of American security through arms control. I believe they deserve our most thoughtful attention.

Of course, the views that these gentlemen hold are not the only ones the subcommittee intends to hear. The case for the expansion of the Safeguard ABM and the deployment of multiple warheads also deserves close study. We hope that the bashfulness of the Defense Department will not interfere with our hearing that side of the issue.

I ask unanimous consent that the statements of Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Dr. Herbert F. York, Dr. W. K. H. Panofsky, Dr. A. Doak Barnett, and Dr. Herbert Scoville, Jr., be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the statements were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

STATEMENT BY HERBERT F. YORK BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON ARMS CONTROL, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION OF THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE, APRIL 8, 1970

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: I appreciate very much having the privilege of appearing before your committee at this particular crucial moment. I plan to discuss the ABM and the MIRV and their relationship to each other and to the arms race as a whole. I should like to begin by first describing how we got where we are, and then speculating a bit on where we're going to be in the current attempts to halt the arms race. I will also present my views on how the current ABM and MIRV developments and deployments affect the prospects for a successful outcome to the SALT talks.

In 1955, about a year after the United States started development of its first Intercontinental Ballistic Missile, the Army asked the Bell Telephone Laboratories to make a study of the feasibility of an Anti-Ballistic Missile. The problem was then thought of as being simply how to hit a "bullet with a bullet," or more accurately, how to intercept large simple incoming warheads one at a time. The Bell Laboratories concluded that the technological state of the art in radar, electronic computing, nuclear explosives and rocketry had reached a point such that it was indeed feasible to build an ABM with that simple objective. As a result, the Nike Zeus project was started late in 1956.

Very soon after, it was recognized that the defense problem might well be complicated by various hypothetical "penetration aids" available to the offense. The Office of the Secretary of Defense set up a committee to review the matter. In early 1958, this committee pointed out the feasibility of greatly complicating the missile defense problem by using decoys, chaff, tank fragments, reduced radar reflectivity, nuclear blackout and last, but by no means least, multiple warheads.

At first, the designers of our offensive missiles did not take missile defense very seriously. By 1960, however, technical progress in our own Nike Zeus program, plus accumulating evidence of a major Soviet effort in the ABM field, forced the developers of our ICBM's and Polaris missiles to take this possibility into account. These weapons designers accepted the challenge, and they initiated a number of programs to exploit the possibilities enumerated above. Thus began the technological contest between missile defense and missile offense which continues to the present and which was discussed before this committee in considerable detail last year.

For our purposes here today, the most important result of this contest was the emergence of the multiple warhead idea as the most promising of all the various "penetration aid" concepts. At first, the idea involved a shotgun technique in which a group of warheads plus some lightweight decoys were to be launched along several different paths all leading to a common target area. But shortly after, methods for aiming each of the individual warheads at separate targets were invented. The reasons for this extension of the original idea were: 1) it provided additional flexibility for the offense, 2) it made the defense problem still harder, and 3) it was more complicated and expensive, and thus provided the weapons engineers and scientists with a still better means of displaying their technological virtuosity. This extension of the original idea is, of course, the new well-known MIRV, an acronym standing for Multiple Independently-targetable Reentry Vehicles. It is, I think, most important to note that these early developments of MIRV and ABM were not primarily the result of any careful operations analysis of the problem or anything which might be described as a "provocation" by the other side. Rather, they were largely the result of a continuously reciprocating process consisting of a technological challenge put out by the designers of our own defense and accepted by the designers of our own offense, then followed by a similar challenge/response sequence in the reverse direction. In this fashion, our ABM development program made very substantial progress during the early sixties.

Concurrent with this internal contest, the Soviets were making progress on their own. As early as 1962, Premier Khrushchev and Defense Minister Malinovsky boasted about how they had solved the missile defense problem. By 1965, Soviet progress in development and deployment of an ABM had proceeded to the point where we felt compelled to react. As a result, we decided to deploy MIRV as the one certain means of assuring penetration of Soviet defenses and thus maintaining the credibility of our deterrent.

What was the result of this cycle of action and reaction? Last year, in the course of the national ABM debate, it was said that the Soviets had deployed a total of about 70 ABM interceptors, all of them around Moscow. This year, it was announced that the U.S. was going ahead with its plans to deploy MIRV's on our Minute Men and on our sub-launched Poseidon missiles. Using figures generated by this committee last year, we see that the result of this U.S. reaction will be a net increase of around 5,000 in the number of warheads aimed at Russia. If every one of those Soviet interceptors was successful in the event of an attack (and I have substantial doubt that they would be), they could cope with just 70 of those additional 5,000 warheads. The deployment of the Moscow ABM must rank as one of history's most counterproductive moves. It also shows more closely than any speculative analysis how, despite its defensive nature, the ABM can be a powerfully accelerating element in the nuclear arms race.

But that's not the whole story. The Russians have proceeded with a multiple warhead development of their own. Their program apparently is a number of years behind ours. It was probably stimulated by our program, and their technologists probably used the same justifications for it that ours did. The device they are currently testing is the payload package for the large SS-9 missile. It is said to contain three separate warheads of five megatons each. The present device may not be a true MIRV, but there is no doubt they could develop one soon.

After making a number of estimates and projections concerning the accuracy, the reliability, and the current deployment and rate of build-up of such SS-9 missiles, our defense officials concluded last year that the threat posed by this Soviet MIRV required us to deploy the Safeguard ABM system to defend our Minute Man force. We thus see that the whole process has made one full turn around the spiral: Soviet ABM led to U.S. MIRV; U.S. MIRV led to Soviet MIRV; Soviet MIRV leads to U.S. ABM.

Last year, some of those who spoke in favor of the Safeguard System described the Soviet MIRV development as being especially dangerous and foreboding because it seemed to them that its only rational purpose was to destroy our Minute Men before they could be launched. They further speculated that if this were so, the Soviet MIRV indicated preparation for a possible preemptive strike against us. These same people argued, by contrast, that our own MIRV development was clearly benign, since its main purpose was to maintain the credibility of our deterrent in the face of a hypothetical extensive Soviet ABM, and that, in any event, our MIRV was clearly not a "missile killer."

The main argument in support of this supposed difference between the purposes of the U.S. and Soviet MIRV's involves the large difference in their explosive power. The Soviet SS-9 MIRV is said to have an estimated yield of 5 megatons. This yield is twenty-five times the yield usually quoted for one of the individual warheads in the U.S. Minute Man MIRV; it is one-hundred times as large as the common estimate of a single Poseidon MIRV warhead. These large differences in yield are doubtless real, and they are important, but they are not by any means the whole story. The killing power of a warhead against a hard target, such as a missile silo, depends much more critically on accuracy than on yield. In fact, a factor of 3 in accuracy makes up for a factor of 25 in yield, and a factor of 4.6 in accuracy makes up for a factor of 100 in yield. To be more specific, a Minute Man MIRV warhead having a yield of 200 KT and an accuracy (or CEP) or about  $\frac{1}{4}$  of a nautical mile has a 95% chance of destroying a so-called "300 psi" target (which is a typical estimate of the strength of hardness of a missile silo). Similarly, a Poseidon MIRV warhead having a yield of 50 kilotons and an accuracy of about  $\frac{1}{4}$  of a mile has the same probability of destroying a missile silo. And what are the prospects for attaining such accuracies? The accuracy of real operational missiles is classified, but in last year's debates, a figure of about  $\frac{1}{4}$  of a mile for U.S. accuracies was commonly used. That is quite different from  $\frac{1}{4}$  or  $\frac{1}{8}$  of a mile, but what is the record of progress in improving accuracy? In 1944, the German V-2 missile, which used a primitive version of the same kind of guidance system as the present day Minute Man and Poseidon, achieved an accuracy of about 4 miles in a range of about 200 miles. Ten years later, when the decision to build the U.S. ICBM was made, an accuracy of five miles in a range of 5,000 miles was estimated as both possible and sufficient. That was an improvement of twentyfold in the ratio of accuracy to range. Now we talk about  $\frac{1}{4}$  mile at the same range, so in an additional 15 years, we have achieved another factor of 20.

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Altogether, that makes an improvement of 400-fold in only 25 years. Any conservative Russian planner considering these figures would have to conclude that in a relatively short time U.S. technology could improve missile accuracy by another factor of two or four and thus convert not only the Minute Man MIRV but even the Poseidon MIRV into a missile-silo-destroyer.

We have seen that the SS-9 MIRV is causing our Defense Department to fear for the viability of our deterrent and to react strongly to it for that reason. In the present international context, and in the absence of any real progress in arms control, the Soviets must be expected to react to our MIRV in some similarly fear-inspired way.

ABM and MIRV are thus inseparable; each one requires and inspires the other. Separately or in combination, they create uncertainty in each of the nuclear powers about the capability and even the intentions of the other. These uncertainties eventually lead in turn to fear, overreaction, and further increases in the number and types of all kinds of weapons, defensive as well as offensive.

What about the future? In the absence of international arms control agreements, what can we expect? Predictions are, of course, very uncertain, but one can single out some likely possibilities.

The ABM is a low confidence system. The expressions of confidence in the system made by those who supported it last year are bound to give way to a more realistic appraisal by the time the system is deployed. When that happens, the defense establishment will turn in accordance with the precepts of "worst plausible case" analysis to other methods of insuring the survival of the Minute Man. Of the various possibilities, the surest, quickest and the cheapest, is simply to adopt the Launch on Warning Doctrine. This doctrine involves, first: detecting that a launch of enemy missiles has occurred; second: analyzing the information in order to determine whether the launch endangers our missile forces; and, third: if it does, launching our missiles toward their targets before the incoming warheads can catch them in their silos and destroy them. This method of coping with the problem has been in people's minds since the beginning of the missile program.

In the early fifties, we anticipated that the early warning systems then foreseen would provide about fifteen minutes' notice before enemy warheads landed. For that reason, the original Atlas was designed to be launched within less than fifteen minutes after receipt of orders to do so. One of the major reasons in the early sixties for switching to the Titan II, with its storable propellants, and the Minute Man with its solid propellants, was that the time from the "go signal" to the actual launch could be made still shorter.

Many of the people who have proposed this solution to the problem are thoughtful and moderate, but even so, I find this resolution of the dilemma to be completely unsatisfactory. The time in which the decision to launch must be made varies from just a few minutes up to perhaps 20 minutes, depending on the nature of the attack, and the details of our warning system, communication system, and our command and control system. This time is so short that the decision to launch our missiles must be made either by a computer, by a pre-programmed President, or by some pre-programmed delegate of the President. There will be no time to stop and think about what the signals mean or to check to see whether they might somehow be false alarms. The decision will have to be made on the basis of electronic signals electronically analyzed, in accordance with a plan worked out long before by a political analysis in an antiseptic and unreal atmosphere. In effect, not even the President, let alone the Congress, would really be a party to the ultimate decision to end civilization.

If launching our missiles on electronic warning does not seem so bad, then consider the situation the other way around. Our current technical developments, specifically greater accuracy and reliability of missiles, MIRV and ABM are pushing the Russians in the same direction. Further, in their case a far larger fraction of the deterrent is provided by fixed land-based forces than in ours, and so they have an even greater need to find a truly reliable means of protecting their deterrent from a preemptive attack by us. If we continue with our MIRV developments, and thus force the Soviets to go to a Launch on Warning System, can we rely on them to invent and institute adequate controls? Do they have the necessary level of sophistication to solve the contradiction inherent in the need for a "hair trigger" (so that their system will respond in time) and a "stiff trigger" (so they won't fire accidentally)? How good are their computers at recognizing false alarms? How good is the command and control system for the Polaris-type submarine fleet they are now rapidly, if belatedly, building? Will it be "fail-safe"?

It cannot be emphasized too strongly that unfavorable answers to these questions about their capability will mean diminished national security for us. Yet there is no way for us to assure favorable answers to them. The only way we can avoid the danger to our security inherent in these questions is by eliminating the need to ask them. Strategic Weapons systems on both sides must be designed so that no premium is put on a preemptive attack, and so that neither side is forced to adopt the kind of "hair trigger" epitomized in the "launch on warning" concept.

Fortunately for us, the Soviets have also expressed concern about this problem. In words very similar to those used before this committee last Spring, Foreign Minister Gromyko last Summer said, "(There) is another matter that cannot be ignored. . . . It is linked to a considerable extent to the fact that the command and control systems for arms are becoming increasingly autonomous. . . . from the people who create them. . . . The human brain is no longer capable of assessing at sufficient speed the results of the multitude of instruments. The decisions made by man depend in the last analysis on the conclusions provided by computers. Governments must do everything possible to be able to determine the development of events and not to find themselves in the role of captive of events."

The nuclear arms race has led to a situation that is at once absurd and poses a dilemma. Ever since the end of World War II, the military power of the United States has been steadily increasing, while at the same time our national security has been rapidly and inexorably decreasing. The same thing is happening to the Soviet Union.

At the end of World War II, the United States was still invulnerable to a direct attack by a foreign power. In 1949, the development of the Atomic Bomb by the Soviet Union ended that ideal state of affairs, perhaps forever.

By the early 1950's, the USSR, on the basis of its own unilateral decision to accept the inevitable retaliation, could have launched an attack on the U.S. with bombers carrying fission bombs. Most of these bombers would have penetrated our defense and the American casualties could have numbered in the tens of millions.

During the late fifties and early sixties first thermonuclear bombs and then intercontinental missiles became part of the equation. As a result, by 1970, the USSR, again on the basis of its own unilateral decision to accept the inevitable retaliation, could launch an attack that could produce 100-million or more American casualties.

This steady decrease in national security does not result from inaction on the part

of responsible U.S. military and civilian authorities. It is the inevitable consequence of the arms race and the systematic exploitation of the fruits of modern science and technology by the USA and the USSR. Our attempts to deploy bomber defenses during the fifties and sixties did not substantially modify this picture, and ABM deployment will, I believe, have an even smaller direct impact on the number of casualties we might suffer in a future attack.

Nearly everyone now recognizes the futility of the arms race, and nearly everyone now realizes that still more of the same baroque military technology is not going to provide a solution to the dilemma of the steady decrease in our national security that has accompanied the increase in our military power. The SALT talks are one hopeful result of the widening recognition of the absolute necessity of finding some other approach to the problem, and finding it soon.

So, how do ABM (and MIRV) affect these talks? We must consider both of these elements of the arms race since they are really inseparable. ABM automatically leads to MIRV, and vice versa. There are at least two major effects.

First of all, ABM has both a multiplying and a racket effect on the arms race; its deployment produces a stepwise, irreversible increase in the number of offensive missiles required. It does not matter whether it is Chinese-oriented or Soviet-oriented. Consider a Chinese-oriented ABM. People who propose such imagine the Chinese blackmailing us with just a few (50-100) ICBM's by threatening to destroy some small but vital part of the U.S. Since the defensive coverage of an ABM interceptor is small compared to the dimensions of the U.S., since Hawaii and Alaska must also be defended, and since the offense in this special and peculiar case could concentrate all of its missiles on just one small area of the U.S., we would need many times as many ABM's as the Chinese have missiles. If they have no penetration aids, we might get by with only 24 times as many interceptors as they have missiles; however, if they do have good decoys or multiple warheads, a cautious U.S. defense planner would call for a great many more. Thus, a really serious Chinese-oriented ABM system requires many thousands of U.S. ABM interceptors. Now reverse this and ask what the Russians would have to do in the face of such a supposedly Chinese-oriented U.S. ABM deployment. In their case we do not imagine them as merely blackmailing us by threatening to destroy a few cities. Rather, we imagine them as trying to deter us, as we try to deter them.

According to the current fashion in strategic analysis, in order to achieve deterrence it is necessary to have an offensive force which, after weathering a surprise attack against it, can still retaliate and destroy a large fraction of the enemy population and industrial base, and as much of his offensive forces as may still remain in silos and on bases. In order for the Soviets to be able to do that, they must be able to penetrate all parts of our ABM shield with whatever force they might have left after a first attack by us. And to guarantee that outcome, a conservative Soviet planner would have to call for many more total Soviet offensive warheads than there were total U.S. interceptors. Thus, an ABM designed to cope with blackmail by 50-100 Chinese missiles, can produce a multiplying and a racket effect requiring a total Soviet warhead inventory much larger than the more than 1,000 they even now possess. Clearly, in such an event we cannot hope to achieve any meaningful strategic arms limitation.

A second way in which ABM and MIRV affect the possibility of a successful outcome of the SALT talks is through the uncertainties they introduce into the strategic equation. The main uncertainty connected with ABM is the one that has been so per-

sistently raised here: how well will it work? The main uncertainty connected with MIRV has to do with the impossibility of knowing how many warheads were actually poised for launch. As is well-known, we are fairly confident about our ability to know how many missiles they have, but as others have pointed out, it is quite another matter to know how many MIRV warheads each missile carries.

At present, then, each of us is fairly confident in his predictions about the results of a hypothetical nuclear exchange, and each is confident that he has an adequate force to deter the other. With ABM and MIRV, this confidence will be greatly weakened, and neither of us will be sure of what we could do to the other, and what they could do to us. Unfortunately, experience has clearly shown that such gross uncertainties produce an atmosphere in which arms control agreements are practically impossible. For example, for more than a decade, similar uncertainties about detecting underground explosions combined with wild speculations about the kinds of developments which might flow from a secret series of underground tests have inhibited any progress toward eliminating such tests and thus achieving a complete nuclear test ban. In the same way, the uncertainties inevitably associated with ABM and MIRV will lead us into a similar morass, and no progress will be possible in the extremely vital area of strategic arms limitations.

In summary: The steady progress of the arms race has led to an equally steady and seemingly inexorable decrease in our national security and safety. Today, the strategic balance is such that Strategic Arms Limitation agreements, which could bring an end to the nuclear arms race, seem possible. ABM and MIRV threaten to upset this balance in a way which will make such agreements impossible, or at least extremely difficult. ABM and MIRV are inseparable; each inspires and requires the other. They must be stopped before it is too late if we are to avoid another increase in the magnitude of the nuclear holocaust we all face.

We must do everything possible to ensure a positive outcome to the SALT talks. The interim freeze on the deployment of offensive and defensive strategic weapons, now being considered by the Senate, is one such move.

STATEMENT OF McGEORGE BUNDY SUBCOMMITTEE ON ARMS CONTROL, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, APRIL 8, 1970

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: I am happy to accept your invitation to testify on the arms race, and I am particularly happy to appear in company with Dr. York. I would like to associate myself strongly with his basic argument.

My broad view of the arms race was stated last October in an article in FOREIGN AFFAIRS, and to save the time of the Committee I would like, with your permission, to offer that article for the record instead of repeating it. Its principal conclusion was simply that the strategic arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union has gone too far, threatens to go further, and should be stopped by an early agreement between these two great powers. Since then SALT has begun in a businesslike way, and our Government is now considering what its position will be as the talks resume in Vienna next week.

My own strong belief is that the best next step for the United States in this field is to follow the course proposed in Senate Resolution 211. That Resolution first states the sense of the Senate that prompt negotiations be urgently pursued between the two great powers, and on this point I think there is little or no disagreement among Americans. The second part of the Resolution ex-

presses the sense of the Senate that we should now propose an immediate suspension by both sides "of further deployment of all offensive and defensive nuclear strategic weapons systems." An excellent basic argument in favor of this Resolution is developed in the report submitted by Senator Fulbright, and I will not waste your time by repeating it. Let me rather offer ten brief comments on the significance of your Committee's position.

1. I assume that in passing Senate Resolution 211, the Senate will be urging the President to propose to the Soviet Union the mutual suspension of these deployments for some reasonable term during which further progress could be made toward a definite agreement. There are some who suppose that the word "moratorium" implies a form of permanent self-entanglement, but as I understand it no such self-entanglement is either necessary or intended.

2. I strongly support the statement in the Committee Report that an agreed suspension of deployment of strategic systems will necessarily imply a suspension also of tests—as well as deployment—of such emerging systems as MIRV. The Committee Report makes the correct connection between the Soviet SS-9 and the American MIRV. This connection goes both ways. Just as the Soviets must limit SS-9 if they wish to stop MIRV, so I believe that if we are to get any early limit on SS-9 deployment, we ourselves must place MIRV on the bargaining table.

3. I believe that there will not be much progress in SALT until the United States Government is prepared to make a specific proposal. I think the odds are heavy that it will prove wise and right for us to move first. The Committee has heard the sensitive and perceptive testimony of Professor Marshall Shulman on Soviet attitudes towards arms negotiation. I share his view that Soviet wariness is at least equal to our own. Our experience, understanding and present strength make it right for us to take the initiative.

4. Specifically, I believe that as a part of any proposal for an agreed moratorium the United States should take a first step by announcing a suspension of its own deployment of ABM and MIRV for a limited time. Such a time could and should be relatively brief, and its extension could and should depend upon the promptness and seriousness of Soviet response. There might be some marginal inconvenience for our defense organization in such a suspension, and our already overwhelming strategic war plans might need marginal revision if specific planned deployments are delayed—but there is no real or present danger in such a limited suspension, and if we want results in SALT, we should try it. How long such a trial should be, and precisely what it should include, are matters I do not attempt to cover, since it would be unwise for a private citizen to try to define the exact length and direction of any first step. My point is simply that we should begin by an action as well as a proposal.

5. This belief rests not on any sentimental notion that we must be more virtuous than the Russians, but rather upon the deep conviction that effective limitation and reduction of the strategic arms race is an objective deeply in our own national interest as well as the interest of all mankind. It is wholly false to suppose that the national security is always served by adding strategic weapons and never by their limitation. In the world of the 1970s the truth is more nearly the opposite. We have more than enough strategic weapons today. The addition of new systems which will inevitably produce further Soviet systems is not the road to safety for anyone in any country.

6. In particular we should be on guard against the notion that it is useful to press the development or deployment of any given

weapons systems because of its value as a bargaining-counter for SALT. It is quite true that if we get nowhere in SALT and if Soviet strategic expansion continues, we shall have to take careful stock of our own needs. But there is no evidence at all that pressing the deployment of systems we do not yet need is likely to have a constructive effect on Soviet behavior in SALT. There are times and topics for toughness with Moscow, but SALT in April is not one of them, and many of those who urge this tactic are men who do not want SALT to succeed. It will be very hard to get a good agreement even if we do only what we have to do. It will probably be impossible if we provide unnecessary ammunition to Soviet weapon-lovers by pressing our own deployments relentlessly throughout the talks.

7. In moving toward effective limitation of the arms race, we shall need to be alert and skeptical against distractions and diversions from those whose special interests may be threatened. This history of arms negotiation includes many examples of efforts by the partisans of particular weapons systems to prevent any agreement at all. During the negotiations before the Limited Test Ban Treaty, for example, it was suggested that the Soviets might obtain some decisive advantage by secret nuclear tests conducted behind the sun or by the construction of underground holes so big that the very existence of a test could not be detected. These arguments now rest properly in the dustbin of dead fantasy. But now new dangers are depicted in the effort to justify a refusal to limit or delay our own new weapons systems. Such arguments should be subjected to most meticulous and skeptical analysis, and in such study the role of the Congress is of high importance.

8. There is a particular danger in the uncritical acceptance of doctrines of strategic superiority—or even sufficiency—which may be used by zealous men in support of their own preferred weapons. This is as true of the Eisenhower Administration's belief in "prevailing" in a general war as it is of later doctrines of "assured destruction" and "damage limitation." All of these forms of words can be used to justify excessive expenditure on unnecessary strategic systems. At present there are four new criteria of strategic sufficiency, but the Administration has not told us what they are. According to press reports, these criteria include "assured destruction," "hostage equality," "crisis stability" and "third country protection." If the Administration and the Congress are not alert and watchful, criteria like these can be protective umbrellas for unchecked strategic expansionism. They can also be roadblocks in the way of arms limitation. They deserve public discussion. My own conviction is that the realities of strategic nuclear weapons are not subject to control by such verbal formulae. In the language of Justice Holmes, I believe that criteria like these tend to be spiders' webs inadequate to control the dominant facts.

9. The main proposition which we need to understand in order to limit the dangers of the nuclear age is that enough is enough. The Soviet Union and the United States have long since reached and passed that point. Each is now able to do totally unacceptable damage to the other, no matter how a nuclear catastrophe begins. Sane political leaders on both sides know this reality for what it is. It is of course possible that some still unknown technological development might genuinely disrupt this fundamental parity, but there is no evidence whatever that any such development is likely in the present decade. So we have enough, and more than enough, and we are on the edge of a most unstabilizing and dangerous escalation. Now is the time to stop.

10. The Committee Report recognizes what I would like to emphasize in closing: that

while citizens can comment and the Senate can advise, only the President can decide. It will take negotiation to reach agreement, and the official position of the Government of the United States can be stated to the Soviet Union only by our President and his authorized agents. The President must choose the timing and the shape of any initiative he takes; in the end his leadership is what will decide. As he considers the possible choices and deliberates on decisions which have not yet been made, the President is entitled to the thoughtful advice of the Senate, and in this field, where the weight of bureaucratic influence has historically been heavily on the side of arms as against arms control, such advice can be of particular value to him. The easy course is always to avoid decisions; politically the argument for weapons is easy, and the argument for acts of restraint is hard. A President who wants to take the lead needs all the help he can get. The Senate can give such help, and in this situation it is obviously the duty of citizens to respond to the Senate's request for their honest views. I have stated mine, and I will be glad to try to answer your questions.

TESTIMONY OF A. DOAK BARNETT, SENIOR FELLOW, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON ARMS CONTROL, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION, SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE, APRIL 9, 1970

Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, let me begin by saying that I am very grateful for this opportunity to meet and discuss with you a number of questions relating to arms control—questions focusing on the ABM and the SALT talks and their relevance to the broad problem of U.S.-China relations.

I would like to make two preliminary comments about my statement. First, the views I will express today are purely my own, and do not in any way represent views of The Brookings Institution, which does not itself take any stands on policy issues. Secondly, since I have very recently written an article (appearing in the current issue of *Foreign Affairs*) which summarizes many of my views on questions we are considering today, I am taking the liberty of drawing material from that article for the purposes of the statement I am now presenting to you.

We are now, in my view, at a rather critical juncture in the evolution both of our policy toward China and our policy regarding arms control.

For the first time in several years, there now appears to be at least a limited basis for hope that movement can take place in our relations with mainland China, movement which may reduce tensions and increase contacts between us. The current Warsaw talks will help to determine whether some progress is possible, or whether the freeze of the last two decades will continue.

At the same time, I believe that the arms control negotiations which we and the Russians have initiated are clearly the most important ones in the postwar period. We are about to meet again in Vienna at a time when both sides are poised to deploy new weapons systems—in our case, ABMs and MRVs—if no agreements to forego such systems can be reached. Decisions made in the period immediately ahead by Washington and Moscow individually, and by both at the SALT talks, will determine, therefore, whether the U.S.-Soviet arms race will accelerate or slow down in the years immediately ahead. These decisions will also—and this is one of the major points I wish to make today—have a very significant impact on the prospects for improved U.S.-China relations. The evolving triangular relationship among the U.S., Soviet Union, and China is now such that any action by one or two of the three inevitably affects the others.

Since my assignment today is to focus attention on matters relevant to U.S.-China relations, and specifically to consider how we should view the ABM issue and SALT talks in relation to the "China problem," I will not comment on other fundamental questions, such as whether effective ABM systems are technically feasible or how they might affect the stability of the U.S.-Soviet balance. I assume that others will discuss these questions with you.

Let me proceed with my assignment and start by saying that I believe the Nixon Administration is to be commended for the new general approach it has adopted in our overall China policy. In his February 18 report to Congress on foreign policy, the President stated that we do not now wish to "isolate" mainland China but rather hope that in time it "will be ready to re-enter the international community," that we look forward to a "more normal and constructive relationship" with the Peking regime, that "the principles underlying our relations with China are similar to those governing our policies towards the U.S.S.R.," and that we will "take what steps we can toward improved practical relations with Peking." This is a very sound and very encouraging approach, in my opinion. Moreover, the limited steps we have taken recently to implement this approach—namely the liberalizing of passport and travel regulations and the reduction of trade restrictions, are highly desirable and deserve strong support. The Administration should now be urged to continue making further and more substantial steps along these same lines—for example, by removing all restrictions on nonstrategic trade with mainland China.

However, having said this, I must immediately go on to say that in my view, the deployment of an anti-Chinese ABM area defense would be extremely undesirable and would, in fact, run directly counter to, and tend to undercut, the basic objectives that underlie our new overall China policy.

Deployment of an anti-Chinese ABM would be both unwise and unsound. I believe, for a number of reasons. Let me summarize these briefly now, and then proceed to elaborate on some of them at greater length.

(1) The ABM is not necessary for the defense of the U.S. against any foreseeable "Chinese threat." For the indefinite future, the U.S. will continue to have overwhelming nuclear superiority in relation to China, and there is every reason to believe that our superiority will operate effectively to deter the Chinese from any offensive nuclear actions or threats. It is not necessary, therefore, to try to achieve a total damage denial capability by building ABMs.

(2) If the U.S. insists on building an anti-Chinese ABM system, Peking will probably interpret this to mean (whatever Washington says to try to convince it otherwise) that we are determined to maintain an unrestricted capability of making "first strike" threats against China, and that we insist on denying China the ability to acquire even a limited, defensive, "second strike" capability. There is every reason to believe that this would tend to reinforce Peking's worst instincts in interpreting our motives and would work against the possibility of improving our relations.

(3) China's present opposition to all international arms control agreements is rooted, in part at least, in its basic sense of vulnerability and nuclear weakness. Peking obviously has been, and still is, fearful of threats by the superpowers of the U.S.-Soviet "collusion" directed against China. Until China achieves a minimal defensive deterrent itself, this situation is likely to continue. However, once the Chinese do acquire a limited "second strike" capability, it is at least conceivable that leaders in Peking may at that point be more inclined than at pres-

ent to consider the advantages of arms control agreements in terms of their own interests. If so, the chances of inducing China to participate in arms control may increase at that point. An anti-Chinese ABM will probably work to postpone that day.

(4) For these and other reasons, the U.S. should itself forgo building an anti-Chinese ABM area defense system, and in addition should attempt, at the SALT talks, to reach agreement with the Soviet Union that neither we nor they will build such systems. If, in the absence of such agreement, either or both proceed to deploy anti-Chinese systems, this will tend to reinforce Peking's fear of anti-Chinese collusion between Washington and Moscow, which at the least would complicate, and could well seriously set back, the prospects for improving U.S. relations with China.

Let me now elaborate on some of these points, starting with a few comments on Chinese motivations, nuclear capabilities, and foreign policy behavior, and how one should view the "Chinese threat."

There is no doubt, I believe, that ever since 1949 the Chinese Communist regime, in its relations with the superpowers, has felt very vulnerable to external pressures and possible attack by one or both of the major nuclear powers. Particularly since the late 1950's—following the Sino-Soviet split and the start of U.S.-Soviet collaboration in the arms control field—Peking has felt itself to be, in a sense, "encircled" by the two superpowers. It is still, in a fundamental sense, weak and knows it; its basic posture in big power relations is, therefore, of necessity defensive.

One of China's basic aims has been, and still is, to acquire at least a minimal nuclear deterrent to improve its ability to deal with the U.S. and Soviet Union. Its hope is to achieve a position less unequal than in the past, and to strengthen its bargaining position and leverage in relations with the big powers. Above all, its aim is to deter attack against China and reduce China's vulnerability to external pressures. This is the basic military-strategic motivation behind its nuclear program.

Without attempting to summarize in detail the progress of China's nuclear program, let me say that while its technological progress has been impressive in many respects, its actual nuclear capabilities are very limited and will remain so for a long time to come—because of the relative weakness of China's resource base.

By the middle or latter 1970's China will, at best, have accumulated perhaps 15 to 40 operational ICBMs plus 100 to 200 MRBMs and a limited number of other bombs deliverable by aircraft. (The most recent Defense Department estimates suggest that by 1975 China may have 10 to 25 ICBMs and 80 to 100 MRBMs.)

To provide a crude basis of comparison, today, the U.S. and the Soviet Union each has over 1,000 ICBMs, plus many thousands of other nuclear weapons deliverable by a variety of sophisticated systems including missiles, airplanes, and submarines.

Projections of China's nuclear capabilities through the 1970's make several things clear. There is no possibility that in the foreseeable future Peking can aspire to parity with the U.S. and the Soviet Union in the nuclear field. The Chinese cannot come close to achieving a "first strike" capability against either of the superpowers. Under any conceivable circumstances, in the event of a Chinese attack, Washington or Moscow could retaliate massively.

The question is whether—and if so, when, and with what consequences—China may be able to acquire a limited, defensive, "second strike" capability which will serve as a minimal deterrent for China—that is, a capacity, if subjected to U.S. or Soviet nuclear attack, to retaliate and hit at least some targets



in the attacking country or, in the U.S. case, possibly American forces in the Pacific or bases in allied countries. To date, it has yet to achieve this.

If the U.S., and Soviet Union, forego building anti-Chinese ABM systems, they will, in effect, be accepting the fact that by the latter 1970's, China will have acquired a small defensive, "second strike" capability.

What risks or costs would this involve? It would require acceptance of the fact that the U.S., and the Soviet Union, cannot with impunity consider or threaten nuclear "first strikes" against China. One can question, however, whether this would involve high costs. The arguments and inhibitions against considering nuclear "first strikes" in most conceivable situations are already very great. (Conceivably, this may be less true for the Soviet Union, than for the U.S., as the vague hints about a possible preemptive strike in 1969 suggest, but even Moscow must feel strong inhibitions about initiating a nuclear "first strike.") Moreover, in most limited conflicts in Asia, nuclear weapons are likely to be almost irrelevant.

The possibility that key non-nuclear powers such as Japan, India, and Australia might feel more vulnerable and threatened cannot be ignored. If this impelled them to embark on independent nuclear programs, the cost in relation to U.S. aims (including the desire to prevent proliferation) would be substantial. Yet, as long as such countries have confidence in the U.S. commitment to defend them against nuclear threats, and as long as it is clear that American nuclear superiority in relation to China is such that any offensive nuclear threats by Peking would not really be credible, there is no reason why China's acquisition of a minimal deterrent should basically alter the position or the views of such countries.

It is sometimes argued that if the U.S. maintains a "first strike" capability against China and builds invulnerable defenses, presumably by developing ABMs, the Japanese are likely to have greater confidence in our defense pledges. I believe that it is much more likely, however, that if the U.S. focuses on such a defense strategy, rather than relying on the continued applicability of mutual deterrence, the Japanese may conclude that the U.S. in a crisis situation might concern itself only with its own defense and abandon interest in allies not protected by such defenses.

The fact is that not only have the Chinese to date resisted whatever temptation they may have felt to engage in "bomb rattling," it is difficult to see how, from their position of nuclear inferiority, they will have any significant capacity for credible "nuclear blackmail" in the foreseeable future. Peking's cautious emphasis, to date, on defense as its sole aim in developing nuclear weapons suggests that Chinese leaders may already realize this.

Some might fear that once the Chinese believe they have acquired a credible deterrent, they might tend to become more aggressive in areas such as Southeast Asia, feeling that they could take more risks in non-nuclear or sub-nuclear situations, involving conventional weapons, because they would be less vulnerable to nuclear counter-threats. Whether one considers this to be a significant risk depends very much on one's general assessment of China's foreign policy goals, strategy, and behavior.

If one views China as a power committed to broad territorial aggression and expansionism by military means, willing to take large risks, and prone to irrational action (i.e., inclined to commit aggression without regard for possible consequences), there would be cause for major concern. However, among specialists on Chinese affairs, both in and out of the U.S. government, there appears to be a fairly broad consensus that analysis of China's behavior and doctrine

over the past two decades does not support this view. In general, this consensus, which I believe is sound, maintains that:

Although China encourages revolutionaries abroad, it is not committed to broad territorial expansionism. Among its national goals is the recovery of certain areas that it considers to be lost territories, but even in regard to these territories its inclination is to pursue long-term, low-risk policies, not broad military expansionism.

It appears to be pre-disposed to keep Chinese military forces within China's boundaries, and it seems likely to continue doing so, except in cases where it feels Chinese security—or that of a Communist buffer state on its periphery—is seriously threatened (as it did in Korea).

Its primary stress, both in the structure of its conventional military forces and the doctrine governing their use, is on defense rather than offense.

It cannot and does not ignore the possible risks and costs of large-scale conventional war, even when nuclear weapons are not involved, and it places a high priority on the desirability of avoiding large-scale war of any sort with the major powers.

It is strongly pre-disposed, in general, to low-cost, low-risk policies. While it clearly encourages and supports revolutionary struggles in other countries, such support does not include Chinese manpower on any significant scale. Even Maoist doctrine insists that all revolutionaries must be "self-reliant," and should depend primarily on indigenous resources; it opposes the use of Chinese forces to fight other revolutionaries' battles for them.

China has used pressures and probes against its neighbors for a variety of purposes, but in doing so its use of force has generally been carefully calculated, limited, and controlled.

In crisis situations, it has tended to act with considerable prudence and caution, and repeatedly it has moved to check escalation when there has appeared to be a serious risk of major conflict.

There is, of course, no absolute guarantee that these patterns of behavior, which seem to have characterized Chinese actions over the past two decades, will persist in the future. Nevertheless, there is a remarkably broad consensus among China specialists that they are likely to continue. In fact, there is a fairly widely-held view—a view that I share—that post-Mao leaders are likely to be more pragmatic and realistic than Mao, and subject to even greater internal as well as external constraints.

As a result of the internal disruptions caused by the Cultural Revolution in China during the past four years, the Peking regime has clearly been weakened in some respects. Consequently, there are now new constraints, in fact if not in theory, on Chinese policy, which will certainly affect its strategies abroad.

Moreover, as a result of the steady deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations in the 1960's, the "Russian threat" appears to have replaced the "U.S. threat" as Peking's major foreign policy preoccupation, and this seems to have impelled the Chinese leadership to consider new options and strategies, to reduce China's present isolation and vulnerability and explore new opportunities for maneuver and flexibility.

It is at least plausible to believe, therefore, that future Chinese leaders may downgrade the importance of revolutionary aims (not ending, but possibly deemphasizing, Chinese activity in this field) and upgrade the importance of state-to-state relationships and more conventional political and economic instruments of policy. There is remarkably little support among China specialists for the idea that China is now, or is likely to be in the future, prone to act in an irrational or highly reckless manner, which it

would certainly be doing if it were to ignore the continuing fact of its nuclear inferiority, and its vulnerability to both conventional and nuclear retaliation, even if, and when, it acquires a minimal deterrent.

If these judgments are correct, there are strong reasons to assume that once China achieves a nuclear deterrent it can be expected, in a basic sense, to act much as the other nuclear powers have, and to be constrained, as they are, by the realities of nuclear deterrence. There is little basis for arguing that the U.S., or Soviet Union, can feel secure vis-à-vis China only if they have a total damage denial capability and an unquestionable ability to threaten China with a "first strike". To argue this is to argue, in effect, that the U.S. and the Soviet Union can only feel secure under conditions that guarantee that the Chinese will continue to feel highly insecure.

As I stated earlier, if the U.S. operates on other assumptions and proceeds to build an anti-Chinese ABM, this will not only tend to strengthen Chinese suspicions that we are determined to maintain a potentially threatening "first strike" capability against China and to deny China even a minimal defensive "second strike" capability, it will also tend to postpone the day when China may be willing to consider participating in international arms control agreements.

Fundamental change in China's posture on strategic and nuclear arms control issues will not be easy for Peking to make, under any circumstances, because of China's basic weakness relative to the two superpowers. However, if one asks when and under what conditions a more flexible and pragmatic leadership in China might be inclined to change its posture on arms control, and even begin to see arms control measures as in the interest of China as well as of the other powers, the answer would seem to be the following: When China is convinced that its own nuclear development has reached a stage where it has at least a minimal credible nuclear deterrent—that is, some kind of defensive "second strike" retaliatory capacity—so that it will be able to deal with the U.S. and Soviet Union on terms less unequal than at present.

It is not easy to define when this point will be reached. But it will doubtless be reached eventually, whether or not we build an anti-Chinese ABM. It is almost certain that in time the Chinese will have acquired a sufficient nuclear capability so that no one could be sure whether, if China were subjected to a "first strike", it could not mount a significant retaliatory strike, at least against allies or forces in the Pacific if not against the U.S. itself.

Whenever the Chinese, and we, are convinced that China has acquired some sort of limited "second strike" capability, the possibility that Peking may reconsider its present blanket opposition to arms control may increase, for a variety of reasons. The realization that pursuit of parity is a will-o-the-wisp is likely to begin to sink in, in China. Moreover, once China has acquired any sort of credible deterrent, some Chinese leaders may conclude that it is more feasible to try to reduce the gap between China and the superpowers through agreements limiting (or reducing) U.S. and Soviet capabilities than by trying to catch up in a hopeless race. And, as the cost of deterrence goes up (it inevitably must, as China gets involved in more sophisticated hardware), and as the competition for resources in China increases (between those stressing economic development and those emphasizing defense) there may be greater pressures within China, on economic grounds, to limit investment in strategic arms development.

The construction of anti-Chinese ABM systems would be likely, therefore, to postpone the day when there may be some realistic

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hope of including China in international arms control. It would tend to raise the level of nuclear development which Peking's leaders will consider essential as a minimum goal. And in general it will tend to make more remote the possibility of establishing a "more normal and constructive relationship" with China and the possibility of inducing Peking to "re-enter the international community"—which are now our stated, and in my opinion eminently sensible, goals.

What does all of this suggest regarding the decisions we should make and the policies we should pursue regarding an anti-Chinese ABM system—both in our own consideration of the problem and in discussions with the Russians at Vienna?

I strongly believe we should clearly decide that, in terms of our broad national interests and aims, we should not build an anti-Chinese ABM system, because it conflicts with the main thrust of our new China policy and, is unnecessary for our defense—wholly apart from other possible reasons. The cost of such a system would certainly be in its disfavor, too, but clearly the costs would be tolerable if it were essential in terms of our defense and foreign policy goals. The point is that it is not only unessential, but would tend to be damaging in terms of our overall objectives.

We should not only make this decision ourselves; we should also in the SALT talks attempt to reach agreement with the Soviets on this issue, so that both we and they will forego traveling this road. This would be desirable in relation both to our aims regarding China and our desire to check the U.S.-Soviet arms race.

Both the U.S. and the Soviet Union must concern themselves, more than they have in the past, not only with the problem of strategic stability in their bilateral relations but also with the task of inducing China, over time, to improve relations in general and, eventually, to participate in arms control efforts and accommodate more fully than it has to date to the requirements of the nuclear age. Neither need fear that the Chinese will be able to achieve a "first strike" capability, or approach nuclear parity, in the foreseeable future. Nor should they consider China's eventual acquisition of a minimal deterrent to be a special danger. While it is true that China's acquisition of a credible deterrent will improve Peking's defensive capabilities, it will not significantly alter the overall nuclear balance. Moreover, China can be expected to act much as other nuclear powers have, and to be constrained, as others are, by the realities of mutual deterrence. Equally important, when China achieves a credible deterrent, Peking's leaders may be more inclined than at present to reassess their strategic policies and consider the value of arms control.

The hope should be that Moscow as well as Washington will see the importance of this. But even if Moscow does not, the U.S. in shaping its own strategic and arms control policies, should take the "China problem," as well as the problem of U.S.-Soviet bilateral relations, fully into account.

#### SAFEGUARD, ABM, AND SALT (By W. K. H. Panofsky)

(Testimony before the Disarmament Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, April 13, 1970)

Last year I had the opportunity of discussing the Phase I ABC deployment decision before this committee; I very much appreciate the privilege of appearing before you again this year. Again, to avoid any misunderstanding, let me say that I am testifying as an individual scientist who has been involved in defense matters in general, and ABM in particular, for a long period of time. My first official contact with the subject was in 1955 when I served on the Scientific Advi-

sory Board to the Air Force, which recommended the establishment of the Ballistic Missile Early Warning (BMEWS) System. I have been participating in various advisory roles on these and related subjects to the government since that time.

#### I. OUTLINE OF TESTIMONY

Last year, during his press conference of March 14, 1969, the President gave three reasons for wishing to go forward with Phase I of the Safeguard System. These were:

A. Protection of the land-based deterrent (Minuteman and SAC air fields).

B. Protection against an accidentally launched missile.

C. A thin area defense against small nuclear powers, in particular Mainland China.

In connection with announcing his deployment decision the President emphasized several additional points last year. Among these are:

A. He did not wish the ABM deployment to threaten the Soviet deterrent against U.S. attack. For this reason he specifically ruled out deployment of ABM in the role of defense of U.S. cities against Soviet attack; in contrast a defense dedicated solely to defending Minuteman silos does not threaten the Soviet deterrent.

B. The deployment decision should not endanger the chance of success of the forthcoming SALT talks.

As I testified last year, I welcomed the President's statement that he did not wish to endanger SALT and that he did not wish to escalate the arms race further by endangering the Soviet deterrent, thus forcing the Soviet Union towards further increases of offensive weapons. However, I am opposed to the Phase I deployment as actually carried out by the Department of Defense and to the proposed Safeguard expansion; these steps do not meet the President's objectives in many essential respects, as summarized here:

A. The Safeguard system does very little, if anything, to protect the Minuteman force—better protection could be achieved at a lower cost on a comparable or shorter time scale.

B. The President stated in his press conference of January 31, 1970, that he had been assured that the system would provide a "virtually infallible" defense against ICBM attack from China. Safeguard does not fit this description, nor does technology permit construction of a dependable ABM shield over the entire country.

C. A National Policy requiring a highly effective ABM defense against Mainland China implies an ever-growing deployment of city defense ABMs which would threaten the Soviet deterrent in contrast to the President's stated objectives.

D. An expanded ABM deployment, as now proposed, in particular considering its stated objective as being an anti-China defense, seriously interferes with the flexibility the President will have in negotiating an acceptable ABM level with the Soviet Union at the SALT talks.

The President promised that this program will be reviewed annually from the point of view of:

A. Technical development.

B. The threat.

C. The diplomatic context, including any talks on arms limitation.

Where, then, is the new experience on which the decision to expand ABM deployment now was to be based? There has been no construction activity on the sites authorized last year; the contract to develop the first site for future technical use was awarded by the Army just two weeks ago. The date at which equipment can be received at the sites has slipped by almost one year. None of the technical results in the ongoing development work have made Safeguard look better. On the contrary, several factors exist which tend to degrade the ex-

pected performance of Safeguard: The ability of the PAR to function in the presence of nuclear explosions is highly dubious, and the computer severely limits the performance of the system in handling large attacks; also, costs have risen substantially.

Where is the new threat justifying ABM expansion? The Soviet threat against Minuteman has indeed been growing; but it is just in defending Minuteman against growing threats that Safeguard is now admitted to be uneconomical and ineffective. As a "hedge" to counter the Soviet threat we can develop a system specifically designed to protect Minuteman on a time scale at least as fast as that of Safeguard, and at much lower cost. Estimates of a Chinese ICBM threat have been slipping farther into the future, yet we are now re-emphasizing the anti-China mission of the Safeguard.

What is the diplomatic context to justify expansion of Safeguard now? The agreed level of ABM deployment which might arise from the SALT talks will control more than any other single factor the total level of strategic armament at which we might be able to freeze the weaponry of the world as a result of SALT. Authorization to expand Safeguard with emphasis on its anti-China mission would thus endanger the success of SALT, since the negotiability with the Soviets to reduce ABM levels is limited by such a decision. The argument for an expensive but technically ineffective expansion of Safeguard in order to "negotiate from a position of strength" has little merit. Although the Soviets have greater total explosive power in their nuclear arsenal, we have numerical superiority of three to one in nuclear warheads, and U.S. MIRVs are ready for deployment.

The sequence of events between last year's Safeguard decision and this year's request for expansion gives little confidence that we are embarking on an "orderly, phased" deployment, carefully tailored to changing circumstances. This is the time to push toward a halt in the nuclear arms spiral—a race which has cast a shadow over the history of our time.

#### II. THE VALUE OF SAFEGUARD IN PROTECTING MINUTEMAN

During the past year the Soviet threat against the Minuteman force, due to growth of the numbers of Soviet SS-9 missiles of high explosive power, and owing to the recognized technical possibility of improved accuracy of Soviet missiles, has increased at approximately the rate forecast by Secretary Laird last year. However, a threat against Minuteman is not synonymous with a first strike capability against the U.S., let alone a first strike intent. In last year's testimony it was conclusively demonstrated that a first strike threat against the United States would have to envisage a simultaneous attack against the American Minuteman force, the SAC bomber fleet, and the Polaris-Poseidon fleet on a time scale which is technically impossible because of existing U.S. early warning capabilities. I note that under current policies each of these U.S. forces is designed to be able to inflict enormous damage on the Soviet Union and Mainland China; even after absorbing a first strike the level of damage the U.S. could inflict would be such that the society of the attacker would be unlikely to survive.

Nevertheless, in view of the reality of the emerging threat against Minuteman it might be prudent to consider a number of alternatives to improve the U.S. deterrent, such as:

A. ABM defense of the Minuteman force against missile attack.

B. Phase-out of the land-based deterrent force and relying for deterrence entirely on an airborne bomber force and an improved or amplified submarine force.

C. Increase in the hardness of the Minuteman force or improvement of its chance for

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survival under attack through increased mobility.

D. Increase in the number of Minuteman silos at a rate sufficient to stay ahead of the Soviet threat.

E. Limitation of the threat by "freezing" the number of Soviet missiles as a result of the SALT talks, possibly preceded by an agreed temporary moratorium during the talks.

Naturally, the last alternative is the most attractive one from the point of view of the peace of the world; thus nothing should be done to endanger the success of SALT.

Secretary Laird has testified that he considers this year's request for military authorization (which includes expansion of the Safeguard system at a cost of \$1.450 billion of new obligatory authority) to be a "holding" operation in order to avoid the difficult decisions this year among the alternative options listed. He maintained that defense of the Minuteman silos is a non-threatening "hedge" to lengthen the period of time over which Minuteman might be expected to survive. With this conclusion I agree, as I also agreed with the President's stated objective to protect Minuteman. However, during last year's hearings, many witnesses (and I among them) introduced severe technical criticisms which have never been answered satisfactorily by the Defense Department on the role of Safeguard in Minuteman defense. The dominant points of these criticisms were: The Safeguard system provides only a single, very expensive (about \$200 million) radar for each Minuteman complex and only a very small, still classified, number of Sprint missiles to protect the Minuteman silos and the radar. If, therefore, the radar were to malfunction, or be destroyed by enemy attack, then the whole system collapses. Attack on the radar is an attractive enemy tactic, since the missile site radar is much "softer", that is, vulnerable, than the missile silos it defends.

Defense of an entire Minuteman complex by a single MSR radar contradicts the fundamental philosophy of the Minuteman system: The value of Minuteman as a deterrent is based on the survival of each silo, independent of any other silo which might be destroyed. The single radar on which the entire defense depends is thus the "Achilles' Heel" of the entire system and a substantial part of the defense has to be dedicated to protecting this radar, i.e., to "defending the defense."

This criticism is aggravated by a second objection never answered by the Defense Department: The Soviet SS-11 missiles (which now exist in much larger quantities than the SS-9's) are at present of sufficient accuracy and explosive power to destroy the missile site radar, although they do not endanger the Minuteman silos. Thus in effect a Safeguard defense to protect Minuteman against the SS-9 could be totally negated by the Soviets even if the system were deployed today.

During the last year it has become clear beyond a reasonable doubt that if the defense of Minuteman were the only, or even the principal, function of Safeguard, its deployment clearly could not be justified. Not only is the number of Minuteman silos saved by the Safeguard deployment negligible, but it is also clear that if the attempt were made to increase the protection offered by Safeguard by increasing the numbers of missiles and radars using the Safeguard technology, then such an undertaking would be enormously expensive. Specifically, the cost per silo defended would be many times the cost of each Minuteman saved and the defense cost would also exceed the cost of the enemy missiles which could be intercepted with confidence.

These criticisms have now been tacitly agreed to this year by the Defense Department. Secretary Laird in his statement on

February 20, 1970, before the Joint Session of the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees of the Senate, proposed:

"If, in the future, the defense of Minuteman has to be expanded, new and smaller additional radars placed in Minuteman fields would be less costly than the Safeguard Missile Site Radar (MSR) because they would not have to cover such large areas. For this reason we will pursue a program to determine the optimum radar for such a defense and begin the development of this radar and associated components in FY 1971 . . ."

Similarly, the Secretary of the Air Force stated before the Senate Armed Services Committee in March 1970:

"If the Soviets continue to increase the threat (against Minutemen) it may prove most cost effective to rely on a broader list of defensive measures . . . close hardpoint defense, hardening and multi-basing as examples . . ."

The Deputy Secretary of Defense recently testified to the House Committee on Armed Services:

"For example, we have under consideration a new, smaller, less-expensive radar and data processor aimed specifically at close-in defense of Minuteman . . ."

In contrast the Secretary testified last year on April 16, 1969, that he saw:

"no feasible substitute for Safeguard . . ."

The Secretary of Defense has now proposed an additional appropriation of \$158 million for these new development programs, intended to protect Minutemen by techniques better than Safeguard. This is an admission of the validity of the technical criticisms voiced last year: Those witnesses opposing Safeguard deployment maintained that a more effective and less expensive way to defend Minuteman would clearly be a system which employed smaller radars rather than a large, vulnerable one. The Defense Department now recognizes belatedly that any hope of a reasonably effective defense of Minuteman would require the development and deployment of a system of defense of hardened Minuteman silos, rather than being a general purpose development such as the Safeguard adaptation of the former Sentinel and Nike-X systems, which were primarily designed as city defense ABM systems.

A frequent "criticism of the critics" voiced last year was, "Assuming you are right, that Safeguard is technically very poorly suited to defending Minuteman, but considering the evolving threat, can we afford to wait to develop a better system specifically designed for defending Minuteman?" The answer to that is "Yes, we can." the total schedule for deploying the Safeguard Phase I defense is not controlled by providing the hardware, that is, the missile and radars, but is paced by the unprecedented complexity of the computer and the associated programming which is required to control the system.

Last year Secretary Packard testified that the data processing job was a large one and this year DOD witnesses testified that progress was "satisfactory." What they did not state was that the programming task not only control the level of threat which can be handled, but also paces the entire deployment schedule. Therefore, "doing the job right" will not delay the time at which Minuteman could be defended, and may in fact shorten it.

Last year critics expressed concern that the performance of the PAR radar would be impaired by the proximity of nuclear explosions. This year Dr. Foster testified on February 24, 1970: "We have encountered no serious problems in engineering the PAR." What he did not state is that the concern of the critics is more than justified: Nuclear bursts degrade the expected performance of the PAR to such an extent that there is great doubt that he PAR can contribute to the defense of Minuteman at all, and that fur-

thermore its role in area coverage is seriously impaired. I consider this a "serious engineering problem."

The totality of all these technical facts amounts to one thing: Even if Safeguard functions perfectly it offers significant protection to Minuteman only over a very narrow band of threats; if the threat continues to grow as rapidly as it is at present, Safeguard is obsolete before deployed; if the threat levels off, Safeguard is not needed. If one combines this fact with the likelihood of catastrophic failure of the single radar and computer controlling the system, and the fact that a less failure-prone and more effective system to defend Minuteman can be produced on the same time scale for less money, Safeguard looks like a very poor use of the shrinking defense dollar indeed.

### III. THE DEFENSE AGAINST CHINESE ICBM'S

There is now general agreement that the mission of defending Minuteman alone cannot justify Safeguard Phase I deployment, let alone deployment of an amplified Safeguard system. Therefore, the principal motive for wishing to go forward has again become the role of the system in defense of cities; it was this role which was de-emphasized in the testimony of Department of Defense witnesses last year, e.g., the Deputy Secretary of Defense testified before this Committee on March 26, 1969:

"I must say that I am very pleased to know that you and I have come to the same conclusion on this matter—that an ABM defense of our cities makes no sense and that it is the kind of thing that does lead to escalation of the arms race. That is one of the first conclusions I came to after getting into the study of this matter. That is why I have recommended a different course—the course of protecting our retaliatory capability rather than protecting our cities."

However, the President put city defense again into primary focus as an anti-Chinese defense during his press conference of January 31 of this year. This shifting role of Safeguard was described by Senator Gore last year by the words "a defense looking for a mission;" we now find that such a multiple role system is very poorly suited for the defense of Minuteman and is also of little value in offering total protection against a possible Chinese threat.

Although there has been progress in the development of Chinese nuclear devices our projections of a Chinese ICBM capability have continuously slipped in time. We expected that the Chinese would undertake an experimental launch of an ICBM in 1967 (as was recently mentioned by Secretary Laird), but now the expectation of such an event has slipped to 1970, a shift of 3 years. What is the new urgency for an anti-ICBM defense against China?

The President, in his press conference of January 31, 1970, indicated that he had been assured that Safeguard would provide a "virtually infallible" defense to provide a "credible foreign policy in the Pacific areas." Presumably under such an umbrella the U.S. can use its nuclear power in response to Communist moves without exposing its population.

I will not enter into the controversial question whether the threat by the U.S. of a nuclear "massive retaliation" against unacceptable Communist moves is a wise or moral policy in Asia; I only would like to point out that for this role Safeguard is subject to many valid technical objections. The thin area defense proposed is very fallible indeed for many reasons. Among these are:

A. Any system as complex as an ABM and which can never be tested is subject to many sources of failure—human or technical.

B. Since the PAR radar is required for complete area coverage the nuclear environment produced both by explosions of the defensive Spartan missile and the incoming

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missile can interfere with proper functioning in many ways.

C. Since each interceptor will never have perfect reliability there is always a good chance of the enemy's attack "leaking through."

D. The area defense against China is of no value at all until one has completed the full deployment of all planned sites, since otherwise it can be bypassed by ICBM attack against uncovered areas. Hawaii and Alaska are not covered.

E. Many mechanical devices designed to penetrate ABM defenses and which can be added to ICBM's with relative ease are well known. These could be adopted by the Chinese at their option to confuse and thus defeat the radar.

F. Should the Chinese really plan or threaten a suicidal attack against the U.S. they would have means other than an ICBM to deliver a nuclear explosion to the U.S. homeland, for instance by smuggling in a bomb.

Secretary Packard, in his testimony to the Committee on Armed Services of the U.S. House of Representatives, agreed that "Relatively simple devices like tank fragments have a limited ability to deceive a sophisticated defense system like Safeguard." I would go beyond this by stating that the Safeguard area defense can definitely be defeated by tactics as simple as tank fragmentation (the U.S. did this in its ATLAS Program in the mid-fifties!), as well as other simple penetration devices such as balloons. It is well known from more than a decade of experience that defeating the defense by presenting many confusing objects outside the atmosphere is no longer a technological challenge.

In his testimony Secretary Packard tried to minimize the threat of such Chinese moves by pointing out that the Chinese would have to construct range instrumentation to monitor whether the tank had actually exploded and would have to possess detailed knowledge of the characteristics of Safeguard. Since the President was proposing protection in "perhaps ten years from now" it is clear that the Chinese are fully capable of providing such simple radar instrumentation once they have successfully mastered the technology of ICBM development itself.

Considering this combination of facts it is clear that an area defense system such as Safeguard can never be expected to achieve total protection. Defeating Safeguard, if desired by the Chinese, would, of course, require additional effort, but it is an effort which they are clearly capable of undertaking. The only hope would be that the Chinese would not choose to adopt measures to defeat Safeguard, or would fail to remedy some essential defect of their ICBM's.

I am impressed how tortured the argument of the DOD witnesses has become: In order to justify Safeguard as a defense against Soviet missiles and to justify immediate deployment of MIRV against suspected clandestine Soviet ABM defenses, we are giving the Soviets credit for a degree of performance and reliability of their military systems which we could not dream of achieving ourselves; when talking about an "infallible" defense against China we are assuming that even a decade from now the Chinese could not achieve results we accomplished fifteen years ago!

The serious inadequacy of the area defense against China will, of course, become apparent as time goes on. As a result pressure will mount to add progressively to the "thin" defense to make it more and more effective against the conjectured threat from Mainland China. This means that once the U.S. has adopted the policy that it needs a complete shield against China the stage is set for an ever-expanding but never fully effective ABM system at enormous cost.

It is this last conclusion, namely that adoption of an anti-Chinese ABM policy leads us to a technological arms race with China, which gives rise to the most serious concern: Pressures will rise to have each area of the country covered by a thicker defense so that each center of population can be protected against the total Chinese ICBM force. But the very existence of a growing U.S. city ABM system, however dubious its performance, would lead the conservative Soviet planners to conclude that their deterrence against U.S. first strike nuclear attack is threatened: Therefore the Soviets will press for expansion of their offensive weapons. Conversely, the U.S. conservative planners, being well aware of the technical deficiencies of Safeguard, are ignoring the protection it may offer in their strategic force planning. It was for this reason that last year President Nixon in his March 14, 1969, press conference ruled out a substantial city defense ABM; he agreed that such a move would be escalatory and hence undesirable. This year this position appears reversed through the emphasis on defense against China, although in the intervening year no developments have created a new urgency to deploy an anti-Chinese ABM.

## IV. RELATION OF ABM TO SALT

In the previous sections I have demonstrated that Safeguard is ineffective in defending Minuteman, and is incapable of providing a tight umbrella over the U.S. to de-

fend reliably against ICBM attacks which Mainland China might be able to launch late this decade. Despite the clear technical limitations of Safeguard as an anti-Chinese defense the very fact that the President has stated such a defense to be a U.S. policy objective creates a danger to the success of SALT. Fortunately the President has emphasized, in particular in his more recent statements, that he considers ABM levels fully negotiable in the forthcoming SALT talks. I hope that he can justify to the American people giving away in negotiation with the Soviets a system which he is now persuading the American people is a defense we need against Communist China.

While emphasizing the negotiability of ABM deployment the President and DOD witnesses urge an expanded Safeguard system now, in spite of the obvious technical inadequacies, in order to be in a position of "negotiating from the strength" at SALT. The expressed fear is that since the Soviet strategic forces are growing in numbers, while the seven billion dollar U.S. strategic budget is only buying qualitative improvements, the Soviets will not feel under sufficient military pressure to negotiate a limitation of strategic arms under terms acceptable to the U.S. But are we really negotiating from weakness? Quite apart from MIRV deployment, the status of U.S. vs. Soviet intercontinental strategic defensive forces (as presented on February 20, 1970, by Secretary Laird) is given in the following table:

UNITED STATES VERSUS SOVIET INTERCONTINENTAL STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE FORCES

	United States	Sept. 1, 1968 Soviet	United States	Sept. 1, 1969 Soviet
ICBM launchers.....	1,054	900	1,054	1,060
SLBM launchers.....	656	45	656	110
Total launchers.....	1,710	945	1,710	1,170
Intercontinental bombers.....	646	150	581	140-145
Total force loadings weapons.....	4,200	1,100	4,200	1,350

This belies the fact that the U.S. is in an inferior position. At present the U.S. is clearly ahead by a large factor in the total number of deliverable nuclear warheads while the Soviets are ahead in terms of the total explosive power of their weapons. Under current circumstances neither side could deliver a first strike against the other without exposing itself to a retaliatory blow of such enormous magnitude as to endanger the very survival of the society of the attacker. However, the Soviets appear to be racing ahead to achieve a nuclear "war fighting" capability and the U.S. has already acquired nuclear strategic armaments greatly in excess of those required for deterrent purposes only. What better time could there be for both sides to attempt to freeze strategic armaments near current levels rather than escalating the arms race further by trying to negotiate "from a position of strength?"

Once the Congress approves an expanded Safeguard under the announced policy to give full protection against Chinese ICBM's it will be difficult for the U.S. negotiators to propose ABM levels below those authorized at home. In turn the Soviets will find it impossible to agree to ABM levels on their own below those proposed by the U.S. I note that current Soviet ABM deployment levels consist of only the few interceptors and associated radars deployed around Moscow. The expanded Safeguard system now before the Congress involves more interceptor missiles than those deployed around Moscow and is technically much more advanced. An ABM freeze agreed at SALT at a level no lower than that of the expanded Safeguard system would thus permit and in fact encourage the Soviets to further expand and improve their ABM systems.

If the agreed ABM levels are high then both sides will insist on higher levels, both qualitatively and quantitatively, of offensive arms in order to retain their deterrent against the other country. Thus the level of ABM defenses which may be agreed on at SALT ultimately will control the limit which one has any hope of imposing on both the offensive and defensive strategic weapons of the two nations.

The level of ABM deployment which will be agreed on at SALT is even more critical than the question of prohibition on MIRV testing and deployment and the associated questions of verification of such a MIRV ban. A highly accurate MIRV, if deployed, can only threaten the fixed land-based deterrent of the other side; for example, the multiple nuclear warheads of the SS-9's may endanger our Minuteman, and Soviet fears that upgrading and accuracy of the U.S. Poseidon and Minuteman III MIRV's may endanger the Soviet land-based missile silos are well justified. In contrast, ABMs threaten to intercept ballistic missiles from wherever they are launched—land or sea—and therefore will raise doubts on the effectiveness of the entire deterrent missile force of each country.

The terms of a SALT treaty setting a level of ABM at agreed numbers of interceptors or radars other than at "zero" would be difficult to police: It is much easier to assure compliance with provisions which prohibit a weapons system entirely than with a specific limit on the number of weapons. Once both sides have agreed to ABM levels as high as those of the advanced phases of Safeguard, then the fears of clandestine upgrading of the Soviet ABM system into an even larger system sufficient to endanger the U.S. deterrent will gain in substance. Once radars as



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sophisticated as the Safeguard MSR are extensively deployed around the Soviet Union, and once other components of a "legal" ABM system are widely deployed, then clandestine upgrading using some of the existing parts of the air defense system is much harder to prevent. *I therefore foresee a real danger that if the agreed levels of ABM deployment at SALT turn out to be no lower than that of the expanded Safeguard, then in turn we will be unable to accept a freeze on the quantity of our offensive missiles or a ban on MIRV deployment and testing.*

Specifically, the objections to a moratorium on MIRV deployment, or a prohibition of MIRV under SALT voiced by DOD witnesses in the past, have been based on the assertion that MIRVs are required to penetrate Soviet ABM. While I conclude that such statements have no technical validity at present, they may become valid if increases of ABM in the Soviet Union are permitted or in fact encouraged at SALT. It is this chain of events which leads to the conclusion that the decision to expand Safeguard now is a clear danger to the entire success of the SALT talks, both in regard to limiting strategic offensive and defensive missiles.

## V. CONCLUSION

There can no longer be any question that ABM has escalated and will continue to escalate the nuclear arms race; let me review some recent history: Suspected deployment of ABM by the Soviets has given the incentive for U.S. development of the MIRV, deployment of multiple warheads by the Soviets has given last year's justification for the U.S. deployment decision on Safeguard, the possible expanding role of Safeguard in protecting our cities will give rise to Soviet fears of being able to maintain their deterrent against us, the possibility of improving the accuracy of American MIRV's with which we are trying to counter Soviet ABM's appears to threaten Soviet missile silos, etc. In short, starting from the concern about ABM deployment, the world is embarking on the next large step of the arms race. Yet the world has now strategic nuclear armament sufficient to destroy life as we know it on both the European and North American continents and in fact to endanger survival of the entire human race. *The various arguments in which contrived situations are created to justify even further expansion of this enormous arsenal in the name of "security" must be weighed against the resulting ever-increasing danger of accident and inadvertent escalation into nuclear war.*

SALT extends the hope to freeze nuclear strategic arms at their present levels which are already vastly in excess of those required to maintain a strategic balance between the two super powers; SALT may even extend hope for reduction from these levels. I have presented technical evidence that the actual Safeguard deployment contrasts sharply with the justification stated by the President, that the anti-Chinese rationale for Safeguard impedes the negotiability of ABM levels at SALT, and that any level of ABM other than a very minimal one will endanger seriously the success of SALT in achieving meaningful arms limitation. I urge that the Congress express its intent to bring the arms race under control through successful SALT negotiations by rejecting any expansion of the Safeguard ABM system at this critical time.

OPENING STATEMENT BY DR. HERBERT SCOVILLE, JR., APRIL 13, 1970

Mr. Chairman, it is a great pleasure to come before your Committee again, this time as a private citizen after having met with your Committee for many years as a member of the Government. In this connection, I should like to emphasize that any statements I may make here today are my own personal views and do not necessarily reflect those of the Carnegie Endowment for International

Peace for whom I am now working part-time. Furthermore, I would like to make it clear that I have not had access to classified Government documents or positions on SALT, and so what I say should not in any way be construed as describing its views.

I have been asked and am particularly pleased to be able to present to you my thoughts on the subject of verification since this has been and is a key problem in achieving arms control. Any limitations on strategic arms, whether they be by formal agreement or occur as a result of mutual understanding, must be able to be verified to provide confidence that violations which would endanger security are not occurring. Unless this confidence exists, any agreement will be dangerous, unstable, and probably not endure for very long.

Verification has been the stumbling block in negotiating almost all arms control agreements since World War II. The closed society in the Soviet Union has always fed fears in this country that the Soviets might use an arms control agreement to restrict a U.S. weapons program while allowing the Russians to continue their program clandestinely to the point of achieving a military advantage. A classic and perhaps over-emphasized example of this problem has been in the negotiation of a comprehensive test ban treaty. The U.S. has always feared that the Soviets could derive significant military gains by underground tests which could not be distinguished from earthquakes and sought inspections to clarify the nature of the seismic events. The Soviet Union resisted this desire as a threat to their society, and as a consequence no agreement on banning underground nuclear tests has yet been achieved.

In evaluating the adequacy of any verification procedures, it is important to emphasize that it is not necessary to be able to detect every possible violation but only to have the ability to detect violations which could significantly affect U.S. security. If a nation believes that there is a risk of the violation being discovered, it is unlikely that it would take that risk unless the violation provided a significant gain. Cheating on an ICBM launcher freeze by secretly building a dozen or even a hundred missile silos makes no sense when both nations already have more than a thousand missiles.

Any arms limitation together with its means of verification should also be designed to avoid continual alarms that violations were occurring, since if these occurred frequently the value of the agreement could be greatly reduced. Fears of minor infractions of the agreement should not be allowed to become a source of major international incidents. This can be avoided as much by proper phrasing of the agreement as by the mechanics of verification itself.

In general, arm limitation verification procedures are divided into two categories. The first are known as "national" or "unilateral" verification techniques which do not require any agreements for inspection within the boundaries of another nation. The second category are termed "onsite inspections" in which a nation would agree to allow nationals of another country to inspect within its territories to determine whether a violation had occurred. Intermediate to these categories would be those situations in which both sides agreed to conduct their operations so as to facilitate verification by national means.

Only in the case of the Antarctic Treaty has the Soviet Union allowed the use of onsite inspections to verify compliance with the treaty. At one time Chairman Khrushchev agreed in principle to three onsite inspections per year within the Soviet Union to monitor a comprehensive test ban treaty, but at that time the U.S. did not believe three a sufficiently large number. Since then the Soviet Union has withdrawn that offer. All other arms control agreements which have

been negotiated have relied primarily on national means of verification. The limited test ban treaty is monitored by such national systems, and all countries have a high degree of confidence that significant violations are not occurring. The same is true of the undertaking in the outer space treaty not to place nuclear weapons in orbit around the earth. General Wheeler in testifying in support of that obligation said that he favored reliance on national means since he did not believe that the Soviet Union could, without U.S. knowledge, violate this provision so as to obtain a significant military advantage.

In this connection, it is interesting to consider briefly the history of the limited test ban treaty. This treaty is verified by highly sophisticated scientific national techniques, and I believe that all countries have a high confidence that any significant violation of this treaty could be detected. Nevertheless on several occasions since the treaty came into effect radioactive material from underground tests has been detected outside the boundaries of the country in which the tests were held. This could well be considered a technical violation since the treaty bans tests which cause radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the state under whose control the explosion is conducted. While these occasions have resulted in exchanges of notes and requests for explanation, both the U.S. and the Soviet governments have recognized that the events did not threaten either nation's security nor did they significantly increase the health hazards throughout the world. As a consequence neither nation has made a major international incident out of these possible technical infractions. However it is an example of where the wording of the treaty was sufficiently ambiguous as to permit a difference of views as to whether violation had occurred even though the verification procedures were quite satisfactory. Such ambiguities in treaty language should be avoided to the maximum extent possible, without at the same time incorporating so many technical details that the treaty could become inoperable as a result of unforeseen scientific developments.

Verification is not limited to arms control agreements but is also an important factor in our everyday unilateral national security planning. Decisions that are made on ICBM force levels, on whether to deploy an ABM, or on whether to develop MIRVs or other penetration aids to overcome a Soviet ABM are all based on the best information nationally available on Soviet armament programs. In this day-to-day unilateral planning it is not enough to just know that a missile has been deployed. One must also know the characteristics of that missile and have some basis for estimating the quantity and the timing of the total deployment program. Thus, the information required for unilateral planning is much more difficult to obtain than that required to monitor an arms limitation agreement where information that a single missile launcher had been added to the force would be all that might be required in order to verify that the arms control agreement was not being abided by.

A good example of where it would be much easier to verify satisfactorily an arms control agreement than the size of the force for unilateral planning would be in the area of mobile ICBMs. If, as a result of SALT, it were agreed that mobile ICBMs would be totally banned, then the ability to detect the deployment of even a single such missile would be sufficient to verify whether the agreement was being abided by. It would not be necessary to count precisely the number of mobile missiles deployed, which might be very difficult unless one had instantaneous observation of the entire Soviet Union, since the missiles could otherwise be moved from one place to another between observations. On the other hand in order to determine for our

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unilateral force planning whether a Soviet mobile ICBM force, which had not been restricted by an agreement, posed a threat, one would need to know the size of such a force. This might be very difficult to accomplish with suitable reliability.

This example raises another point which should be kept in mind in evaluating the adequacy of verification capabilities for any arms control agreement. First one must always evaluate the relative risk from a possible violation against the risk which might exist if no arms control agreement were achieved. For example, the risk of an undetected Soviet violation of a ban on mobile ICBMs which the U.S. has no plans to deploy would be far less than the risk of no agreement which allowed the Soviets to build up a force of undeterminable size and characteristics. Further when programs are proceeding without any restrictions, information on the nature of new developments and deployments can often be confusing and misleading and consequently produce less than optimal unilateral U.S. weapons decisions.

Finally, adequate verification of limitations on strategic arms is greatly simplified at this time by the fact that both sides now have such large forces of survivable strategic weapons that any clandestine program in violation of a treaty would have to be very great before it could threaten our national security. Not only are the numbers large but there are also several different types of systems available in our assured destruction force, i.e., submarine launched missiles, hardened land-based missiles, and intercontinental bombers, so that a sudden unexpected threat to one system will not jeopardize the entire second strike force. Deterrence can be maintained by both sides despite large changes, either qualitative or quantitative, in the force structure of either side. For example, although the Soviets have trebled their missile force in the last five years they are still a long way from being able to prevent the U.S. from inflicting widespread and unacceptable devastation on the Soviet Union in retaliatory attack. Even if in the highly unlikely event that the Soviets succeeded in secretly developing a MIRV missile force which could destroy all U.S. land-based missiles, the U.S. would still have a force of 41 Polaris submarines each with 16 missiles, only a small fraction of which would be required to devastate the Soviet Union.

This was, however, not the case in 1960 when the deterrent force relied almost entirely on vulnerable bombers and had only a few or no ICBMs. Then, even a small increment to these missile forces would have had very significant military consequences. Likewise we are much better off technically to verify by national means the size and characteristics of the opposing strategic forces than in the 50's. While it is not appropriate for me to discuss our technical capabilities in an open hearing, I am sure it is no secret that our capabilities have improved markedly in the last ten years. Had they not so improved, it would not have been possible for Secretaries McNamara, Clifford and Laird to report year after year with high confidence on the size of the Soviet ICBM force, submarine force, and ABMs.

Any nation which attempts to violate any arms limitation agreement on a scale sufficient to obtain a significant military advantage will run some risk of being detected. Defection by disillusioned personnel or disclosure of the violation by an agent can never be ruled out for even the most secret program. However, such sources of information are unreliable and cannot be counted on by the U.S. when its vital security interests are at stake. Therefore since verification capabilities vary greatly for different phases of the weapons development cycle, arms limitation agreements should be

designed to emphasize those phases which are at the same time easy to monitor and critical to security.

Research and development, while still in the laboratory, could rarely be reliably detected by either any type of national observation system or any acceptable onsite inspection scheme. Thus it is only when the development reaches the testing phase that strategic weapons programs become observable and provide opportunities to verify restrictions on development of new systems. Before most offensive missile systems can be reliably deployed, they require extensive tests at long range so that they can be observed beyond the borders of the testing nation. The U.S. has been able to observe Soviet ICBM tests consistently since their program began in 1957. Not only have successive Secretaries of Defense reported on the number of missile firings but in many cases on the characteristics of the weapons being developed. While defensive interceptor missiles do not travel such long distances, the high-powered radars which track the incoming warhead and guide the interceptors emit radio waves which can often be discernible at remote locations. Since much testing is relatively easily verifiable, it is frequently a good point in the weapons cycle to start applying limitations.

The production of strategic weapons is again more difficult to observe. Many components can be produced in small buildings and even a complete missile could be assembled in structures which might not be easily identifiable. National means of verification might locate many suspicious structures, and frequent onsite inspections might be required to provide sufficient confidence that violations of a ban on production were not occurring. For ABM systems it would be even more difficult since the missiles are smaller and the electronic components for the radars would be indistinguishable from those required for other purposes until they were finally assembled in the deployed radar. The one exception would be the production of missile launching submarines which employ for their construction large and relatively easily identifiable shipyard facilities.

Finally, looking at the last stage in the weapons cycle—deployment. It is relatively easy to observe deployment and determine changes in the size of operationally deployed systems. To simplify the verification it is usually best to have a complete ban or to freeze the number at existing levels rather than agreeing on a fixed number of items. After a freeze has been achieved, then the levels can be reduced by agreed numbers.

It is often not so easy to determine the characteristics of the systems deployed, since many of these are independent of the external configuration of the hardware. Once missiles with certain capabilities were demonstrated and proven in testing and particularly if troop training were observed, one must assume that they could be deployed, but it will frequently be impossible to know how many have been incorporated in the force and what will be their real operational capability. It would, for example, be difficult to verify with high confidence whether a new type of missile was being substituted for an existing one or whether improvements were being made to existing systems. Therefore, limitations on deployment should emphasize numbers of weapons rather than weapon characteristics.

In order to evaluate the ability to verify deployment limitations, it is necessary to look at each individual strategic weapons system. For the purpose of discussion today I have concentrated on those systems which would be most critical in a freeze on strategic offensive and defensive weapons.

#### LAND-BASED ICBM'S

Fixed land-based ICBMs require extensive launch site construction in order to provide the necessary hardening to make them resistant to blast from a nuclear explosion.

This construction requires many months, and therefore ample time is available to permit its detection. In presenting his FY 71 Defense Program, Secretary Laird has reported with great precision the numbers of such Soviet launchers, both operational and their rate of construction, each year since 1966. While in theory it might be possible to build clandestinely at great cost in time and money a few additional launchers using elaborate camouflage techniques, such a violation would have no effect on U.S. security since they would be an insignificant addition to the already existing large forces of more than a thousand ICBMs on both sides. Therefore, a limitation on numbers of ICBM launchers could be adequately verified by national means without the need for any supplementary procedures.

Mobile land-based missiles would be more difficult to monitor, but even these require logistic support which would be difficult to conceal. This would be particularly true in the Soviet Union, where the road system is limited and the rail system well known. If large numbers were already deployed, it might be hard to obtain a reliable count of the number of such missiles since the missiles might be moved between observations. If deployment were nonexistent or small at the time the agreement was reached, then a large new deployment would become apparent. Therefore, a total ban on deployment of such systems would be preferable, since the detection of even one would constitute a violation. This country has not developed or deployed any mobile ICBMs and there are no reliable reports of Soviet deployment of either mobile ICBMs or IRBMs, although the Russians have displayed missiles in the Moscow parades which they claim to be mobile ICBMs. It is highly unlikely that the Soviets could secretly deploy the many hundreds of mobile ICBMs which would be required to affect the present strategic balance, but the sooner a ban took effect the easier the verification.

#### SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILES (SLBMS)

Submarines which have large numbers of long range missiles and which can operate for protracted periods at long distances from their home ports require large and distinctive facilities for their construction. Secretary Laird has reported in his FY71 Defense Program that the Soviets can accommodate 12 complete hulls at two different shipyards. After they are launched they require many months for fitting out, during all of which they are subject to observation. To have a reliable operational capability they must be shaken down and cruise in the open oceans. Secretary Laird, like his predecessors, has on several occasions reported with confidence the numbers of existing Soviet submarine-launched missiles. Again, for the Soviets to increase their present relatively small but rapidly growing SLBM force without U.S. knowledge to a point where it could significantly affect U.S. security would not seem possible. Therefore a ban on construction of new ballistic missile submarines could be verified by national means.

#### MIRVS

So far I have addressed only the numbers of missiles or their launching platforms; the number of nuclear warheads within a given missile is another thing. Since a single large warhead can be replaced, without changing the external configuration of the missiles, by several smaller warheads either with or without a capability to be individually targeted (MIRVs or MRVs), it is hard to visualize how the U.S. could verify by national means whether a deployed missile has or has not multiple warheads. In fact even onsite inspection to make this determination would be difficult. It would require the right to inspect any deployed missile including those on submarines, on sufficiently short notice

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to prevent substitution of the reentry vehicle. The inspection would require access into the interior of the reentry vehicle or at the very least, the use at close range of some scientific technique, such as X-rays, to determine the number of warheads present. Such inspection would almost certainly not be acceptable to the USSR. If the Soviets required similar inspection to verify that the U.S. was not secretly deploying MIRVs, it is doubtful that the U.S. could accept it.

Therefore, if MIRVs are to be controlled, every effort should be made to limit testing as well as deployment. At the present time, neither the U.S. nor the USSR have fully developed and tested a MIRV system with sufficient accuracy and reliability to provide a first strike capability. The Soviets began testing MRVs on the SS9 in August 1968, and President Nixon in the summer of 1969 stated that the "footprint" of the Russian MRV indicates that they may happen to fall in a pattern comparable to the area covered by a complex of three Minuteman sites. However, Dr. John Foster, DDR&E, has stated on February 24, 1970 that the Soviets "have not demonstrated to us the flexibility necessary to target each warhead at a different Minuteman silo." All Minuteman sites do not have the same spacing so that the Soviets would require the ability to vary the footprint reliably and accurately if they were to have a capability to wipe out the entire Minuteman force.

The U.S. started a two-year program to test first generation MIRVs for the Poseidon and Minuteman III missiles also in August 1968, and DOD officials have announced that the Minuteman III will begin to be fielded in June 1970 and the Poseidon become operational in January 1971. While U.S. officials have emphasized that the accuracy-yield combination of these first MIRVs will not be sufficient to provide a first strike counterforce capability, the Soviets may be concerned that the first U.S. systems might have such a capability. Fortunately the Soviets should be able to satisfy themselves that the U.S. was not deploying MIRVs in violation of a ban, since it is hard to conceive how the U.S., with its open society, could place MIRVs in a large part of its force without detection. Certainly we should not prejudge the decision for the Soviets and conclude that controls on MIRVs are unverifiable because the U.S. program has proceeded too far. There is still time, but maybe only a little, to prevent deployment of MIRVs if a ban on testing and deployment can be achieved soon.

What are the opportunities for the U.S. to verify a ban on MIRV and MRV testing? (MRV testing would probably also have to be banned to be confident that these were not confused with MIRVs). Since the type of MIRV which could threaten the fixed land-based missile force is one which has a reliable capability for destroying hardened ICBM sites, i.e., a MIRV with high accuracy and high yield, I believe verification is possible. In order to achieve such a capability it will be necessary to test at full range and at as near operational conditions as possible. Such tests can be monitored to determine the number of reentry vehicles. No nation would replace existing reliable missiles and consider initiating a nuclear war with a missile which had only been partially tested. Planners would demand high confidence on the reliability and accuracy of the full system before risking national suicide by carrying out a first strike.

Tests in which only one of the multiple warheads was allowed to separate would be useful for development but not satisfactory for proving out the complete system. Such tests would in any case probably raise suspicions. Likewise, simulated tests in space or, as has been suggested in analogy to the proposal for evading the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, "tests behind the moon" would be equally unsatisfactory. Elaborate schemes for

clandestine testing will undoubtedly be put forward as they were in the case of nuclear weapons testing, but even with much simpler systems than MIRVs, military planners like to see full operational testing before undertaking deployment. For example, even more than five years after development testing has been completed on the Polaris A3 MRV system, the military are claiming that additional firings of the complete system are essential to maintain confidence in the operational capability of the system. Based on past experience Soviet military are even more stringent in their requirements for full operational testing than the U.S. It is most unlikely that the Soviets could without U.S. knowledge violate a MIRV-MRV test ban to the extent that they would be in a position to deploy a MIRV system which would be sufficiently reliable and accurate to threaten to destroy the entire Minuteman force.

#### LONG-RANGE BOMBERS

The Soviets have no known present program for deploying a new truly intercontinental bomber. If they were to undertake such a deployment in violation of a ban it is almost certain that the force would be detected before it had reached a significant size. Bombers are not easy to conceal, and U.S. authorities have known with confidence and publicly reported the size of the Soviet bomber force since the mid-fifties. Suggestions have been made that they would masquerade such a force under the guise of a supersonic transport which could be rapidly converted to a bomber. Both Generals LeMay and Power have frequently emphasized that a bomber force which does not train and carry out realistic simulated operations is of almost no value. It is inconceivable that the Soviets could create secretly an operationally capable bomber force which could provide any serious additional threat to U.S. security.

#### ABMS

Finally, going to strategic defensive systems, I shall concentrate on ABMs, since they pose the most serious potential threat to our confidence in our strategic deterrent forces and since they are the system of most interest in any strategic arm limitation agreement. In 1966 Secretary McNamara publicly announced that we had clear evidence that the Soviets were building an ABM system around Moscow, and the progress of this system has been reported on since at regular intervals. Secretary Laird has recently reported that a number of the complexes in this system were only brought to operational status this past year. Furthermore both Secretaries Clifford and Laird were even able to report that the deployment had been reduced in scope from that originally planned but that the Soviets are continuing to press forward with R & D on a more advanced system. Secretary Laird also referred to large Soviet phased array radars for tracking and warning. I am confident, and these statements are a public substantiation, that we are now capable of verifying a freeze on the deployment of ABM systems and that any violation could be detected well in advance of their becoming operational.

ABMs to cope with the sophisticated type threat of which the U.S. is capable are complicated and large systems. They require large radars which have a high visibility, have a long lead time for construction and which, furthermore, must radiate energy continuously if they are to be of any value. In addition, an ABM system requires large numbers of high performance defensive missiles if it is not to be saturated. Extensive training exercises must be carried out to develop operational competence. All these factors greatly facilitate the verification of a freeze on ABMs.

The greatest problem in this area could be the confusion between systems designed for

defense against aircraft with those for defense against ballistic missiles of the former were not controlled. For example, during the early construction period there was some doubt as to whether the so-called Tallinn air defense system was for ABM purposes or not. However, as deployment proceeded, it became more and more clear that it was for defense against aircraft.

Nevertheless, fears still exist that the Tallinn or other air defense systems might be upgraded to provide an ABM capability without our knowledge. In evaluating this risk it is important to realize that any air defense system may have some limited capability to shoot down an incoming missile. To be a threat to a retaliatory attack of which the U.S. is capable and thereby erode the deterrent it must, however, have an extremely high capability. Its radars must be able to handle rapidly large numbers of incoming targets and must also be defended. The missiles must have a high acceleration to avoid the necessity of committing the defense before the radar has determined the nature of the incoming objects. President Nixon has stated when the Safeguard decision was first made that the heaviest defense system considered, an ABM system designed to protect cities from a Soviet type threat, could not prevent a catastrophic level of U.S. fatalities. Clearly a Soviet system to cope with the even larger U.S. threat cannot be built by clandestinely upgrading existing air defense systems. New or large numbers of greatly improved radars, new missiles, new command and control systems and new radar defense systems would be required if the Soviet anti-aircraft systems were to be turned into even a partially effective ABM. Extensive troop training would be needed to develop operational effectiveness. Such a program would undoubtedly be detected with plenty of lead time to incorporate counter-measures to permit penetration of such a system. The U.S. already has developed and tested MIRVs capable of penetrating an ABM system, and these could be deployed in an emergency much more rapidly than a Soviet ABM.

Thus it would appear that the limitations on ABMs to low or zero levels can be adequately verified by national means. While some fears might arise about the upgrading of Soviet defense systems, it is believed that the risk to our security from such a secret program would be less than if there were no limitations on ABMs. It would be preferable to ban ABMs or restrict them to very low levels, since in these instances, radar deployments could be limited and thus facilitate verification.

In summary: Quantitative limitations on the deployment of the key strategic weapons systems can be adequately verified by national means.

Limitations on the testing of all multiple reentry vehicles can be adequately verified by national means and should be sought immediately together with a ban on MIRV deployment if MIRVs are to be controlled. It is not yet too late to achieve such limitations since MIRV systems which are sufficiently reliable and accurate to threaten hardened ICBM sites are not yet fully tested and deployable and since the U.S. could not secretly deploy MIRVs.

ABM deployment limitations at zero or low levels can also be verified. Any upgrading of existing air defense systems which could escape detection would not provide an ABM capability which could seriously degrade the U.S. deterrent.

In light of existing national verification capabilities, the large numbers of weapons on each side, and the insensitivity of each side's deterrent to relatively large force changes, I am confident that an agreement can be designed which would significantly limit strategic armaments and in fact increase real security.

## REFUGEES AND CIVILIAN WAR CASUALTIES IN LAOS

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, one of the more distressing aspects of the war in Laos is the plight of the Laotian people, who, like their neighbors elsewhere in Indochina, are paying a heavy toll not only from insurgent attack, but also from the nature of our own military activities. As chairman of the Judiciary Subcommittee on Refugees, there is little doubt in my mind that the escalation of these military activities is following the familiar pattern of Vietnam in the destruction of the countryside, the generation of refugees, and the occurrence of civilian war casualties. The subcommittee is pursuing this significant aspect of our involvement in Laos, and, as I suggested last week, will, it is hoped, hold hearings within the very near future.

Some recent press articles detail the current situation among the people in Laos. Because of the broad congressional and public interest in this matter, I ask unanimous consent that articles from the March 14 issues of the Christian Science Monitor and the Manchester Guardian weekly, from the New York Times of March 15, from the Washington Post of March 26, from the Washington Evening Star of March 27, from Life magazine of April 3, and from the Washington Sunday Star of April 19, be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the items were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

[From the Christian Science Monitor, Mar. 14, 1970]

### WHAT U.S. BOMBING FEELS LIKE TO LAOTIANS (By Daniel Southerland)

BAM NOM XAY, LAOS.—The old woman said she had been through several wars but that this was the most destructive and terrifying—because of the bombing.

"In the other wars, I didn't have to leave my home," she said.

"When the soldiers came on the ground to fight, I wasn't so afraid," she said. "But when they came in airplanes, it was terrible."

The 70-year-old Lao woman was one of some 14,000 refugees evacuated from the Plain of Jars prior to the Feb. 21 recovery of that area by North Vietnamese forces and the Lao rebels, the Pathet Lao.

Few civilian inhabitants, if any, were left in the Plain of Jars following the evacuation of the refugees.

In 1960, the plateau itself and its surrounding ridges and valleys had supported an estimated 150,000 people. But a decade of war has taken its toll.

The old woman and some 750 other persons from her native village were moved by plane and then by truck last month to this refugee camp with its bamboo-and-straw huts, about 40 miles east of Vientiane.

### AIR POWER REDIRECTED

The correspondent visited four refugee camps and talked with refugees from six different locations in and around the Plain of Jars.

After questioning a large number of them, it was possible to get a picture of the devastation unleashed by American fighter-bombers in northeastern Laos over the past two years, and it is not a pretty one.

After the United States halted its bombing of North Vietnam on Nov. 1, 1968, it stepped up as much as 10-fold its bombing raids—support which started on a minor scale in mid-1964—against Pathet Lao-occupied northeastern Laos. The number of

bombing sorties by United States Air Force and Navy jets rose to as many as 300 a day.

This bombing campaign, code-named Barrel Roll, is separate from the other, more-publicized campaign. The latter, code-named Steel Tiger, is directed against the Ho Chi Minh Trail in southern Laos.

The refugees said about 9 out of 10 of the bombing strikes flown over the past two years in the Plain of Jars area were carried out by American jets and the rest by propeller-driven Royal Lao Air Force T-28s.

In most areas of the plain, the bombing forced the people to move out of their homes and into trenches, caves, and bunkers where they lived for the most part for two years.

### HIDDEN BY DAY

They threw corrugated iron over the trenches and covered it with dirt, topped with branches for camouflage. Many said they ventured out to farm only at night because of the bombing.

By all accounts, the situation has been somewhat similar for the estimated 192,000 people living in Houa Han, or Sam Neua Province to the northeast of the Plain of Jars, although information is more difficult to come by on that area.

One Western diplomat reported, however, that in some areas of that province "whole communities are living underground."

It has been a similar story also for villagers living in the vicinity of the Ho Chi Minh Trail in southeastern Laos, where refugees and North Vietnamese prisoners and defectors say many villages have been destroyed.

In all of these places, the bombing stepped up greatly after the cessation of the attacks against North Vietnam.

In the Plain of Jars area, the bombing destroyed the main towns of Kien Khouang, Khang Khay, and Pmongsavan. The refugees said the bombs flattened many villages in and around the plain and heavily damaged others. They said no villages they knew of escaped the bombing.

The refugees said they were sometimes forced to leave their villages and bunkers to do portage—carrying rice and ammunition—for the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese. But they added that in many bombing raids there were no Pathet Lao or North Vietnamese troops near their villages.

### RAIDS DAILY OR OFTEN

As the bombing increased, they said, the troops moved farther away from the populated areas.

In 1969, they said they saw the bombers every day when the weather was clear, sometimes so often they could not count the number of raids. The planes tended to fire at anything that moved, they said.

For the most part, however, the attackers apparently spared their buffaloes and cows, although some refugees felt that even these were sometimes targets.

One man said he narrowly escaped being blasted to pieces on six separate occasions when bombs fell near his hole, several times knocking him unconscious. But while he escaped death, there was one thing he could not escape—fear. It stalked him day in and day out.

### CIVILIAN TERRORS DESCRIBED

Some refugees said they moved four or five times, each time farther away from their villages, to escape the bombing. But the bombs always followed them. Even at night the bombers came, and finally, even the rice fields were bombed.

"There wasn't a night when we went to sleep that we thought we'd live to see the morning," said one refugee. "And there wasn't a morning when we got up and thought we'd live to see the night."

"It was terrible living in those holes in the ground," said another. "We never saw the sun. Our hair was falling out."

My wife and three children were killed," said a man in his thirties. "There were no troops [Pathet Lao or North Vietnamese] anywhere near our village."

All this raises some basic questions about the bombing in northeastern Laos. What has been its purpose?

It is impossible to get the United States Government side of the picture in any detail because American officials refuse to discuss except in the vaguest generalities the activity in Laos.

### PILOTS PLEDGED TO SECRECY

The pilots who fly the raids from air bases in Thailand and South Vietnam and from carriers in the Gulf of Tonkin are under instructions not to discuss the details of their missions.

For years, the United States maintained the fiction that it was only flying "armed reconnaissance" missions over northern Laos.

The most candid official acknowledgment that something other than "reconnaissance" was going on came in President Nixon's March 6 statement when he said for the first time that the United States had been flying "combat support missions" in northern Laos when requested to do so by the Royal Lao Government.

"The level of our air operations has increased only as the number of North Vietnamese in Laos and the level of their aggression has been increased," the President said.

### BUILDUP ADMITTED

On this point, there is no question that there has been a continuing North Vietnamese buildup in northeastern Laos. This buildup has been in direct violation of the 1962 Geneva accords and has allowed the Pathet Lao, heavily supported by the North Vietnamese, to solidify their control there.

But has the bombing been a justifiable or effective response? A number of well-qualified military sources feel the bombing's effectiveness in cutting enemy supply lines and slowing down the North Vietnamese has been in general greatly exaggerated, just as it so often had been in both North and South Vietnam.

### BOOMERANG EFFECT?

According to the refugees from the Plain of Jars, the bombing may even have had a boomerang effect in some areas.

One refugee said that as the bombing increased, the Pathet Lao forces in his district started getting more volunteers, whose attitude was "better to die a soldier than to stay at home waiting for the the airplanes to kill you."

He also said the bombing tended to heighten the fighting spirit of the Pathet Lao—no mean achievement given the Lao propensity for avoiding battle.

Whatever the effects of the bombing on enemy military forces in Laos—still a subject for much debate—there is no doubt as to its effectiveness in completely disrupting civilian life.

### TRANSPORTATION HALTED

Whereas the North Vietnamese and the Pathet Lao soldiers are capable of moving into the protection of the forests and living off supplies shipped in from neighboring North Vietnam, the civilians are tied to their rice fields, their livestock, and the rest of their belongings and are thus exposed more constantly to the bombing than the soldiers.

A refugee from Phongsavan said the bombing put a halt to all civilian motorized transportation in his district and caused markets to open only in the predawn darkness and to close before sunrise. Schools were destroyed, and there was a general shortage of everything from clothing to bicycle parts.

Sometimes it took some prodding and a lot of patience to get the refugees to talk



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made and the intense desire of Dick Daley to serve the people of Chicago.

In addition to being mayor of our city, he is also the county chairman of the Democratic Party. He has often said "good government is good politics," and more of us should be concerned about good government and good politics, because America cannot progress without more and more political participation, especially participation in a constructive and sound manner on behalf of the people of America.

At this point in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, I want to insert an article written by Harry Golden, Jr., which appeared in the Midwest magazine section of the Sunday, April 19, 1970, Chicago Sun-Times. The article follows:

A SURE HAND, A HARD HAT: 15 YEARS OF  
MAYOR DALEY

(By Harry Golden Jr.)

Richard J. Daley, head of Chicago government for precisely 15 years on Monday, is a hard-hat mayor—a chief executive who has helped create a Chicago where the sound of construction never ceases.

He presides over a dynamic city of architecturally distinguished new buildings, a revitalized public transit system, new expressways, of vaulting bridges and massive public projects above and below ground.

No sooner is a project like O'Hare Airport a reality than the mayor is planning its expansion, and ultimate replacement.

Few men in their lifetimes have been able to look upon so complete a change that they themselves have wrought in their physical environment.

Daley has combined a dedication to renewal and a mastery of finance to bring about the metamorphosis of his home town. But he says he's far prouder of his administration's social welfare record than in physical renewal.

It will remain for historians to judge whether Daley's role as the builder has been superseded by his work as an administrator and behind-the-scenes architect of such innovative programs as the federal war on poverty (\$50 million a year in Chicago), the Model Cities programs (\$38 million) and his own Office of Inquiry and Information, first city agency in the nation to offer direct communication between the administration and the public.

But the city will offer physical evidence of Daley for the next three quarters of a century in such monuments to his administration as the Civic Center, graced—some think ironically—with the inscrutable work of Picasso. Critics say that, in his zest for public works and business development, Daley has neglected the cultural.

But Daley showed how to use urban renewal to create the University of Illinois at Chicago Circle—a brand-new university for 20,000 students. "They talked about that for 35 years before we got it built," says the mayor.

And he prodded the board of the Chicago Public Library to proceed with planning for a \$25 million new central building that will preserve the most artistic features of the present building on Michigan Av.

Even when Daley gives the plans impetus, years must pass between the idea and the realization.

As Daley completes his 15th year as mayor Monday, the gigantic projects he has announced but not yet seen through doubtless will figure in his reflections on whether to run for a fifth four-year term.

Since early 1969, Daley has been fending off reporters' questions about his political plans.

"Ask me about it early in 1971," he would say.

Any doubt that he intends to run again seemed to be dispelled for political observers recently.

On the day of the last City Council session April 8, the mayor disclosed his intention in a governmental triple play. Within an eight-hour span, he mediated the dispute between contract home buyers and owners, urged a tougher anti-pollution code to reduce further the sulphur content of coal used in the city and led the City Council in ordering an unprecedented emergency outlay of \$500,000 to cope with hunger.

Two days earlier, he took another step which some observers regarded as a clue to his fourth-term plans. He ordered his city department heads to reduce spending. He told the bosses of 52 city agencies he wants a corporate budget surplus of 6 percent this year, rather than the normally expected 4 percent. That would mean a year-end surplus of \$25.3 million to apply to the 1971 budget.

Though Daley must be taken at his word that he ordered the economies because of the unpredictability of the present business climate, it should not be forgotten that mayors like surpluses to offset tax increases in election years.

As Daley starts his 16th year in office, he has a number of projects with which to kick off that auspicious occasion.

For instance, although a \$400 million expansion is under way at O'Hare, he is convinced the city needs a third major airport. He has asked (and will shortly get) the airlines to make greater use of Midway. But though he recently said that a third airport may not be needed for another decade, he wants planning to go forward, and thus far he is persuaded that the best place to put the \$500 million facility is in Lake Michigan somewhere off the South Side.

Then there's a \$650 million sewer-tunnel system that he proposed last Nov. 7 to clean up Chicago waterways and relieve flooding in the metropolitan area.

Still another major project—even closer to realization—is a \$600 million replacement of the Loop L with a subway transit under Franklin, Randolph, Van Buren and Wabash and extension of lines north, south and west. An elaborate financing arrangement to raise funds for this project would include a special tax, matching state funds and a federal grant. Work could very well start early in the 1970s.

Mayor Daley already holds seniority among all big-city American mayors. He was first elected April 5, 1955, succeeding Martin J. Kennelly, and he took the oath of office in the City Council chamber 15 days later.

On April 23, 1969, Daley eclipsed the previous record of mayoral service in Chicago established by the late Edward J. Kelly, who served in office from April 13, 1933, until April 15, 1947.

To be sure, Mayor Daley could count on the momentum of a flourishing economy to help rebuild the city.

But the statistics that emerge from his public works and from administration policies that have encouraged development are nonetheless striking in any inter-city comparison, even after allowance is made for the effect of inflation.

He instigated at least 30 urban renewal projects involving a total of \$250 million.

He prodded into existence virtually the entire Chicago expressway system and provided it with the revolutionary median-strip transit line. Late this year or early in 1971, he will give the green light to construction of the \$800 million crosstown expressway from the Kennedy-Edens Expressway interchange on the north to the Dan Ryan at a point south of its intersection with the Chicago-Skyway.

The current five-year program of public works planned by all public agencies in the period ending in 1973 totals \$3.5 billion. It

must be remembered that Daley has an overriding say in the building policies of most public agencies other than the city itself.

He appoints all members of the Chicago Board of Education, the boards that run the library and park systems, and half of the members of the board that runs McCormick Place. And his political organization dominates the elective board of the Sanitary District and the government of Cook County.

His influence is everywhere. Nowhere is it so evident as in guiding projects through the Public Building Commission of Chicago, an agency that he got the General Assembly to create the year he became mayor.

PBC undertakes construction of projects needed by other public agencies. PBC then issues bonds for the work. The bonds are retired with "rents" paid by the other public agencies. PBC obviously was created partly to circumvent what the Daley Administration regards as archaic state constitutional limitations on borrowing without a vote of the people.

The first project of PBC was the \$87 million Civic Center. About a year ago, PBC undertook 20 new school projects that will cost \$200 million.

On March 31, PBC voted to build a \$10 million underground parking garage because the McCormick Place governing board found it couldn't complete the reconstruction of the hall itself, let alone the garage, much under the approximately \$100 million available from other sources.

At the same meeting, PBC undertook a \$65 million package of public works including police, fire and health installations proposed by Mayor Daley to the City Council last Jan. 27. In both matters, the PBC vote was affirmative and unanimous. Mayor Daley presided as chairman of the PBC.

Beyond the public projects, however, Daley has been instrumental in encouraging the construction of each new skyscraper.

The City Building Department is under orders to "bend over backwards" to assist any private construction. Officials of that department routinely go to architects' offices to point out the least expensive way a new project can meet the building code requirements.

Through the City Council, which he dominates, Daley pursues zoning policies which some anti-administration aldermen condemn as too permissive but which unquestionably promote new construction.

Priorities for water and sewer extensions are often rearranged on order of the mayor so that a street, water or sewer line can be built in time to lure a new factory to the city.

Here is an example of how Daley brings the prestige of his office to bear on an important occasion: a few years ago Sears Roebuck & Co. had tentatively decided to build one of the nation's largest office buildings in suburban Chicago. Daley personally appealed to Sears officers to locate the huge, \$100 million building, with three million square feet of floor space, in Chicago.

The city sold Sears a one-block section of Quincy St. to let the project go forward this year immediately west of the Loop in Wacker.

Ald. Leon M. Despres (5th), the most articulate critic of the mayor, asserted: "You have to say that a cardinal point of his policy, perhaps the cardinal point, has been the subsidy and encouragement of the central area—the Loop and the Near North Side. They have been nourished, caressed, assisted, encouraged and dealt with in every way to produce the maximum development. And the administration has encouraged as many public works as possible because they are showy and profitable—profitable to the contractors and to the insiders and the friends of insiders.

"But these projects," Despres complains, "are not part of a coherent plan. They ignore

the gray areas of our city and its decaying neighborhoods and they go forward without regard to the needs of light, air, traffic and livability."

The mayor shrugs off such criticism.

Lewis W. Hill, Daley's commissioner of development and planning, said the Despres charges are easy to refute.

"Any review of the capital improvements programs of the last 15 years," Hill said, "will show that the preponderant expenditures have been in the neighborhoods—in street and alley lighting, local street improvements, police, fire, health and sanitation facilities.

"The current five year program calls for city investments totaling \$2.3 billion, of which only \$140 million is for the area from Chicago to Roosevelt and from the Chicago River to Lake Michigan.

"Even if we add the non-city McCormick Place at \$100 million, the total for the central area would still be only \$240 million, or about 10 per cent of the whole."

Hill went on, "Probably the clearest expression of this dedication to the improvement of the urban environment can be seen in urban renewal. In contrast to other cities Chicago has not even one downtown central business district urban renewal project."

Hill noted facetiously, "As to favors granted to encourage developments, perhaps Ald. Despres is referring to the recent modification of the zoning requirements approved by the city to permit construction of Woodlawn Gardens, by the not-for-profit organization formed by the Woodlawn Organization and the Kate Maremont Foundation to provide moderate income housing at 60th and Cottage Grove in his ward."

Mayor Daley's appointments for a week's groundbreakings and dedications look something like this:

Monday morning, for instance, he used the silver-plated shovel on the site of a new school.

On Tuesday, he attended steel topping-out ceremonies at McCormick Place.

On Thursday, he broke ground for a \$38 million O'Hare Airport parking garage—biggest in the world.

Records of the City Building Department show that new construction, public and private, in Daley's 15 years as mayor has totaled \$5,669,701,974—or about \$378 million a year.

In the five years previous to his administration, also boom years, new construction was valued at \$1,064,817,183—or about \$213 million a year.

Dick Daley the doer and builder?

"Construction is what brings jobs," said Paul N. Zimmerer, executive director of the Mayor's Committee for Economic and Cultural Development. "That's what brings money and activity and the base for taxes."

But, underlying all, said Zimmerer, is Mayor Daley's love for the City of Chicago. "If you love something," he said, "you want to see it grow."

Again, on behalf of the Chicago delegation, we want to extend best wishes to Mayor Richard J. Daley for abundant good health and for continued service to the people of our city and the people of America.

(Mr. ANNUNZIO asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record, and to include extraneous matter.)

(Mr. ANNUNZIO addressed the House. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.)

#### SALUTE TO SECRETARIES

(Mr. PRICE of Illinois asked and was given permission to extend his remarks

at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. PRICE of Illinois. Mr. Speaker, I am indeed proud to pay tribute to our secretaries during National Secretaries Week.

For the 19th consecutive year, the last full week in April has been designated as Secretaries Week, with business, industry, education, government, and the professions joining in its observance. In 1970, Secretaries Week is April 19–25, with Wednesday, April 22, set aside as Secretaries Day. Under the sponsorship of the National Secretaries Association—International—the world's leading secretarial organization, the theme will again be "Better Secretaries Mean Better Business."

The week is acknowledged by Federal, State, and municipal governments and is observed with special NSA sponsored activities. In the District of Columbia, Mayor Washington signed a proclamation on April 17, urging recognition for all secretaries for the vital role they play.

Washington's Capital Chapter and District of Columbia Chapter will join together in the activities of the week, beginning with a church service on Sunday, April 19, at the Christ Church. And a morning walking tour of Old Alexandria on Saturday, April 25.

The highlight of the week will be Secretaries Day, April 22, with a reception and banquet being held in Blackie's House of Beef. The speaker will be Hon. William L. Gifford, Special Assistant for Legislative Affairs to the Secretary of Labor, and entertainment will be by Bo Kinnel and his cordovox.

I am familiar with this organization as Margaret Morrison, a member of my staff, is an active member and a former officer.

I commend our secretaries and I am glad to have this opportunity to participate in National Secretaries Week with the National Secretaries Association—International.

**SALT**

#### ADDRESS BY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE MELVIN R. LAIRD

(Mr. GERALD R. FORD asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include an address by the Secretary of Defense, Melvin R. Laird.)

Mr. GERALD R. FORD. Mr. Speaker, the Secretary of Defense, our former colleague from Wisconsin, Mr. Laird, made a most important address today in New York City. Addressing the annual Associated Press luncheon he warned of the increasing strategic capability of the Soviet Union and of some of the hard choices which we are going to have to face up to in the area of national security. In order that all Members might have an opportunity to read the Secretary's speech in full I include it in the Record with these remarks.

ADDRESS BY THE HONORABLE MELVIN R. LAIRD

I was particularly pleased when your President, Paul Miller of Gannett Newspapers, called me on a Saturday morning several months ago to invite me to speak to the Annual Luncheon of the Associated Press on the subject of the strategic balance. I

told him that I regarded this forum as particularly appropriate to express my views on the need to make available to the American people additional information regarding national security.

When I assumed office 15 months ago, I immediately established as a top priority goal the restoration of credibility in the Department of Defense. Since then we have attempted to follow President Nixon's stated desire to make more information available to the American people.

The editors of the Associated Press and all members of the communications media in this country have a deep interest in this subject. I pledge to you that we shall continue to devote maximum attention to reducing and hopefully eliminating overclassification in the Department of Defense. And, we will provide all the information we can within the limits of national security, consistent with the safety and legal rights of our citizens.

This open news policy has brought about significant progress in at least five major areas where information was previously withheld from the American people.

1. Previous policy was to restrict public discussion of Prisoner of War matters. Present policy is to foster public discussion and to focus worldwide attention on the plight of our prisoners of war in order to gain humane treatment for them and to obtain their release.

2. Previous policy was to withhold from the public information on chemical warfare and biological research matters. Present policy is to keep the public informed about our new policies in these two areas, the reasons for these new policies, and the steps being taken to implement them.

3. Previous practices on reporting the costs of major weapons systems led to a major creditability problem in the Department of Defense. Our new policy of full disclosure on major weapons costs will help to restore the Department's credibility and will assist us in gaining better control of costs and in developing better management practices.

4. For several years, the American people were denied knowledge about our activities in Laos. Today, the American people are being informed about what we are doing and what we are not doing in Laos.

5. In the past, overuse of classification denied to the American people pertinent information on the nature and scope of the strategic nuclear threat. In my view, there is still too much classification, but we have tried and will continue to make more and more information available on this subject which is so crucial for the future security of our country.

In my remarks today I will attempt to shed more light on the crucial subject of the strategic threat. In particular, I want to discuss with you editors the nature and scope of the growing Soviet threat, recognizing full well that, in Vienna, our negotiators have just begun round two of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, commonly called SALT.

I hope for success at SALT. I want to emphasize that point. I also want to emphasize that our top military leadership hopes for success at SALT. Where the security of the United States is involved, it is this objective—insuring national security—which is most important. A lower-cost means to achieve that objective, lower compared to what otherwise may be required—if it can be achieved within tolerable risks—is obviously most desirable to all Americans, civilian and military.

The budget we have recommended to Congress for the next fiscal year demonstrates how deeply the Nixon Administration is committed to progress at SALT. We have called this year's defense budget a transitional

budget. It is transitional because in terms of military capability, it is basically a status quo, stand-pat budget. We have postponed basic national security decisions in the strategic field in order to give maximum opportunity for SALT to be successful, and to foster a meaningful beginning for the era of negotiation President Nixon and the American people seek.

The objective of the Nixon Administration is to restore and maintain peace. With regard to SALT, the President's actions and words document this Administration's accent on negotiation rather than confrontation.

In my Defense Report to Congress in February, I expressed concern that the United States, by the mid-1970's, could find itself in a second-rate strategic position with regard to the future security of the Free World.

Today, in keeping with our policy of maximum information, I intend to present additional reasons for this concern.

It is important to discuss the growing strategic threat because it is essential for the American people to understand the complex issues involved, if we are to insure our national security interests through the decade of the 1970's. The American people need to understand the reasons President Nixon is pursuing the course he has recommended in this year's transitional budget.

As Secretary of Defense, I must face the fact that we are taking a risk by postponing hard decisions which the increasing Soviet threat poses for us. I recognize that in the interests of lasting peace, some risks must be taken. But, it is my judgment that as the American people are provided additional information, such as we are discussing here today, they will agree that we are literally at the edge of prudent risk. And the inescapable conclusion will be that if the Soviet strategic offensive buildup continues, the risk to our nation will become too great to sustain without major offsetting actions.

Therefore, what I particularly want to focus on today is the basic asymmetry between what the United States has been doing and what the Soviet Union has been doing in the field of strategic nuclear weapons in recent years.

In a word, for the past five years, the United States has virtually been in neutral gear in the deployment of strategic offensive forces, while the Soviet Union has moved into high gear in both deployment and development of strategic nuclear weapons. In the 1965-67 time period, the United States decided on a level of strategic nuclear forces, including Multiple Independently Targeted Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs), which was deemed adequate to preserve our deterrent posture for the threat of the 1970's which was projected then. No basic change has been made in the force level decisions established in the mid-1960's.

The Soviet Union, by contrast, has engaged in a major effort since 1965 to change the balance of power. The United States then, unlike the situation today, clearly occupied a superior position.

Except for the minimum "hedge" that Safeguard will provide, we have not responded to the Soviet strategic offensive buildup with new deployment programs. We did not respond in past years because the United States deliberately chose to assume that the Soviet buildup at most was aimed at achieving a deterrent posture comparable to that of the United States. We have not responded this year because, as I have said, we fervently hope that SALT can render such a response unnecessary.

As much as we might wish it otherwise, however, we must concentrate our attention on what the Soviet Union is actually doing. In the current situation of a diminishing U.S. deterrent and Soviet momentum, we simply cannot base our plans and programs on what we hope the Soviet Union may do either unilaterally or in SALT. The Soviets

have a momentum going both in strategic weapons deployments and in strategic weapons developments. If their strategic posture could be expected to stay at the operationally deployed posture which exists today, I believe we would have a tolerable situation. What must concern us, however, is the momentum the Soviets have established both in deployments and developments and where that momentum may carry them.

Let me explain in more detail the basic problem.

The most crucial aspect of national security is the strategic balance between nations that have competing interests in the world. The strategic balance has a direct effect on relations between the superpowers. It has an indirect effect on other nations both in terms of their own relations with each other and in terms of their relations with the superpowers. As one example, a situation of clear superiority on the part of the Soviet Union would have profound implications for any future political or military confrontation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. In fact, a clear strategic superiority on the part of the Soviet Union would affect our interests and our obligations throughout the world.

In our continuing debate on defense matters, it has been said many times that the driving force behind the so-called strategic arms race is the "action-reaction" phenomenon. The recent ABM-MIRV discussions in this country illustrate this. The argument is made, for instance, that the deployment of defensive missiles by one side tends to generate increased offensive deployments by the other side.

I certainly agree that one side's actions definitely can influence what the other side does. But just as weapons in themselves are not the cause of wars, neither are a country's actions in weapons deployment—in themselves—the driving force in a so-called arms race. The fundamental driving force in an arms race is what one country perceives as possible objectives of another country's actions.

Let me explain it this way. Our goal is a stable peace. Our strategic policy to achieve that goal is deterrence. As publicly stated, the basic rationale for United States weapons deployment in the strategic field has been and remains deterrence. Our actions of the past several years underscore the fact that deterrence is our fundamental policy and that we seek no more than a posture of effective deterrence.

Because we in the United States seek a posture of deterrence to protect our interests and those of our allies, we obviously could recognize as legitimate a Soviet desire for a comparable deterrent to protect its interests.

I know that the actions of the Soviet Union in recent years have raised questions in the minds of some of our editors and others about the true objectives they are pursuing.

As I have said many times, I do not believe that it is appropriate for me, as Secretary of Defense, to attempt to assess the strategic intentions of another country. However, under my responsibilities, I must be concerned about present and potential strategic capabilities.

You representatives of a free press understand fully the national security price an open society must pay when competing with adversaries who cloak their plan in secrecy and attempt to hide both their objectives and their hardware behind the mantle of a closed society. The whole world knows what we in the United States have and what we plan in the national security field. Meaningful essentials are laid bare in an open forum—in official statements, in Congressional hearings, in the give and take of Congressional and public debate and in the reports of a free and competitive press. I would not have it any other way.

Let me emphasize again my conviction that the American people have a right to

know even more than has been available in the past about matters which affect their safety and security. There has been too much classification in this country. In particular, too much has been withheld in the past about what has been going on in the closed societies of the Soviet Union and Communist China.

As we all pray for success in Vienna, let me point out that, in my view, the American people will support an arms limitation agreement only if they are confident they have the relevant facts about the strategic balance.

The facts I am about to present are not taken from external Soviet discussions of their strategic forces. They do not come from press conferences in Moscow, from testimony in the Kremlin, from news stories in Pravda, or from published annual Defense Reports by Marshal Grechko.

Rather, the information I am presenting to you is based on our own observations of what the Soviets are doing—and on our belief that this information and these facts should not be withheld from the American people and should be made available to others in the world.

Let us examine what has happened in the past five years to shift the relationship between U.S. and Soviet strategic forces and to provide an accelerated momentum to the Soviets in the strategic field:

In 1965, the Soviet Union had about 220 launchers for the relatively old-fashioned missiles—SS-6's, SS-7's and SS-8's—some-what similar to our Titan. We had 54 Titans in the inventory at that time.

Today, these two forces remain essentially the same. So in this category of old-fashioned multimegaton weapons the Soviets had and still maintain a better than 4-1 advantage.

In 1965, the Soviet Union had no relatively small ICBM launchers comparable to our Minuteman. By 1965, we had 880 Minuteman missiles operational and had established that the total force level for Minuteman would be 1,000 launchers. In the 1965-67 time period, the United States finalized plans to convert a portion of the established Minuteman force to a MIRV Minuteman III configuration.

Today, the Soviet Union has over 800 such launchers operational, and a projected force that could exceed 1,000 launchers within the next two years. These launchers include both the SS-11 and SS-13 missiles. Concurrently, flight testing of an improved SS-11 missile continues. Thus, at present construction rates, the Soviets will achieve parity in Minuteman-type launchers within the next two years or so and could move into a substantial lead in this category by the mid-1970's if they continue to deploy these missiles. The previously scheduled U.S. program to MIRV a substantial part of Minuteman continues in progress.

In 1965, there were no operational launchers for the large Soviet SS-9 missile which, in its single warhead version, can carry up to 25 megatons.

Today, I can report to you that there are some 220 SS-9's operational with at least 60 more under construction. Testing of an SS-9 multiple reentry vehicle—the triplet version—continues. The U.S. has no counterpart to this program involving large missiles. So, in this area, the Soviets have and will maintain a monopoly.

In 1965, neither a depressed trajectory ICBM nor a Fractional Orbital Bombardment System existed in either the Soviet or U.S. inventory.

Today, the Soviets have tested both configurations and could have an operational version already deployed. The United States has developed nothing comparable to these systems.

In 1965, the Soviet Union had about 25 launchers for Submarine Launched Ballistic

Missiles (SLBMs) on nuclear submarines, and about 80 more on diesel submarines. Most were designed for surface launch only. The U.S. had 464 SLBM launchers operational on 29 submarines in 1965 and Congress had authorized the last of the 41 nuclear-powered submarines in our Polaris Force in the previous fiscal year.

Today, the Soviets have over 200 operational launchers on nuclear submarines for submerged launch SLBMs and about 70 operational launchers on diesel submarines. In the next two years, the Soviets are expected to have some 400-500 operational launchers on Polaris-type submarines, and at present construction rates—6-8 submarines a year—could match or exceed the number in the U.S. force by 1974-75. United States Polaris submarines still number 41 and no increase is projected in current plans. Conversion of 31 of our Polaris submarines to the MIRVed Poseidon missile is planned, and eight conversions have already been authorized by Congress.

In 1965, there was no development underway of a so-called Undersea Long-Range Missile System (ULMS) in the United States and there appeared to be none in the Soviet Union.

Today, the United States is spending relatively small sums in the research and development area on preliminary investigations of such a system. I can also report to you today that the Soviet Union, on the other hand, already is testing a new, long-range missile for possible Naval use.

In 1965, the Soviet heavy bomber force consisted of slightly over 200 aircraft, about 50 of which were configured as tankers. The U.S. heavy bomber force strength was about 780 in 1965.

Today, the Soviet heavy bomber force is slightly under 200, with about 50 still configured as tankers. U.S. heavy bomber strength has declined to about 550 today.

In 1965, we estimated that the Soviet Union had a complex of ABM launchers being constructed around Moscow as well as a number of radars under construction which could provide early warning acquisition and tracking functions for ABM use.

Today, we believe that 64 Moscow ABM launchers are operational together with sophisticated early warning radars and tracking capabilities. ABM testing for new and/or improved systems continues. Today, the first two Safeguard sites have been authorized, but will not be operational before 1974-75. This modified deployment schedule is considerably behind the schedule Congress has approved in 1967 for the planned Sentinel area defense, which called for initial capability in 1972, and nation-wide coverage in 1975.

Thus, in the space of five years—from 1965 to 1970—the Soviet Union has more than tripled its inventory of strategic offensive nuclear weapon launchers from about 500 to about 1700—which includes some 200 heavy bombers in both totals—and continues the momentum of a vigorous construction program. In that same period, the Soviet Union has virtually quadrupled the total megatonnage in its strategic offensive force. The United States, on the other hand, in the same time period, made no increase in its established level of 1710 strategic nuclear missile launchers and reduced its heavy bomber strength of 780 by over 200. In that same period the United States also reduced its megatonnage by more than 40%.

To repeat: The United States has taken no action to increase the total of approved strategic offensive delivery vehicles in the past five years in response to the rapid growth in Soviet strategic delivery vehicles. We have, of course, maintained certain options and other steps have been taken to preserve our deterrent in the face of this increase.

Two programs that have been the subject of intense public discussion are, of course, our MIRV and Safeguard systems.

Let me emphasize that MIRV is needed to preserve our deterrent. Many people do not fully understand why it is necessary for us to continue the previously planned, Congressionally-approved and funded deployment of MIRV systems. The point is made that the current number of strategic nuclear weapons on alert in our force is sufficient for immediate retaliatory use in a crisis. Because MIRVing would more than double the number of deliverable weapons, the conclusion is drawn that this is unnecessary.

This conclusion could be valid, if we assumed that the Polaris, Minuteman, and Bomber forces all would survive a surprise attack and that the Soviet Union would not deploy an extensive ABM system. However, as was pointed out in my Defense Report in February, the rapidly-growing Soviet strategic offensive forces could seriously threaten both the U.S. Minuteman and strategic bomber forces by the mid-1970's.

Assuming we do not take additional actions to offset the expanding threat—and this apparently is what some people urge—I must, as Secretary of Defense, face the disquieting possibility that in the mid-to-late 1970's we would no longer be able to rely on either the Bomber or Minuteman force to survive a surprise attack. In such a situation, we would be left with only the Polaris/Poseidon deterrent force in our strategic arsenal for high confidence retaliatory purposes. This would pose intolerable risks for American security.

Thus, the critical choice in the face of that situation is this:

1. Do we rely on the fraction of the 656 current weapons that will be at sea on our Polaris force if we do not convert to Poseidon and do not defend our land-based strategic forces?

2. Or, do we continue the previously established program to convert 31 Polaris submarines to the long-approved Poseidon MIRV program—which would provide approximately the same number of sea-based retaliatory weapons on alert that we currently have today in the sea-based and land-based retaliatory forces combined, but with much reduced megatonnage?

Pending a successful outcome in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, therefore, prudence dictates that we must continue our approved program to MIRV current forces.

Moreover, as the experience of the past five years demonstrates, it would be dangerous and imprudent to place unquestioned reliance on the invulnerability of any single strategic system for more than five to seven years into the future.

This is why we must also, at the very least, preserve an option to defend a portion of our land-based retaliatory forces. That is a major part of what the proposed minimal addition to the Safeguard Defensive program is designed to do. I will come back to that.

Because we want to give the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks every chance of succeeding, we are deliberately accepting certain risks by postponing hard choices related to strategic offensive weapons. These risks are acceptable only in the context of proceeding with the MIRV deployments that have been programmed and approved for several years and the Safeguard increment we are recommending this year.

A second and equally important reason for MIRV is that it helps preserve our deterrent by increasing confidence in our ability to penetrate Soviet strategic defensive forces which, by the mid-to-late 1970's, also could be quite formidable. In addition to the extensive air defense capabilities they already possess, the Soviets are pursuing a vigorous antiballistic missile research and development program designed to improve the present

operational system or to develop substantially better second-generation ABM components.

We now have evidence that the Soviet Union is testing an improved long-range ABM missile. They are also expanding their radar surveillance coverage. We cannot rule out the possibility that they have or will give the extensively deployed SA-5 surface-to-air missile system an ABM role. We believe such a role is technically feasible for this system.

With regard to Safeguard, which I mentioned previously, let me say this. In addition to other objectives, the reoriented Safeguard program, initiated last year, is designed to provide protection for our land-based deterrent forces, the Minuteman and Bombers. As you know, the President directed that each phase of the Safeguard deployment is to be reviewed each year to ensure that we are doing as much as necessary but not more than that required by the threat. The increments of Safeguard proposed so far will provide protection for a portion of our land-based deterrent, and permit flexibility with regard to our future course of action.

Without approval by Congress of the Modified Phase II Safeguard protection proposed by the President, we would be forced to recommend going forward this year with other strategic nuclear offensive force programs.

All of my comments so far have, of course, been focused on the more immediate and troublesome threat posed by the Soviet strategic force buildup. The nuclear weapons program of Communist China also concerns us and directly relates to the need for preserving timely Safeguard options as we move toward the mid-1970's. Time does not permit a discussion of this issue and the interrelationship of maintaining adequate strategic offensive and defensive forces to meet both the Soviet and Communist Chinese threats.

Where does all this leave us, and what is President Nixon attempting to do with the decisions he has incorporated in his Fiscal Year 1971 transitional defense budget?

Clearly, this Administration has not accelerated the previously planned deployment of offensive systems during our 15 months in office. On the contrary, we have slowed it down. The only major change we have made has been modification of the previously approved Sentinel ABM deployment; and that change was a slowdown, not a speed-up. We slowed the original deployment plan Congress approved, keyed it to the emerging threat on an annual review basis, and re-oriented it to provide more timely protection needed for our land-based deterrent forces.

If the programmed forces established by the last Administration some years ago and approved by Congress were deemed appropriate and necessary for the security of the United States in the 1970's against the then projected threat, I am at a loss to understand how critics can claim that the Nixon Administration has escalated the arms race. The record clearly shows that we have not done so. We have chosen instead to defer major new weapons decisions as long as possible pending developments in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. In continuing the MIRV and ABM programs, we are simply going ahead with programs on which our deterrent policy was formulated by previous Administrations, even before the current momentum of Soviet strategic programs became clear.

With regard to the important talks which have just resumed in Vienna, the President has stated that every U.S. system is negotiable. To those who argue that the U.S. should take specific, and perhaps unilateral, action at the start of these negotiations, I would reply that the place to resolve these issues is at the conference table with the Soviets. Let us try to find out at the conference table the meaning of the Soviet Union's increased weapons deployments and let us conduct these



important negotiations with full recognition of these continuing Soviet deployments.

My appraisal today has covered some of the available evidence of the Soviet military buildup. I am not unmindful, however, of possible other directions of Soviet policy that could be relevant to our security. There have been reports that Soviet economic problems may place pressure upon their leadership to devote major attention to internal matters, thus reducing the recent emphasis on a continued military buildup.

As Secretary of Defense, I will continue to hope that the shift in national priorities we have instituted in America will be duplicated in the Soviet Union. But until evidence of that shift is discernible in weapons deployment activities, I have no alternative but to base my actions and recommendations on the evidence available, much of which I have shared with you editors today and, through you, with the American people.

### THE LATE BILL HENRY

(Mr. GERALD R. FORD asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. GERALD R. FORD. Mr. Speaker, only a few months ago, on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of Mrs. Bill Henry's column in the Los Angeles Times, the distinguished majority leader, the chairman of the California delegation (Mr. HOLIFIELD) and our late beloved colleague Mr. Lipscomb, joined in tributes from this floor to a veteran Washington newsman and a warm friend.

Now, we are saddened to learn of Bill's death, just a few days before he was to have received from President Nixon the highest civilian honor of our country, the Medal of Freedom. In expressing the condolences of all of us to his wonderful wife, Corinne, and to their daughters and grandchildren, may I share with Bill's many friends in the House the tribute paid him last week by the President.

[From the Los Angeles Times, April 14, 1970]  
TEXT OF A NOTE FROM PRESIDENT NIXON TO  
MRS. BILL HENRY

Pat and I were deeply saddened to learn of Bill's death and we join in sending our heartfelt sympathy to you. Bill was a man deeply dedicated to his profession and he set high goals for himself. His intense loyalty to our nation, his passion for freedom and justice were the only challenges he needed in life. Bill loved people. He believed in them and he worked for them.

He wrote a fine chapter in the world of newspaper reporting. And all of us who had the privilege to know him personally will miss our warm and generous friend who sparkled with zest for life.

- We know how proud Bill was of you. And we pray that the memory of your happy years together and of his great achievements in life will bring you comfort in this very difficult time.

### THE UNHERALDED WHO SUPPORT THE PUBLIC TRUST

(Mr. HALL asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include pertinent material.)

Mr. HALL. Mr. Speaker, the U.S. Government maintains a civilian staff of over 2.7 million personnel. In so large and

complex an organization, it often happens that the key element, the individual employee who has devoted many years of service to his job, may have his efforts go largely unnoticed. I am very pleased, therefore, when employees who have continuously demonstrated a high degree of proficiency are properly honored for their abilities.

Such a case recently occurred in St. Louis, where Mrs. Pearlline Golliday of the National Personnel Records Center was presented with the Federal Employee of the Year award in the Administrative Services category. Currently an employee of GSA, Mrs. Golliday has been a dedicated public servant for 27 years. During her tenure with the Federal Government, she has received several awards for her administrative abilities, including the outstanding performance rating and several Sustained Superior Performance awards. Mrs. Golliday was selected out of the 38,000 Federal employees in the area by a group of both Federal executives and distinguished members of the non-Federal community.

The award was presented by General Services Administrator Robert L. Kunzig, who was the featured speaker at the event. In his remarks, Mr. Kunzig aptly recognized the high value of the career civil servant, indicating that it was the Federal Career Service which has provided the continuity of administration at the National level that is the envy of many countries. Kunzig noted the Nation's pride in career service personnel, and challenged them to progressive thinking during the next decade. He cited President Nixon's recent message to Congress, which pointed out the need for a reduction, termination, or restructuring of those programs which are obsolete, of low priority, or in need of basic reform, and called on each Federal employee to actively pursue the President's goals. He said that understanding, flexibility, and responsiveness were essential leadership traits in the career Federal employee, and congratulated Mrs. Golliday, as well as Miss Joyce Allen, and Mr. John Johnson, who were also honored at the ceremony, for demonstrating those qualities.

At this point, I would like to have inserted into the Record an article from the St. Louis Post-Dispatch of March 14, 1970, regarding the event:

### THREE HONORED AS TOP FEDERAL EMPLOYEES HERE

Three employees of federal agencies were honored last night with awards naming each as a Greater St. Louis Federal Employee of the Year. They were selected from among 37 candidates competing in categories of administrative services, managerial and technical, and professional and scientific.

Honored were Mrs. Pearlline Golliday, National Personnel Records Center; Miss Joyce Allen, Army Aviation Systems Command, and John I. Johnson, Air Force Aeronautical Chart and Information Center. The awards were presented at a banquet at Stouffer's Riverfront Inn. Winners were selected for exceptional performance and devotion to federal service, participation in community activities, and self-education improving the value of the individual to his agency.

Robert L. Kunzig, administrator of the General Services Administration, was guest

speaker. More than 1000 federal employees attended the event.

### LAOS AND CAMBODIA LOOM AS NEWEST BATTLEGROUND

(Mr. BOLAND asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record.)

Mr. BOLAND. Mr. Speaker, Laos and Cambodia loom before us as the newest battlegrounds in Southeast Asia. The startling testimony made public yesterday by Senator STUART SYMINGTON's Subcommittee on Foreign Relations reveals this country's role in what is aptly termed a "secret war." The transcript of testimony—as chilling and chastening a document as we are likely to read in a long time—shows that tens of thousands of Americans have been taking part in the Laotian war over the past several years. The grim toll: nearly 200 dead, hundreds more wounded, and billions of dollars wasted in a war that virtually any military strategist would consider futile. The role of the U.S. Ambassador to Laos is roughly akin to that of commander in chief of all military operations. He coordinates air, ground, and intelligence missions with the kind of feudal sovereignty that even the Laotian Government itself might envy. The United States is paying half the cost—quite literally, half the cost—of running that government. Indeed, the United States is even paying two-thirds the cost of operating Laotian embassies abroad.

Is this the "limited involvement" President Nixon cited in his guarded press release a few weeks ago?

The answer is obvious—indeed, conspicuous. The Nixon administration—and the Johnson administration before it—have concealed the extent of American military activities in the countries bordering Vietnam. Stonily aloof to the American people and its representatives in the Congress, two administrations have been pursuing a war without our consent.

The military situation in Cambodia threatens to become as forbidding as the one in neighboring Laos. Cambodia's new regime, energetically pressing the war against Communist insurgents, has appealed to the world for military aid. And the United States, it is said, is seriously contemplating shipments of arms. It is a familiar situation to anyone even cursorily aware of Southeast Asia's recent history. First, arms. Then, "advisers" to train Asian troops in the use of such arms. Then—perhaps inevitably—American troops to guide the war effort.

The lessons of this country's harrowing decade in Vietnam has schooled few administration officials in the futility of Asian civil wars. After 40,000 American deaths, after 10 years of devastating war, we appear no closer to a meaningful peace settlement than we were in the early 1960's. Now the war is spreading into Laos and Cambodia, threatening to engulf the entire area conventionally referred to as Indochina. Are we prepared for such a war? Are we prepared to continue sacrificing American lives and wasting American dollars in a kind of Messianic campaign to thwart anything

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even tenuously comparable to communism in Southeast Asia? I think not.

Several weeks ago I introduced a resolution calling on the administration to reveal the extent of military operations in Laos and demanding that such operations not be increased without the consent of Congress.

Today I am introducing a new resolution.

It maintains that this country's military activities in the countries bordering Vietnam should be limited to only those missions necessary to shield American troops in South Vietnam against enemy infiltration, and that troop withdrawals from Vietnam should be accelerated so that no American combat forces remain there 1 year from today.

We have spilled enough of our blood and dissipated enough of our resources in Southeast Asia.

The time to stop is now.

#### LEAVE OF ABSENCE

By unanimous request (at the request of Mr. ALBERT) leave of absence was granted to:

Mr. PATTEN, for today and tomorrow, on account of official business.

Mr. PATMAN, for today, on account of official business.

Mr. LENNON, for today and rest of week, on account of official business.

Mr. EILBERG, for Monday and Tuesday of this week, on account of religious reason.

Mr. PEPPER, for today, on account of official business.

Mr. GETTYS (at the request of Mr. BOGGS), for today, on account of official business.

Mr. GRIFFIN (at the request of Mr. BOGGS), for today, on account of illness in family.

Mr. HAGAN (at the request of Mr. GRAY), for today, on account of official business.

Mr. FALLON (at the request of Mr. GARMATZ), for today, on account of official business.

#### SPECIAL ORDERS GRANTED

By unanimous consent, permission to address the House, following the legislative program and any special orders heretofore entered, was granted to:

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. DELLENBACK) to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material:)

Mr. HALPERN, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. CONTE, for 10 minutes, today.

Mr. MILLER of Ohio, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. HOGAN, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. McCLOSKEY, for 60 minutes, April 21.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. DANIEL of Virginia) to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material:)

Mr. FARBERSTEIN, for 20 minutes, today.

Mr. GONZALEZ, for 10 minutes, today.

#### EXTENSION OF REMARKS

By unanimous consent, permission to revise and extend remarks was granted to:

Mr. JONES of Alabama.

Mr. WYATT prior to the vote on H.R. 780 and to include extraneous matter.

Mr. DEVINE (at the request of Mr. KYL) to extend his remarks on Senate Joint Resolution 1060 and S. 1968.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. DELLENBACK) and to include extraneous material:)

Mr. QUIE in two instances.

Mr. FINDLEY in two instances.

Mr. STEIGER of Wisconsin in three instances.

Mr. DERWINSKI in two instances.

Mr. ASHBROOK in two instances.

Mr. McCLODY.

Mr. CONTE.

Mr. DUNCAN.

Mr. GERALD R. FORD in two instances.

Mr. JONAS.

Mr. WYMAN in two instances.

Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois in two instances.

Mr. BURTON of Utah in five instances.

Mr. GUBSER.

Mr. SCHERLE.

Mr. MYERS.

Mr. JOHNSON of Pennsylvania.

Mr. THOMPSON of Georgia.

Mr. BERRY.

Mr. HASTINGS.

Mrs. MAY.

Mr. WATSON.

Mr. REID of New York in three instances.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. DANIEL of Virginia) and to include extraneous material:)

Mr. EVINS of Tennessee in three instances.

Mr. ALBERT.

Mr. CULVER.

Mr. HUNGATE.

Mr. ROONEY of New York.

Mr. MARSH in two instances.

Mr. CAREY in two instances.

Mrs. HANSEN of Washington in two instances.

Mr. DINGELL in two instances.

Mr. HOWARD in two instances.

Mr. JACOBS in two instances.

Mr. RARICK in three instances.

Mr. COHELAN in six instances.

Mr. GONZALEZ.

Mr. GARMATZ.

Mr. ANDERSON of California.

Mr. MIKVA in six instances.

Mr. SYMINGTON.

Mr. STOKES in three instances.

Mr. COLMER in two instances.

Mr. FOUNTAIN in two instances.

Mr. ROGERS of Florida in five instances.

Mr. REES.

Mr. GALLAGHER in two instances.

Mr. RODINO in two instances.

Mrs. SULLIVAN in three instances.

#### SENATE BILL REFERRED

A bill of the Senate of the following title was taken from the Speaker's table and, under the rule, referred as follows:

S. 3685.—An act to increase the availability of mortgage credit for the financing of urgently needed housing, and for the other purposes; to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

#### ADJOURNMENT

Mr. DANIEL of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House do now adjourn.

The motion was agreed to; accordingly (at 3 o'clock and 43 minutes p.m.), the House adjourned until tomorrow, Tuesday, April 21, 1970, at 12 o'clock noon.

#### EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.

Under clause 2 of rule XXIV, executive communications were taken from the Speaker's table and referred as follows:

1939. A letter from the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, transmitting the fifth annual report of the Advisory Council on State Departments of Education, pursuant to title V of Public Law 89-10; to the Committee on Education and Labor.

1940. A letter from the Chairman, Water Resources Council, transmitting a report and comprehensive plan for the Pascagoula River Basin, Ala. and Miss., pursuant to the Water Resources Planning Act (Public Law 89-80); to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

1941. A letter from the Chairman, Water Resources Council, transmitting a report and comprehensive plan for the Sabine River Basin, La., and Tex., pursuant to the Water Resources Planning Act (Public Law 89-90); to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

1942. A letter from the Chairman, Water Resources Council, transmitting a report and comprehensive plan for the White River Basin, Ark., and Mo., pursuant to the Water Resources Planning Act (Public Law 89-80); to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

1943. A letter from the Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service, U.S. Department of Justice transmitting reports concerning visa petitions approved according certain beneficiaries third and sixth preference classification, pursuant to the provisions of section 204(d) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

1944. A letter from the Secretary of the Interior, transmitting the third report on the national requirements and cost of water pollution control, pursuant to section 16(a) of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, as amended; to the Committee on Public Works.

#### REPORTS OF COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 2 of rule XIII, reports of committees were delivered to the Clerk for printing and reference to the proper calendar, as follows:

Mr. STAGGERS: Committee of conference. Conference report on H.R. 10105 (Rept. No. 91-1008). Ordered to be printed.

Mr. O'NEILL of Massachusetts: Committee on Rules, House resolution 938, Resolution for consideration of H.R. 4599, a bill to extend for 2 years the period for which payments in lieu of taxes may be made with respect to certain real property transferred by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and its

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## CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—Extensions of Remarks

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too true. In their Week in Review section in yesterday's edition, under the heading "Revolution in Welfare From an Unlikely Source," they express surprise that "Congress has endorsed the startling notion" of a guaranteed income plan.

Who would have ever thought that the party which has historically turned a deaf ear to the socialistic Pied Pipers would suddenly exhibit a lemming instinct and provide the votes necessary to pass this radical plan? The Times correctly terms proposal and passage of the administration's welfare bill "an astonishing development" and then adds:

The principle of a guaranteed annual income for all Americans, about as pure a piece of socialism as Washington had seen since the 1930's, had been put forward by—of all people—President Nixon and then ratified in that citadel of conservatism, the House, by a resounding 243-155 vote.

As we have said all along, it is the principle that counts the most, and the writer of the article agrees:

Most significantly, if the Senate concurs, the principle will have been established. Succeeding Congresses, as opponents of the legislation loudly warned, will be able, probably even anxious in election years, to raise the minimum guaranteed income figure.

In other words, once we have initiated the program, all the blanks can be filled in later at taxpayers' expense.

In view of the far-reaching consequences of this ill-advised legislation, I strongly commend the following article to the attention of my colleagues, but in particular to those who thought they were supporting a conservative's solution to the welfare problem:

[From the New York Times, Apr. 19, 1970]  
REVOLUTION IN WELFARE FROM AN UNLIKELY SOURCE

(By Warren Weaver, Jr.)

WASHINGTON.—On the wall of the Capitol meeting room of the House Rules Committee, a group rarely given to whimsy or charm, there hangs the following legend in old English characters: "Due to the lack of experienced trumpeters, the end of the world is postponed for three weeks." Despite this warning, it was with something of a flourish that the end of an era in American Government, the days of the welfare dole, was proclaimed last week in the cavernous and resonant chamber of the House of Representatives.

For the House, scarcely more venturesome in the past than its own Rules Committee, subscribed decisively to a doctrine that was radical, even revolutionary. Its members adopted the theory that the Federal Government would not allow the income of any American family to sink below a minimum tolerable figure, no matter what its adult members were doing.

Taken altogether, it could only be called an astonishing development. The principle of a guaranteed annual income for all Americans, about as pure a piece of socialism as Washington had seen since the 1930's, had been put forward by—of all people—President Nixon and then ratified in that citadel of conservatism, the House, by a resounding 243-155 vote.

## MINIMUM GUARANTEED

True, it was a very modest beginning in terms of impact on an individual poor family. The family assistance plan, the core of the Administration welfare reform bill that moved halfway through Congress, only guarantees a couple with two children an annual

income of \$1,600, or barely \$30 a week. It does not extend this protection to individual adults or childless couples; there must be a family of at least one parent and one child. It does not provide an outright flat grant; the Federal benefits will only be large enough to guarantee that the family income reaches this minimum standard, which is only about half the acknowledged poverty level.

But, for the first time in its history, Congress has endorsed the startling notion that there should be some sort of floor under human misery and that it is up to the Federal Government to lay down that floor and finance its coast-to-coast construction. And, also for the first time, it was recognized that the public obligation to maintain a minimum income for all American families should not be restricted to those with no income at all but should cover the so-called working poor, marginal wage-earners who have been traditionally barred from the welfare rolls.

Most significantly, if the Senate concurs, the principle will have been established. Succeeding Congresses, as opponents of the legislation loudly warned, he will be able, probably even anxious in election years, to raise the minimum guaranteed income figure to something more nearly resembling the cost of keeping alive in the United States.

The impact on the Federal budget, even initially, is substantial. In its first year of operation, the Administration bill will approximately double Federal welfare expenditures, to about \$8.4-billion. The cost will continue to rise for a time—critics said to \$15-billion a year—before accompanying training and employment programs begin reducing the caseload.

How was the timorous House of Representatives ever persuaded to buy such a package? It took broad and powerful combination of forces. Primarily, 103 Republicans became convinced that (A) the present welfare system is so disastrous that any bold revision has got to be an improvement, and (B) on a major political issue, party loyalty demanded support of President Nixon, who could hardly be suspected of radical tendencies.

For the 140 Democrats who voted for the welfare bill, it was much easier. They had to swallow their reluctance to help the Republican Administration win a major Congressional victory, but many of them had long been supporters of the income maintenance principle and could scarcely turn their backs on it because it came to the floor under the aegis of Richard Nixon.

Perhaps most important, waverers of both parties could listed to the homespun Arkansas rhetoric of Representative Wilbur Mills, the Ways and Means Committee Chairman, whose outspoken advocacy of the welfare bill demonstrated the enthusiasm of the recent convert. The House really could not accept that something he backed could be socialism.

The problems the welfare program faces in the Senate are of a different character. No one doubts that the votes are there for the family assistance plan; the question is whether liberal Senators can be dissuaded from increasing the benefit level—and the resulting cost—to such an extent that President Nixon will feel compelled to turn back his own program with a veto.

## SALT TALKS RESUME

HON. JOHN B. ANDERSON

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, April 20, 1970

Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. Mr. Speaker, I want to commend the administration on its announced intention

to seek a comprehensive strategic arms limitation agreement with the Soviet Union at the talks which resumed in Vienna last Thursday. In his state of the world message President Nixon termed the SALT talks, "The most important arms control negotiations this country has ever entered." And he went on to explain why this was so. In his words:

Both the Soviet Union and the United States have acquired the ability to inflict unacceptable damage on the other, no matter which strikes first. There can be no gain and certainly no victory for the power that provokes a thermonuclear exchange. Thus, both sides have recognized the vital mutual interest in halting the dangerous momentum of the nuclear arms race.

I have long been concerned about the "mad momentum" of the arms race and where it has been taking us. I agree with the President that it is senseless to continue this dangerous and costly race since we and the Soviet Union already have an assured destruction capability. And I would further agree with the President that both we and the Soviet Union have a "vital mutual interest" in stopping the arms spiral. This is our primary aim at the SALT talks.

Congressional concern about the arms race has been running high for some time. There has been widespread support in both bodies of Congress for a mutual moratorium on the further testing and deployment of multiple-warhead missiles, and I am proud to be one of the principal sponsors of that resolution in the House. Two weeks ago, the other body, by a 72 to 6 vote, passed a resolution in support of the SALT talks and the goal of a comprehensive limitation agreement on both offensive and defensive weapons. It further called for an immediate and mutual moratorium on the further deployment of these systems.

An essentially identical resolution was introduced in this body last week by my good friend and colleague from Delaware (Mr. ROTH), and today I am proud to add my name to the list of cosponsors of that resolution. I do want to emphasize our sincere desire that we not only seek a comprehensive limitation agreement on offensive and defensive strategic weapons, but that we also seek with the Soviets an immediate and mutual moratorium on the further deployment of these systems. The SALT talks may be rather long and drawn out and it will be some time before a formal agreement is arrived at and officially ratified. In the interim, in the absence of a deployment moratorium, the temptation may be great for both sides to arm to the hilt, thereby setting off the arms spiral the agreement would be designed to prevent. It would be somewhat analogous to the two drunks trying to buy as many drinks as possible before the bar closes down. Needless to say, the results could be of staggering proportions, and we could well walk away from those talks more drunk and dizzy with power than ever before. The balance of terror could be seriously jeopardized by the destabilizing effects of new offensive and defensive weapons systems. That is why it is so crucial, it seems to me, for both sides to postpone further deployments while these talks are in progress, "subject to national verification

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or such other measures of observation and inspection as may be appropriate," in the words of the resolution.

At this point in the Record, Mr. Speaker, I include a copy of the resolution introduced by the gentleman from Delaware (Mr. Rora) and which I am cosponsoring. I also include an article from the April 17 Washington Post, and two articles from the Sunday New York Times of April 19. The items follow:

## RESOLUTION

Expressing the support of the House of Representatives with respect to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, and for other purposes

Whereas the preparations for the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks have involved the most intensive study of strategic arms problems ever made by the Government of the United States of America or any other government:

Whereas the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics open talks on April 16, 1970, which could result in agreement to limit arms and other matters: Now, therefore, be it

*Resolved*, That the House of Representatives hereby expresses its unreserved support for the talks which begin April 16, 1970, on the limitations of strategic arms between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

*Be it further resolved*, That it is the sense of the House of Representatives that—

(1) prompt negotiations between the Governments of the United States of America and of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to seek agreed limitations of both offensive and defensive strategic weapons should be urgently pursued; and

(2) the President should in such negotiations propose to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics an immediate suspension by the United States and by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of the further deployment of all offensive and defensive nuclear strategic weapons systems, subject to national verification or such other measures of observation and inspection as may be appropriate.

[From the Washington Post, Apr. 17, 1970]

SALT TALKS REOPEN WITH RUSSIAN SOLEMN  
(By Chalmers M. Roberts)

VIENNA, April 16.—The strategic arms limitation talks resumed here today on a note more of caution than of optimism.

There were fewer smiles from Vladimir S. Semyonov, the chief Soviet delegate, than there had been when the preliminary phase began last November in Helsinki, and what he had to say sounded harsher than his Helsinki words.

Semyonov once again mentioned Lenin and the Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence. But this time he added a phrase saying that intensification of the arms race, in contrast to its curtailment, "serves the interests of aggressive imperialist circles." No names or nations were mentioned, but such phrases have been applied recently to American Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird.

At Helsinki the Soviet delegate had spoken both of limitation and the subsequent reduction of nuclear arms. Today he spoke only of "curbing" the arms race and he added that "the items on our program of work in Vienna are not simple."

The chief American delegate, Gerard C. Smith, as at Helsinki, read a message from President Nixon before saying on his own that "we both have nothing to gain from failure. We have and the whole world has much to gain from success. We look forward to its early achievement."

The Nixon message reaffirmed what he had said at Helsinki: hope for an agreement on limitation and eventual reduction of strategic arsenals, "with proper recognition of the legitimate security interests of the United States and the Soviet Union and of third countries."

Then the President added that Smith's instructions "will enable you to move from general explorations," the Helsinki pattern, "to a discussion of more specific proposals toward these ends." Mr. Nixon also told Smith that "you have authority to approach the issues in the most comprehensive manner."

A comprehensive agreement would curb the deployment of rival multiple nuclear warheads on missile systems as well as curb anti-missile defense systems. Mr. Nixon's use of the word "approach" in reference to a possible comprehensive agreement reflected the known administration caution on this critical issue.

The President also expressed the hope that the Soviet delegation had come to Vienna with "the same determination" as the Americans "to bring about a mutually acceptable agreement."

There is considerable discussion within the American delegation as to what is going on in the Kremlin and whether the widely expected changes in the Politburo about which there is no hard information, would have an effect on the SALT talks, as these discussions now are being called by the Soviets as well as by the Americans.

The dominant view appears to be that any Kremlin changes are more likely to stiffen the Soviet position than to liberalize it.

Semyonov gave no clue, but it was noted that he quoted Soviet Communist Party leader Brezhnev's Tuesday speech in Kharbow to the effect that Moscow would welcome "a reasonable accommodation" and would "do its best for these negotiations to be useful." At least in quoting Brezhnev, whose position seems the most secure in the Kremlin, Semyonov was on safe ground.

The first opportunity for an exchange behind closed doors will come when the two delegations have their first business session at 4 p.m. Friday at the Soviet embassy. A second meeting is scheduled for next Monday morning at the American embassy.

At these initial sessions, Smith and Semyonov are expected to read each other formal statements, as was the practice at Helsinki. The question now is at what point in this procedure one side or the other will indicate what kind of proposal it would like.

Today's 30-minute television opening ceremony was held at the Belvedere, an in-city palace, where the Austrian State Treaty was signed almost 15 years ago, the treaty which evacuated the Red Army from Austria and set this small nation on its current neutral course in international relations.

Austrian Foreign Minister Kurt Waldheim sounded very much as his Finnish counterpart had sounded last November when the Helsinki talks opened. Waldheim hoped for "a turning point in the history of disarmament" (a word both big powers avoid here) and "a new phase" in East-West relations.

[From the New York Times, Apr. 19, 1970]

CHAMPAGNE HERALDS SPRING AND SUMMER OF  
SALT

(By Bernard Weinraub)

VIENNA.—At two minutes to noon last Thursday, a black limousine glided to a halt at the massive Belvedere Palace and Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir S. Semyonov climbed out and walked quickly up the marble steps.

By noon, a similar limousine with Gerard C. Smith, the director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, had stopped at the palace doors. Within moments the American diplomat—tall, bespectacled

craggy-faced—stood beside the Russian minister—short, plump, resembling Otto Priminger—in a glittering red and white marble hall that blended stucco, gilt, mirrors and ceiling frescoes with an allegorical depiction of victory.

"The palace is, you know, a building of war," said an Austrian official early last week. "It was constructed by Prince Eugene of Savoy who plundered and conquered the Turks. It is, perhaps, ironic that the palace could be a building of peace."

It is, perhaps, ironic but also somewhat foreboding and even bizarre that within the baroque splendor of a faded empire—within a palace built between 1714 and 1716 on vine-covered hills facing Vienna—the two superpowers sit down and seek to discuss the nitty gritty of thwarting a nuclear holocaust.

The resumption of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) on Thursday was marked by a curious mood of unease and boredom and a hint—just a hint—of hope. Dutifully, Mr. Semyonov arose and spoke of the arms race "which serves the interests of aggressive imperialist circles." Just as dutifully, Mr. Smith read a message from President Nixon that called for "reduction of strategic arsenals with proper recognition of the legitimate security interests of the United States and the Soviet Union and of third countries."

Dutifully, both men sipped champagne and grinned for photographers and then ordered the paneled doors shut to start the secret talks that may last into the summer.

"It may be *déjà vu*—we've seen and heard so much of this before that some people may be numb by now to these talks," said a junior American official. "It may be the language that confuses people, all this talk of MIRV and ABM and ICBM that makes it cold and technical."

"What people don't seem to realize is that these talks are a hope—possibly an only hope—for peace."

## THE RIVALRY

Another American official, sipping coffee in the Hotel Bristol, slowly discussed the rivalry in nuclear weapons. "We started research in the MIRV (multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle) when we first learned of their deployment of the ABM (anti-ballistic missile)," he said. "Then they started the MIRV."

The official, who has been working for years on disarmament, paused. "The real question is when do you stop. You've got all this overkill anyway. You've got to stop, sometime. There's an economic factor. There's a moral factor too. You've got to stop."

With the talks enveloped in a mood of somberness and secrecy, the 60 members of both delegations, the security men, the secretaries, the advisers, the families and the hundreds of journalists in Vienna, began the uneasy—and difficult—task of watching the negotiations without knowing too confidently what was going on in the Belvedere Palace where 15-year-old Marie Antoinette married the Dauphin who was later Louis XVI of France.

The Soviet delegation itself has carefully sought virtual total isolation—renting the 93-room Park Hotel in nearby Baden replete with spa, sauna and rejuvenating water cure. By the weekend, the Russians were digging in: Trucks moved into Baden and unloaded crates of sturgeon and bottles of vodka for the spring and summer of SALT.

## NIXON CALLS FOR BROAD TALKS ON ARMS

(By John W. Finney)

WASHINGTON.—For weeks a debate has been going on within the Administration over whether the United States should seek a comprehensive strategic arms control agreement or propose piecemeal steps to curb the nuclear arms race. Last week, to



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the surprise and delight of many in Congress, President Nixon came out in favor of the comprehensive approach.

In his still secret instructions, the President authorized the American delegation to the strategic arms limitation talks in Vienna to propose to the Soviet Union a comprehensive limitation on deployment of both offensive and defensive strategic weapons. The general goal of the Administration is an agreement that would place quantitative limitations on the number of offensive and defensive weapons possessed by each side. Thus, for example, each side might be permitted to have modest antiballistic missile (ABM) systems, while numerical ceilings would be placed on the number of offensive weapons, such as intercontinental missiles or bombers, they could possess.

Basically this proposal corresponds to the negotiating position developed in the Johnson Administration for the SALT talks. But with its cautious attitude toward these talks, there had been no certainty that the Nixon Administration would come out in favor of a comprehensive limitation on strategic weapons.

What the Soviet reaction will be to a comprehensive proposal remains unclear, particularly in light of the apparent power reshuffle within the Kremlin. Admittedly it is more complex than a weapons-by-weapons approach, which was generally advocated by the Pentagon. But a comprehensive limitation has the advantage that it deals with all the interrelated elements of the arms race in a manner that presumably would not give an advantage to one side or the other.

If disarmament critics had one objection to the Administration approach, it was that it does not contemplate a stop in the American deployment of an ABM system and MIRV multiple warheads for missiles. That may prove to be a controversial and perhaps crucial omission, for if the United States proceeds with MIRV warheads and the Safeguard ABM System and the Soviet Union with deployment of its large SS-9 intercontinental missiles, then it may prove doubly difficult to reach agreement on any limitation on strategic weapons.

## BETTER SECRETARIES

## HON. PAUL FINDLEY

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, April 20, 1970

Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Speaker, the theme of the 19th consecutive annual Secretaries Week April 19-25 is "Better Secretaries Mean Better Business," sponsored by the National Secretaries Association—International—the world's leading secretarial association, the week will be highlighted on Wednesday, April 22, which is set aside as Secretaries Day.

Many Governors and mayors throughout the United States will officially proclaim "Secretaries Week," while their counterparts in Canada do the same. For the seventh straight year, the Outdoor Advertising Association has undertaken Secretaries Week as a public service project.

Miss Bertha J. Stronach, CPS, NSA's international president, who is secretary and senior staff assistant to L. M. Collins, manager of Educational Marketing Programs, IBM, New York, said that as the leader and authoritative spokesman for the secretarial profession, NSA would be devoting some soul searching to the

present and future respect from superiors, colleagues, and subordinates that secretaries can only command through performance.

Miss Stronach said:

Admittedly, secretaries are in a sellers' market. With the ever-adjusting law of supply and demand in the labor market, we have to be on guard against the erosion of the secretarial "image" that will ultimately come from any compromise of the standards we are committed to elevate. When and if the pendulum swings to a buyers' market, we don't want to be remembered from the difficult days of the so-called secretarial shortage.

On every side, management bewails the fact that secretaries are in short supply and that they are having to settle for minimal job fulfillment at maximal salary levels. Yet, some of the same management attempts to recruit from weakness rather than strength and so offer lures that can only be termed frivolous when applied to a business environment. Naturally, we favor appropriate fringe benefits in the form of adequate paid vacations, hospital and retirement insurance plans, and profit-sharing programs. But non-job-related inducements such as a day at the races, a night at the theater or unearned vacations are not what makes a professional secretary job-happy instead of job-hopping.

Our own NSA research consistently reveals that the one major incentive to a secretary is job satisfaction. One recent research conclusion is that it does not necessarily follow, *ipso facto*, that a successful secretary is satisfied with her job, or that a secretary who is satisfied with her job is successful.

A satisfied secretary is one who is given a challenge and can make a vital contribution to an integral part of the over-all business at hand. When such challenge is offered along with room for advancement, there is a qualified secretary who will be attracted to and remain happy in the position. The key points of what a secretary expects to measure up to are found in NSA's own definition of a secretary, and management's attention is particularly called to the phrases I have underlined:

"A secretary shall be defined as an executive assistant who possesses a mastery of office skills, who demonstrates the ability to assume responsibility without supervision, who exercises initiative and judgment, and who makes decisions within the scope of assigned authority."

One of the primary things management can do toward eliminating the secretarial shortage is to put priority on defining the scope of the secretary's authority on more liberal terms. Then, together, we can work out of the stigmatic, unbalanced atmosphere of the current sellers' market for secretaries.

Miss Stronach also brings to management's attention, as well as that of their employment agents, the continuing need for support and endorsement of the certified professional secretary rating. She states:

Thanks to the support we have already enjoyed, we will have 5,000 CPSs who have passed the examination at the completion of the annual two-day, six-part examination which will be administered May 1 and 2.

As further evidence of the National Secretaries Association's relentless pursuit of seeing that qualified secretaries are trained for the future, Miss Stronach also singles out the goals of the NSA Research and Educational Foundation in defining by in-depth research exactly what secretarial requirements in future years will be.

The Future Secretaries Association, one of NSA's fastest growing endeavors, helps management through FSA's work in assisting business educators to provide realistic training for high school and college students who have chosen to work toward a career in secretaryship.

The observance of Secretaries Week is especially worthy of note on Capitol Hill, where more than 5,000 secretaries provide indispensable skills in handling the steadily rising volume of personal correspondence and official statements which flow from the offices of Representatives and Senators.

## NATIONAL LAND REFORM PROGRAM

## HON. OGDEN R. REID

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, April 20, 1970

Mr. REID of New York. Mr. Speaker, I am introducing today with the gentleman from California (Mr. Moss) a bill to authorize an additional \$200 million in supporting assistance funds for the Government of Vietnam, which money shall be earmarked to support rapid implementation of the national land reform program enacted March 26, 1970, by the GVN.

Under the so-called "Land to the Tiller" program, land is to be given free to the tenants who have been cultivating it. The present landowners will be permitted to retain only that land which they themselves actually cultivate, and no landlord will be allowed to keep more than 37 acres. If the program is effectively administered, it will be one of the most ambitious and progressive land redistribution programs ever promulgated—the government is to buy up more than 2 million acres of land and distribute it free to the 1 million families who have been working it as tenant farmers for absentee landlords.

The action of the South Vietnamese Government and the legislature on land reform is long and tragically overdue. It may well be too late. Nonetheless, the test now is whether the enacted program will be implemented for all farmers in the next few months. Any real administrative delay could doom government in South Vietnam and make a mockery of promised reform.

There will obviously be many opportunities for corruption and inefficiency in so ambitious a program as the one which has been undertaken by the Government of Vietnam. For that reason, our bill makes the use of these new supporting assistance funds for land reform "contingent upon the attainment of mutually agreed goals of accomplishments stressing economy, efficiency, and advanced implementation of the program by July 1, 1972." Payments for land reform assistance shall be made at quarterly intervals, based upon satisfactory achievement toward the 1972 target goal.

The Vietnamese land reform program, if successful, could help hasten the end

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of the war. Certainly it is a vital step toward the economic and social reform which the gentleman from California (Mr. Moss) and I have so long advocated. By making a \$200 million contribution toward the cost of land reform—which is expected to cost the Vietnamese Government a total of \$400 million—the U.S. Government will simply be acknowledging the fact that we, too, have an interest in bringing about social reform in Vietnam and an early end to the war.

The \$200 million authorized by this bill is less than the cost—one-half of 1 week of war. It seems a small enough price to pay for a program which could help bring an end to that war, and enable us once again to focus on the urgent problems here at home.

#### CONCENTRATION ON INTEGRATION IS DOING LITTLE FOR EDUCATION

**HON. ROMAN C. PUCINSKI**

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, April 20, 1970

Mr. PUCINSKI. Mr. Speaker, recently, the very highly respected columnist, Mr. William Raspberry, wrote his column for the Washington Post which included such foresight and depth of understanding of the whole question of integration that I believe every Member of the House ought to read it.

As chairman of the House Subcommittee on General Education, I am placing Mr. Raspberry's excellent article in the Record today:

The article follows:

[From the Washington Post, Feb. 20, 1970]

#### CONCENTRATION ON INTEGRATION IS DOING LITTLE FOR EDUCATION

(By William Raspberry)

Racial segregation in public schools is both foolish and wrong, which has led a lot of us to suppose that school integration must, therefore, be wise and just.

It ain't necessarily so. It may be that one reason why the schools, particularly in Washington, are doing such a poor job of educating black children is that we have spent too much effort on integrating the schools and too little on improving them.

The preoccupation with racial integration follows in part from a misreading of what the suit that led to the 1954 desegregation decision was all about.

The suit was based (tacitly, at least) on what might be called the hostage theory. It was clear that black students were suffering under the dual school systems that were the rule in the South. It was also clear that only the "separate" part of the separate-but-equal doctrine was being enforced.

Civil rights leaders finally became convinced that the only way to ensure that their children would have equal education with white children was to make sure that they received the same education, in the same classrooms.

Nor would the education be merely equal, the theory went: It would be good. White people who after all run things, are going to see to it that their children get a proper education. If ours are in the same classrooms, they'll get a proper education by osmosis.

That, at bottom, was the reasoning behind the suit, no matter that the legal argu-

ments were largely sociological, among them, that segregated education is inherently unequal.

(Why it should be inherently more unequal for blacks than for whites wasn't made clear.)

In any case, the aim of the suit was not so much integrated education but better education. Integration was simply a means to an end.

Much of the confusion today stems from the fact that the means has now become an end in itself. Suits are being brought for integration, boundaries are being redrawn, busing is being instituted—not to improve education but to integrate classrooms.

The results can sometimes be pathetic.

In Washington, blacks send their children (or have them sent) across Rock Creek Park in pursuit of the dream of good education. But as the blacks come, the whites leave, and increasingly we find ourselves busing children from all-black neighborhoods all the way across town to schools that are rapidly becoming all-black.

The Tri-School setup in Southwest Washington is a case in point. Of the three elementary schools in the area, only one was considered a good school: Amidon, where the children of the black and white well-to-do attended. Bowen and Syphax, populated almost exclusively by poor kids from the projects, were rated lousy schools.

Then the hostage theory was applied. A plan was worked out whereby all first- and second-graders in the area would attend one school, all third- and fourth-graders a second, and all fifth- and sixth-graders the third.

The well-to-do parents would see to it that their children got a good education. All the poor parents had to do was see to it that their children were in the same classrooms.

That was the theory. What happened, of course, is that instead of sprinkling their children around three schools, the luxury high-rise dwellers, black and white, packed their youngsters off to private school. Now instead of one good and two bad schools, Southwest Washington has three bad ones.

After 16 years, we should have learned that the hostage theory doesn't work. This is not to suggest that integration is bad but that it must become a secondary consideration.

Busing makes some sense (as a temporary measure) when its purpose is to transport children from neighborhoods with overcrowded classrooms to schools where there is space to spare.

It works to a limited degree when it involves children whose parents want them bused across town for specific reasons.

But it has accomplished nothing useful when it has meant transporting large numbers of reluctant youngsters to schools they'd rather not attend.

The notion will win me the embarrassing support of segregationist bigots, but isn't it about time we started concentrating on educating children where they are?

#### AMERICAN COUNCIL ON EDUCATION—COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS ON THE COLLEGE FRONT

**HON. JOHN R. RARICK**

OF LOUISIANA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, April 20, 1970

Mr. RARICK. Mr. Speaker, recently we have heard a loud and anguished scream from the left—over the computerized invasion of privacy. It seems that the U.S. Army, having been given a

counterinsurgency mission, was in the process of collecting the necessary intelligence to perform its assigned task. It was busy identifying the potential insurgents, determining their capabilities, and presumably making its estimate of the situation.

I call to the attention of the House the computer games of the left—not the counterinsurgency preparations of the Government which is required by the Constitution to assure to each State in the Union a republican form of government.

I call to the attention of the House an intelligence operation—recognized by intelligence experts to be just that—which has developed information so dangerous that it is "safeguarded" by storage in an unidentified foreign nation.

Many Members are aware of the Council on Foreign Relations—the CFR. This introduces its little brother, the Council on Education—the ACE, also spawned in the aftermath of World War I, and like the CFR a silent partner and often a backstage manipulator of the fashioning of our world during the past half century.

A former intelligence officer in my district was kind enough to furnish me with a bylined story relating to college freshmen and a questionnaire. His comment was to the effect that the possession of such information was an intelligence officer's dream—or a counterintelligence officer's nightmare. I certainly agree with him, and I am sure that other Members of the House will have the same reaction.

The careful research of Publisher Frank Capell, of the Herald of Freedom, fills in the background on the council and its past interests and activities. In view of the council's past use—either of or by—Communists and Soviet agents, its possession of such vital intelligence information, stored "for security reasons" in a foreign country, is worthy of our careful attention.

I include in my remarks the two articles mentioned and excerpts from the questionnaire answered by a quarter of a million college freshmen last fall as published in ACE research reports under the title of "National Norms for Entering College Freshmen—"Fall 1969."

[From the Baton Rouge (La.) Morning Advocate, Jan. 19, 1970]

#### COLLEGE FROSH SPILLING SOME FAMILY SECRETS

(By Patricia McCormack)

NEW YORK.—More than a quarter of a million college freshmen spilled some family secrets when they filled out a super-snooper form last fall. Mom and Dad's education level. Family income.

And they told a lot about their innermost thoughts on controversial topics—abortion, marijuana, the Army.

They also designated their race, religion, attitudes toward political leanings.

Information put on the four-page form from the American Council on Education is for those involved in educational guidance, counseling, administration, research and manpower studies.

Since some of the information is of a personal nature, the question arises: What steps are taken to guarantee confidentiality of responses?

The answer: Very elaborate ones—for if there are no precautions, some of the responses may haunt the student later, even stunting career development.

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evident in Saigon and the failure of the Thieu-Ky militarist regime to provide any land reform for the people of South Vietnam and to relieve them from the corruption of absentee landlords who have been favored all along while wounded war veterans have been neglected.

Communist regimes the world over govern by decree. Fascists likewise. Some 40 years ago Adolf Hitler gave similar reasons when he assumed dictatorial power and created the infamous Third Reich. Incidentally, not long ago Ky stated he regarded Adolf as a great hero.

Mr. President, when I was in Vietnam, interviewing the flamboyant Ky, he was very proud of the decoration he displayed, which the French had given him for fighting against his own people.

At present a fully disabled South Vietnam war veteran with a wife and six children receives the paltry sum of \$15 a month in compensation for his crippling war wounds and permanent disability. In contrast to these Vietnamese veterans who with their families slowly starve on their meager monthly allotments, Vice President Ky and many generals and officials of the Thieu-Ky regime, live the rich life stashing away in unlisted Swiss and Hong Kong bank accounts huge sums of money they corruptly acquired. Madam Thieu recently purchased a beautiful and expensive villa in Switzerland, apparently in preparation for the day when the Vietnamese people oust her husband from office.

The people of South Vietnam have courageously demonstrated their opposition to the corrupt policies of the Saigon militarist regime. It is evident that it lacks support of all except a small minority of the people of South Vietnam. Recently, a crowd of crippled former soldiers protested outside the Presidential Palace and the National Assembly building demanding better treatment from the Government. Thieu responded by calling out the police, the key instrument of repression of his regime, who then launched a tear gas attack to disperse the crippled veterans.

The veterans' demonstrations also exposed the Thieu regime's repression of Saigon's fledgling news media. Three Saigon newspapers dared to support the disabled veterans' campaign for more benefits and criticized the police for overreacting to the demonstrations. Police, under government orders, then proceeded to seize all copies of the three papers. The Thieu government justified this under "the national press law," an oppressive edict which allows the Thieu regime to suppress any "subversive and inflammatory" articles appearing in the South Vietnamese press.

Last fall Thieu decided that austerity taxes were urgently needed but doubted they would be passed by the National Assembly so he simply imposed them by decree. Even though a few courageous legislators dared to oppose the will of this bush-league Hitler, the President's tax decree was enacted.

Mr. President, it is a tragic irony that more than 50,000 of our men have laid

down their lives and more than 270,000 have been wounded in an immoral, undeclared war, to maintain in power that corrupt Thieu-Ky regime.

Vietnam is of no importance whatever to the defense of the United States, yet last week 141 of our finest young men were killed over there, and the casualties continue on a huge scale in the escalation of our fighting in Vietnam and now in Cambodia and Laos.

Thieu's plan to rule by decree strips away any pretensions of legitimacy which he has attempted to create. He has revealed himself for what he really is, a parasitic dictator totally dependent on continued American support to sustain his precarious position. Historians will record our continued support of the Thieu regime as one of the saddest and most shameful chapters in the history of our Republic.

### SALT ARMS CONTROL

Mr. FANNIN. Mr. President, the question of arms control is being considered on two fronts today. The Senate is debating the budget request for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

In Vienna, representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union are continuing arms control discussions.

The Soviet Union has shown itself responsive in a time of crisis for the astronauts on the Apollo 13 mission, by offering assistance. While not bearing on the crucial question of arms control, it is a hopeful sign on a level important to the people of this country today. We appreciate it and I would like them to know it.

Columnist Joseph Kraft, with whom I am not often in agreement, has an interesting column on the general outlines of the American proposal to be made in Vienna.

I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD at this point the article by Joseph Kraft to which I have referred, entitled "United States in Vienna: Nonpassive," published in the Baltimore Sun of April 16, 1970.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### UNITED STATES IN VIENNA: NONPASSIVE (By Joseph Kraft)

WASHINGTON.—As an offset to the disappointment of Apollo 13 there comes nicely to hand the opening of the Big Two arms-control talks in what could be a meeting as historic as the other Congress of Vienna.

For contrary to what has been widely reported, the United States is ready to serve up a comprehensive and outgoing proposition for the Vienna talks. And without even knowing the Russian position, the feeling in Washington is that an agreement to moderate the arms race may at last be in the works.

The American position for the outset of the talks was generally figured to be a stance dependent upon a lead from the Russians. But those of us who made that assessment based it on a misreading of the bureaucratic in-fighting that preceded the formulation of the final terms.

It is true that Gerard C. Smith—the head of the arms-control agency and chief of the delegation in Vienna—wanted to offer a

proposal for mutual suspension of new developments in defensive and offensive strategic weapons. That would in effect, have meant a cutoff on the ABM, or anti-ballistic missile, in the defense field, and the MIRV, or multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle, in the matter of offensive weapons.

It is also true that these proposals were vigorously opposed by the military. The armed services came out strongly for continuing MIRV development on the grounds that it was needed as a penetration device against Soviet Defenses which might be suddenly improved through clandestine upgrading of antiaircraft weapons into anti-missile weapons. They also argued ABM deployment was necessary to defend land-based missiles against a knockout first strike by Russia's blockbuster—the SS-9.

These military views were not modified by the Defense Secretary, Melvin Laird, nor seriously opposed by the State Department. Neither were they overruled by the White House—which explains why so many of us concluded any American proposal in the Vienna talks would have to wait on a lead from the Soviet Union.

But at the very end of the long internal bicker in Washington, there happened something unexpected. The White House, while not sustaining the arms-control agency against the Pentagon, did develop a way around the confrontation.

The details of the proposal that emerged are still closely held.

But the guiding principle is not in doubt. The guiding principle is to move toward a phasing out of land-based missiles in favor of missiles fired from submarines. Agreed limits would be placed on the number of submarines, and then the problems posed by ABM and MIRV would tend to wither away.

The ABM has been pushed in this country chiefly as a defense of the land-based missiles. So as these missiles were phased out, ABM development would be leveled off. In effect, there would be a trade of limited ABM development by this country against limited ABM development by Russia.

As to MIRV, development would go forward. But it would not present the overwhelming problem of giving each side untold numbers of missiles the other side could not count. For submarines can be tracked. Each side's pearls, so to speak, would be in a limited number of oysters. And each side would know exactly how many oysters were available to the other side.

Before presenting the practical details of their proposal, the American negotiators will want to have some sense of how the Russians are thinking so there will certainly be some preliminary sparring at the Vienna talks.

But there is no doubt that the Nixon administration is now prepared to make an offer. The White House no longer acts as though the strategic-arms talks were just something handed on by the Johnson administration.

How the Russians will react to the more positive American attitude remains in doubt here. The latest remarks of Leonid Brezhnev are regarded favorably—if only because they imply that Russia, like this country, has numerous internal problems that could usefully absorb resources spent on armaments. But Washington does fear that the arms-control talks might become a political football in the leadership struggle now felt to be going on in the Kremlin.

Still, even there the implication is positive. For the implication is that the prospects are now so good that it will take some untoward disturbance from the outside to get in the way of agreement.

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NIXON ADMINISTRATION TACKLES  
POLLUTION PROBLEMS REALIS-  
TICALLY

Mr. GURNEY. Mr. President, with Earth Day being commemorated next week, a great deal of attention is being focused on what is wrong with the way we are trying to live with our environment. The whole gamut of problems dealing with air and water pollution, waste disposal and the proper use of our natural resources has attracted and is holding national interest to a far greater degree than ever before in our history.

In this light, I would like to call the attention of my colleagues to several very important developments in this field undertaken by the Nixon administration.

The President yesterday asked Congress for authority for the Government to clean up the Great Lakes and prevent their further pollution.

The President has ordered a comprehensive study of the problems and possible solutions to them involved in ocean pollution.

The Department of Agriculture has ordered an end to the use of 2,4,5-T—a weed killer.

Mr. President, all three of these actions are likely to stir up opposition from people who will be affected by them. That is understandable since these changes will mean economic problems for each of the groups.

In the past the Government has been loathe to undertake such actions simply because of the amount of opposition they were likely to create. It is significant that the Nixon administration is moving this swiftly and this courageously into an area where, before, the Government refused to act.

The President is asking for stronger legislation to clean up the Great Lakes. His request places the burden of responsibility now squarely on the Congress. It will be up to us to provide him with the kind of tools needed to undo the damage done by years of ignorance and neglect.

The President is to be commended for these actions.

FOREIGN CORRESPONDENT WRITES  
THAT EUROPEANS ASKS, "WHY  
ARE AMERICANS PROTESTING?  
THEY DON'T KNOW HOW LUCKY  
THEY ARE"

Mr. GURNEY. Mr. President, my attention has been called to an excellent article in the Times-Picayune, New Orleans, by Foreign Correspondent Thomas B. Ross.

Mr. Ross writes from Paris that his—

Enduring impression of a year's reporting in Western and Eastern Europe is how much more there is to protest about here and how much less protesting is done.

He added:

On a recent tour of Eastern Europe, I found the intellectuals in utter despair of Marxist economics and elitist politics and astonished they should be the vogue in certain sectors of the U.S. protest movement.

Mr. Ross quotes Leopold Tyrmand, a Polish intellectual now living in London: American institutions, which (in the U.S.) are taken for granted like oxygen, are the

subject of our wildest dreams in Eastern Europe. I have a certain pity for the Americans because they do not know how to cherish what they have and what others know they have.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD at this point the article to which I have referred, entitled "Unrest in United States Astonishes Foreigners Much Worse Off," written by Thomas B. Ross, and published in the New Orleans Times-Picayune of April 11, 1970.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

UNREST IN U.S. ASTONISHES FOREIGNERS  
MUCH WORSE OFF

(By Thomas B. Ross)

PARIS.—The enduring impression of a year's reporting in Western and Eastern Europe is how much more there is to protest about here and how much less protesting is done.

By official United States definition, half the people of Western Europe and more than three-fourths of those in Eastern Europe are "poor" and "hungry." (Elsewhere, of course, virtually everyone falls in that category.)

The American Negro, one of the most privileged members of U.S. society, has a higher average income than the citizen of Britain, one of the most economically privileged members of the human community.

Despite the discrimination the black has suffered and continues to suffer in the U.S., he would have fared even worse here. Europe operates under the unspoken segregationist assumption that people who are different, by language, nationality, religion and color, cannot live amicably together.

"If Paris were half German," a French journalist remarked in astonishment after a tour of U.S. cities, "there would be blood in the streets every day."

## OLD WORLD RECORD POOR

France had the best racial record of any of the colonial powers, but conditions at home leave much to be desired. The Algerian and African slums of Paris are unspeakable, much worse than the black U.S. ghetto.

In Britain, the question of "color" may become the critical issue in the forthcoming parliamentary election, even though less than 3 per cent of the population is of African or Asian extraction.

The German performance on race hardly needs to be cited. And even after the Jewish holocaust of World War II, anti-Semitism remains a potent political force in Eastern Europe. The Soviet Union requires Jews to carry special identity cards and refuses to allow them to emigrate to Israel.

In Poland, after the Arab-Israeli war of 1967, the Communist regime sought to contrive an entire political policy out of anti-Zionism, even though the Jewish population already had declined from a prewar level of 3 million to fewer than 25,000.

In the Middle East, a variant of racial antagonism lies at the root of the conflict over Israel, even though Jew and Arab are of the same Semitic stock.

The Moslem world, contrary to the sentimental notions of some U.S. blacks, also harbors a strong prejudice against blacks. Though it is not considered a politic subject for public conversation, black American radicals in Algeria grumble privately and bitterly about prejudice there.

Africa, too, has its version of the problem in the tribal hatred that produced the blood-bath in Biafra.

In Asia, the Chinese hold themselves racially superior to occidentals as well as to their neighbors. The feeling is sometimes reciprocated, as in Indonesia and Malaysia,

with wholesale slaughter. The Japanese cling tenaciously to their racial separateness to the point of ostracizing the illegitimate occupation-children of both black and white American soldiers.

Even Sweden, which has gained a reputation for racial tolerance largely through unremitting criticism of the American scene, is not without blemish. The local press is sprinkled with slighting allusions to the swarthy southern Europeans imported into its labor-short market.

Black deserters from the U.S. Army quickly discover a wall of Aryan consciousness just beyond the official welcome mat. A reporter for a Stockholm paper recently decided to test the racial climate. Disguised as a Negro, he tried repeatedly—and without success—to obtain a hotel room in the city.

Confronted by widespread evidence of prejudice, a reporter finds it hard to accept the popular notion that racism is a uniquely American phenomenon. To the contrary, he is led to the conclusion that the evil has deep, tenacious and universal roots in the human psyche, and that the U.S. is remarkable, less for its inadequacies than for being the only society to attempt a just resolution of the problem.

A close look at the law enforcement practices in other countries produces a different perspective on charges of police brutality in the U.S.

Recently a mildly heated political debate among students spilled out onto the sidewalk in front of a cafe on the Left Bank.

Soon a squad of gendarmes, without so much as a warning to disperse, proceeded to beat the students over the heads with rubber truncheons. The youths were then packed into a police van and driven off, undoubtedly to be locked up for the weekend without charge, without lawyer and without legal recourse.

Under France's Napoleonic Code and a stern set of laws laid down at the time of the riots in 1968, the police here have extraordinary freedom. Except in Britain and Scandinavia, that is true throughout Western Europe. In Spain, police controls are considerably more rigorous, and in Eastern Europe they are so severe that any public display of dissent is unthinkable.

## U.S. SYSTEM "BEST SO FAR"

"American institutions, which (in the U.S.) are taken for granted like oxygen," commented Leopold Tyrmand, the expatriate Polish essayist, "are the subject of our wildest dreams in Eastern Europe. I have a certain pity for the Americans because they do not know how to cherish what they have and what others know they have."

On a recent tour of Eastern Europe, I found the intellectuals in utter despair of Marxist economics and elitist politics and astonished they should be the vogue in certain sectors of the U.S. protest movement.

"Utopian programs," a Czech professor remarked, "do not take account of the corruptibility in all of us. Revolutionary idealism quickly gives way to power, lust and greed. But when all the countervailing institutions, have been destroyed—private property, the church, parliamentary democracy, a free press—there is no way to challenge the corrupted idealists. There is no second chance for protest."

Late last month as I sat in a bus edging its way through a checkpoint in the Berlin Wall, I recalled Winston Churchill's remark that democracy is the worst form of government except for every other that has been tried.

Perhaps, I reflected, I would feel differently when I had been back in the States for a while. But at that moment, emerging from the gloom of Eastern Europe, I could not help thinking that the American society was better than the others that had been tried and that it deserved more than violent words or deeds.



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Within this background and for this limited purpose, I support the Secretary's adoption of the pill test. Again, I underline that this pill test is only acceptable as an interim procedure to an acceptable test for flammability. How long it will take the Department of Commerce and industry to develop this appropriate test for flammability remains to be seen. Certainly, this is a legitimate subject for inquiry at the hearings to be conducted in the near future by my Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs which will be conducting oversight hearings on the Flammable Fabrics Act.

I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record the text of my letter to the Secretary of Commerce and his response to me.

There being no objection, the letters were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

FEBRUARY 16, 1970.

HON. MAURICE H. STANS,  
Secretary of Commerce  
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I am enclosing a copy of my opening statement delivered as we began our hearings on questions arising out of the January 9, Ohio Nursing Home fire which to date has taken 32 lives. I have two vital questions:

1. Why hasn't the 1967 Flammable Fabrics Act been implemented?

2. When will the new standard for flammability of carpets and rugs be announced to replace the ineffective "pill test" and will the new test take into consideration smoke emission?

Significantly, it is nowhere indicated in your December 14, 1969 press release that the announced standard for flammability of carpets and rugs (pill test) is of an interim or first generation nature. On the contrary, your release bears the stamp of finality with the singular exception of the word "proposed". Certainly the carpet industry, independent laboratories and Dan River, specifically, viewed the Department's proffered pill test as the test for carpets and rugs.

What is most important at this time is that we have implementation of the Flammable Fabrics Act immediately and the replacement of the pill test with something like the ASTM-E84 tunnel test to measure the flammability and smoke emission of carpets and rugs. I would hope you could act on these objectives at once. The safety of all Americans in our homes and schools, and especially, those who suffer the compound burdens of ill health and advanced age deserve your immediate attention to reduce the risks of injury by fire. In view of the importance of this matter, I would appreciate hearing from you as soon as possible.

Best wishes.

Sincerely,

FRANK E. MOSS,  
Chairman, Subcommittee for the Consumer.

THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE,  
Washington, D.C., April 7, 1970.

HON. FRANK E. MOSS,  
Chairman, Subcommittee on Long-Term Care, Senate Special Subcommittee on Aging, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR MOSS: This letter is in reply to your recent letter requesting information on the Flammable Fabrics Act.

In response to your first question as to why the Flammable Fabrics Act amendments have not been implemented, the following information is submitted. When I was appointed Secretary of Commerce, I immediately asked for a review of this program as I considered it to be one of the Department's

most important responsibilities. This review disclosed that under the previous Administration there had been only minimal progress in implementation of the Act. During that Administration two findings of possible need for a flammability standard were made. In October 1968, there was a finding that there might be a need to revise or amend the general wearing apparel standard on flammability (CS 191-53). In December 1968, there was a finding that there might be a need for a flammability standard for carpets and rugs.

After examining the results of this review, I took the following actions:

1. The Department requested increased funds for fiscal years 1971 and 1972 for use in implementation of the Act;

2. The staff at the National Bureau of Standards working on this program was reorganized, bringing more qualified people into the program and increasing the number of personnel working on the program;

3. Action was initiated to increase the flow of data concerning deaths, injuries and economic losses resulting from the accidental burning of products, fabrics or related materials from the Department of Health, Education and Welfare that was envisioned by section 14(a) of the Act.

4. Research contracts were let by the National Bureau of Standards to supplement the research work being performed "in-house" on flammable fabrics.

5. The entire program of this Department has been reorganized to provide a systematic approach to the identification, evaluation, and testing of common problems of flammable fabrics. Examples of these problems are by-products of combustion, heat measurements from burning fabrics, investigation of the operation of flame retardants, and heat transfer from burning garments. Such research will provide for the first time methods and techniques to determine the flammability characteristics of fabrics and interior furnishings.

In addition to the reorganization of the flammable fabrics program, the Department has also proposed a carpet and rug standard and issued a finding of possible need for a flammability standard for certain items of children's wearing apparel. The more difficult area of wearing apparel in general will require extensive research to resolve the many problems presented before any meaningful revision can be made in that standard.

As to your second question regarding the proposed carpet and rug standard, the Department views this proposed standard and any standard that may issue from this proposal as a "first generation" standard for carpets and rugs. The purpose of the proposed standard is to guard against the hazard of a small ignition source such as a cigarette, ash, cinder or spark that might come in contact with a carpet or rug. The more complex problems of carpet and rug underlayment, smoke and toxic fumes from carpets and rugs, and carpets' and rugs' contribution to a general conflagration will be addressed as soon as either data or research provide us with the tools to adequately identify, assess, characterize and test the hazards in these areas.

We have been preparing facilities to make possible the development of test methods for carpets and rugs that simulate actual room conditions. We have developed the capability to measure both smoke intensity and the concentration of toxic gases in order to evaluate those hazards, and to establish appropriate test methods for future standards. It is our intention to proceed with the development of test methods and with such other research as will make possible a determination of the need for second generation standards.

You inquired specifically about the ASTM-E84 tunnel test for carpets and rugs. It is our view that this test, which exposes the product fixed to the ceiling of the tunnel

to a high intensity flame source, is not representative of service conditions for carpets and rugs. Specifically we feel that a test method must, as nearly as practicable, simulate service conditions. This will be our aim as we continue the technical development of test methods and standards.

Please be assured of my continued interest in this vital program. We are doing everything possible within the limits of the Act and the existing personnel and budgetary limitations to accelerate the work in this program.

I hope that this information will be of assistance to you.

Sincerely,

MAURICE H. STANS,  
Secretary of Commerce.

THE TRUTH OF THE REJECTIONS OF  
JUDGE HAYNSWORTH AND JUDGE  
CARSWELL

Mr. DOLE, Mr. President, although the President's critics are vehemently denying it, the truth of the rejections of both Judge Haynsworth and Judge Carswell is being recognized by astute observers throughout the Nation.

Recently an editorial published in the Indianapolis News pointed up the real issues, and the ambiguity and hypocrisy seen in the reasons alleged for their rejections. One cannot help wondering what excuses will be found with a non-southerner, but as the editorial asserts, "anti-Haynsworth and anti-Carswell Senators will be put to the acid test of whether they will indeed support a strict constructionist."

I ask unanimous consent that the editorial be printed in the Record and commend it to the attention of all Senators.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

[From the Indianapolis News, Apr. 14, 1970]

KEEP IT UP

Both President Nixon's rejected Supreme Court nominees—Judge Clement F. Haynsworth and Judge G. Harrold Carswell—were weighed and assertedly found wanting by the Senate according to standards which have never been applied in the past.

In the case of Haynsworth, critics said that even a mere "appearance of impropriety" disqualifies a man from service on the Supreme Court, even though at least one justice on the court at present is at least equally culpable.

In the case of Carswell, a veteran jurist with long judicial experience, critics said that "mediocrity" was the issue, even though during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations the Senate confirmed nominees who had no previous experience on the bench whatsoever.

Inasmuch as both Judge Haynsworth and Judge Carswell were relatively conservative in judicial philosophy, and the Kennedy and Johnson nominees were not, the suspicion dawns that this was the real reason for their rejection.

Carswell's critics denied this was the case, claiming the issue was not Carswell's judicial philosophy but his intellectual capacity. Some of them, in fact, acknowledged the President's right to appoint strict constructionists to the court.

The time is appropriate, therefore, for President Nixon to challenge his opposition on this point by naming to the court a true strict constructionist who, insofar as possible, is not susceptible to such manufactured allegations.

President Nixon has made a notable start

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in this direction by indicating that his next Supreme Court nominee will not come from the South. It is regrettable but true that regional divisions and animosities still influence our politics in irrational ways, and no doubt the Southern backgrounds of Haynsworth and Carswell contributed to their defeat.

On the next court nomination, the issue should be clearly drawn. If President Nixon names a non-Southern conservative of impeccable credentials, anti-Haynsworth, anti-Carswell senators will be put to the acid test of whether they will indeed support a strict constructionist. In light of their various denials and disavowals in intriguing spectacle—particularly with the fall elections just ahead.

## THE OPENING OF THE SALT TALKS

Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, the second phase of the crucial SALT talks are beginning this week in Vienna under a cloud. Much of the blame for the poor climate lies with the administration's contradictory statements.

Last week the Senate overwhelmingly passed an eminently sensible resolution calling for our Government to propose to the Soviet Union a freeze on the further development of both offensive and defensive nuclear strategic weapons systems. I fail to see what possible harm could have flowed from the implementation of this straight-forward proposal. At the very worst, we would have given tangible evidence of a genuine desire for a halt to the insane spiral of the nuclear arms race. At best, it would have been an impressive opening move which the Soviets would have been hard pressed to reject. Instead, the talks are beginning in the classic cold war atmosphere of mutual distrust, recrimination, and suspicion.

The public disclosure last month by our Secretary of the Air Force of plans to deploy MIRV-tipped Minuteman III missiles this June was termed a "slip" by the administration. It was more of a disaster. As could be expected, this indiscretion was matched by appropriate saber rattling by the other side. Therefore, I was not surprised to read authoritative reports that our delegation has been sent to Vienna with instructions to carefully probe the Soviet position rather than take any initiatives.

Mr. President, this is not the time for our country to be playing a waiting game. We have lived in the shadow of nuclear extermination too long—and we have had to pay a terrible price. The dry rot which is afflicting our institutions, our cities, and the very fabric of our society is directly linked to the allocation of our resources for weapons systems we really do not need. Failure of the SALT talks could well mean another decade of spending billions in the name of security—while we actually became more insecure here at home.

By playing our cards too close to the vest in Vienna, we will be raising the stakes to a point where neither side will risk a bid for peace. April 1970 is a propitious moment—there is now a rough strategic parity between ourselves and the Soviet Union. Even if there is doubt over each others' intentions, there is agreement as to capabilities. Once the Russians complete deployment of all of

their SS-9's, and we deploy our MIRV's and expand the ABM system—we will be off to the races again.

With both sides striving for a margin of security, both must necessarily feel more insecure. This is what escalation is all about. What is needed now is a psychological breakthrough where purely military and strategic considerations yield to sober attempts to inject greater sanity into the discussions of what kind of future mankind will have.

By inseparably linking arms control to the achievement of a general detente with the Soviet Union, we are pursuing unreality. It is more likely that success in Vienna will help to bring about accommodation in Southeast Asia, Europe, and the Middle East, than vice versa.

Despite the poor beginning, there is still some chance of salvaging the SALT talks. But the administration must first make a fundamental commitment to deescalation of the arms race and let the other side know about it—both by word and deed.

Why must the United States and the Soviet Union continue to spar like two scorpions in a bottle? It is time that both nations sought a common way out of the narrow confines we have constructed for ourselves.

## THERE IS STILL HUNGER IN CHICAGO

Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, on April 13, 1969, hunger was discovered in Chicago. For the first time, many people learned that 200,000 children, 150,000 senior citizens, and nearly 300,000 other adults were living in poverty, unable to afford food. For the first time, the city was confronted with a problem they refused to admit existed.

One of the people who forced Chicago to notice its hungry was Mrs. Linda Rockey, of the Sun Times. Through her series of articles entitled "Hunger in Chicago" she elucidated the numbers and problems of the hungry and malnourished in the city.

On Monday, April 20, the Select Committee on Nutrition and Human Needs is going to Chicago to investigate further its hunger problem. Unfortunately, only a little progress has been made in finding solutions since Mrs. Rockey's articles first appeared. On Sunday, Linda Rockey summarized this progress in an article published in the Sun Times. I ask unanimous consent that the article be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

## DESPITE PROGRESS, THERE'S STILL HUNGER IN CHICAGO

(By Linda Rockey)

One year ago this week, a Sun-Times series documented the presence of widespread hunger in Chicago.

But despite all the protests and promises, one fact remains painfully clear:

There is still hunger in Chicago.

It is too early to tell what the impact will be of the \$500,000 emergency outlay ordered Wednesday by the City Council. But it is too late to help James White, 4442 W. Monroe, whose family went without food for several days last month.

White was working as an assembler for Hotpoint last fall when things started to go wrong. He didn't make a lot of money, but it was enough to support his young wife and two baby girls.

## OFF WORK FOR A MONTH

Then, in September, on the way home from the grocery, he was shot in the back by a robber. He was out of work for a month without pay. His wife applied for public assistance, but was told she wasn't eligible. They borrowed money from relatives and friends and somehow managed until he went back to work.

But the medical bills and debts piled up, and White couldn't afford to miss more work when he suffered a relapse in February. There was more surgery and three weeks without pay. He ran out of money and people to borrow from.

His wife went to the Cook County Department of Public Aid. It took six visits and a call from The Sun-Times before she received money for food.

On the afternoon of her fifth visit, the family hadn't eaten since the night before when they borrowed beans, neckbones and cornbread from a neighbor.

"The caseworker gave me money for bus-fare and told me to come back the next day about food money," she recalls. "I asked her why I couldn't go to the office on 21st St. (where emergency food aid is available on evenings and weekends). She said that the program there was for people who'd been burned out. What's worse than being completely out of food?"

## STORE 26 BLOCKS AWAY

The next day Mrs. White did get a food voucher for \$13.25, good only at a supermarket 26 blocks from her home. She was promised another check in the mail in a few days but it didn't come for a week. In the meantime she ran out of food again. She also had to borrow from neighbors for items that food vouchers don't buy—soup, diapers and "things to keep my house in order."

At the western district office, supervisor Geraldine Harris gave no reason for the delay in adding the White family. "It shouldn't have taken that long," she said.

A spokesman for the main office said that apparently there was a misunderstanding over where to process Mrs. White's request.

The incident is not an isolated one, but in a way the Whites were lucky—it was only a temporary crisis. Hunger remains an ongoing problem for the city's poor—the elderly, disabled, dependent children and families whose heads work at poverty wages.

## ADMIT HUNGER EXISTS

City officials no longer deny that hunger exists as then Health Comr. Morgan J. O'Connell did last year in The Sun-Times series. But the extent remains impossible to measure accurately.

The Board of Health study O'Connell promised last spring "to determine if we have a problem" never took place.

The committee appointed April 30 by the Illinois Legislature to study the extent of hunger in the state had one meeting and failed to report back by June 2. The chairman, Rep. Robert S. Juckett (R-Park Ridge), turned down an invitation to attend a hearing this Sunday on hunger in the suburbs.

"The basic existence of hunger remains unchanged," says state Rep. Robert E. Mann (D-Chicago), sponsor of the 1969 free lunch bill. But he added: "The willingness of people in power to acknowledge its existence is an important step forward."

The past year has seen several developments in the war on hunger in Chicago, but none has attacked the problem on a broad scale.

Most significant has been the expansion of the free school lunch program. Under a \$5,200,000 state act to supplement federal

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this inventory under way. In nineteen sixty five, following indications of industry's willingness to cooperate, the Subcommittee again urged that industrial wastes be inventoried. In nineteen sixty seven, the Interior Department, which had new responsibilities for pollution abatement, asked the Budget Bureau to approve an inventory questionnaire. The Budget Bureau, responsive to its industry advisers, again balked.

The Bureau, in an amazing letter sent to Subcommittee Chairman Jones, on four August nineteen sixty seven, said that it wanted to delay getting information until it had more information. The Budget Bureau-industry was stalling, waiting for "economic incentives to protect the environment." The Budget Bureau met again in nineteen sixty eight, with a panel of industry representatives, and again stymied the questionnaire.

Mr. Chairman, I want to advise your Subcommittee on the status, as of yesterday, of this seven-year effort to obtain basic information from industry on pollution. The Budget Bureau advised my office yesterday that the new Administrator of the Water Pollution Control Administration had asked to look at the proposed questionnaire. He decided this was not a proper Federal concern. He wants to see if the states can provide the information.

That attitude by a Federal administrator, starkly illustrates the fact that this Administration does not believe in law enforcement against corporations. It is of a piece with the failure to enforce laws and regulations violated by oil companies which pollute our coastal waters. It is of a piece with the tragic Presidential veto, a decade ago, which said that pollution is a uniquely local blight.

And the Budget Bureau—I was advised yesterday—has withdrawn consideration of the proposed inventory.

If ever there was a time for the legislative branch to assert itself, the time is now.

Yet these industry groups try to maintain the fiction that they do not operate in the policy area.

I would add, Mr. Chairman, as an aside, that these same industries now spend many thousands of dollars advertising how they protect the environment and their customers.

Through use of these industry advisory committees, the teeth are removed from the laws we pass. The public and the regulators are denied basic information to which they are entitled, answers to such fundamental questions as: Who owns the companies? Who works for them? Where does their money go? The answers to such questions are fundamental to meaningful regulation and also to application of anti-trust statutes.

"Nader's Raiders reported this week to the Senate Subcommittee on Surface Transportation that the Interstate Commerce Commission does not have "a single consumer or consumer representative on its numerous advisory groups. I found the same to be true regarding the Budget Bureau advisory committees. Indeed, the utility advisory committees—there are three of them—are so selective that they do not include a single representative of a municipally-owned or cooperatively-owned power system.

For several years I periodically suggested to the Budget Bureau that it broaden the membership of its advisory committees. The Bureau declined to do so. So last year I introduced legislation requiring consumer, small business and labor representation on Budget Bureau advisory committees.

Introduction of this legislation—S. 3067—perturbed the Budget Bureau and its advisory committees, to the extent that the Bureau now suggests, in its report on the bill, that it will find somebody in Mrs. Knauer's office, and maybe some small businessmen, to sit in on those meetings.

They don't say a word about letting our

former colleague, Andy Blemiller, into the inner sanctum.

The few public representatives who have had the temerity to sit in on meetings, since my bill was introduced have been treated like second class citizens.

Obviously, legislation is needed. I am not sure that my bill is the remedy. It would be better to abolish the advisory committees altogether than to simply adorn them with window-dressing. Congressman Moss has the companion bill over here before your present committee—H.R. 15101. I am sure that the record you are developing in this hearing will be helpful in deciding what legislation should finally be reported.

My remarks when I introduced S. 3067 include the membership of these advisory committees, as of last September, along with examples of their actions. I shall submit them for the hearing record, along with the Budget Bureau's adverse report on the bill.

I have three suggestions for your subcommittee to consider.

First, I believe it would be useful to review the minutes of the Budget Bureau advisory committees through the years, to determine the fate of various proposals that have been put before them.

Secondly, I think it would be useful to try to determine the extent to which the Administration and industries are holding closed sessions now that a slight bit of attention is being given to the advisory committees. For example, I have just learned that the Federal Power Commission has agreed to a request by Edison Electric Institute, the trade association of the power companies, to have a very private meeting next Monday with some members of the FPC staff.

The purpose of that meeting will be to discuss proposed collection of data on air and water pollution controls. The Budget Bureau discussed these matters with one of the utility advisory committees last November. However, that meeting was attended by five observers who were not members of the committee. These five observers represented the Consumers Federation of America, the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, the American Public Power Association, the National Consumer Law Center and the National Wildlife Federation.

That was too much public observation for the utilities. They like to settle matters very privately.

If this Subcommittee wants to send a representative to that meeting Monday I will be glad to try to find out where the meeting will be held, but can't guarantee that he'll get in.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit a few questions that have been put to me by the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, at Stanford. These questions relate to current policies and procedures of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare regarding selection of scientific advisory committees. You may have the answers to these questions already. If you have—or if you get them—I hope you will share them with me. I am directing these questions to the Secretary of HEW. As I receive answers, I shall share them with you.

#### NEW FNMA GENERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE MEETS APRIL 14

The Federal National Mortgage Association's General Advisory Committee will hold its first meeting of this year on April 14th at the offices of the corporation in Washington, D.C.

The purpose of the Committee, as explained by FNMA President Oakley Hunter, is to advise the management of the corporation in all matters respecting its activities in the field of housing and home finance.

"The General Advisory Committee," President Hunter stated, "is composed of leading

business executives from throughout the nation who serve without compensation. Their extensive knowledge and experience is invaluable to FNMA, and we are deeply appreciative of their generous contribution."

FNMA is a government-sponsored private corporation that provides support for the secondary mortgage market. By purchasing government-insured or guaranteed residential mortgages from lending institutions, FNMA helps insure a steady flow of funds for mortgage loans. In addition to home mortgages, the corporation purchases mortgages on FHA-insured nursing homes, hospitals, mobile home courts, land development groups, medical practice facilities and apartment projects, including special programs for low- and moderate-income families and for older persons.

During 1970 FNMA estimates it will purchase approximately \$6 billion of mortgages and will issue purchase-commitments totaling approximately \$8 billion. FNMA purchases mortgages with private capital borrowed primarily on the open market.

The Committee was organized in 1969. All of the original members of the committee, with the exception of Charles Wellman, who is deceased, will continue to serve. They are W. P. Bridges, President, Bridges Loan and Investment Company, Inc., Jackson, Mississippi; Franklin Briesse, Chairman and President, The Minnesota Mutual Life Insurance Company, Saint Paul, Minnesota; C. C. Cameron, Chairman and President, First Union National Bancorp. Inc., Charlotte, North Carolina; M. D. Crawford, Jr., Chairman, Bowery Savings Bank, New York, N.Y.; Don E. Dixon, President, Lincoln Securities Company, Lincoln, Nebraska; Hans Gehrke, Jr., Chairman, First Federal Savings and Loan Association, Detroit, Michigan; Robert Graham, Senior Vice President, First National City Bank, New York, N.Y.; Max H. Karl, President, Mortgage Guaranty Insurance Corporation, Milwaukee, Wisconsin; Sidney Kaye, Executive Vice President, Advance Mortgage Corporation, Detroit, Michigan; David L. Krooth, Krooth and Altman, Washington, D.C.; Raymond T. O'Keefe, Executive Vice President, Chase Manhattan Bank, New York, N.Y.; Samuel Rebits, Senior Vice President, Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc., New York, N.Y.; William E. Simon, Salomon Brothers and Hutzler, New York, N.Y.; Douglas C. Welton, President, Dry Dock Savings Bank, New York, N.Y.; John H. Wheeler, President, Mechanics and Farmers Bank, Durham, North Carolina; and Julian Zimmerman, President, Lumbermen's Investment Corporation.

Three additional members have been appointed by President Hunter. They are Albert M. Cole, Attorney, McKenna and Fitting, Washington, D.C.; Eugene F. Ford, President, Mid-City Developers, Inc., Washington, D.C.; and John E. Horne, President, Investors Mortgage Insurance Company, Boston, Massachusetts.

#### ARMS CONTROL

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, during Senate debate on Senate Resolution 211, proposing an opening posture for the United States at the strategic arms limitation talks, I raised a number of reasons why we should, instead of seeking to preserve the Minuteman force with expensive improvements and questionable defensive systems, allow its phase-out in favor of more reliable methods of deterrence.

Although I think his estimates are much too generous, the Secretary of Defense has asserted that the Russian SS-9 can degrade our land-based missiles. In his posture statement this year he tells

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us that even the Safeguard ABM defense cannot counter a threat which includes SS-9's with improved accuracy and multiple independently targetable warheads.

I am convinced, therefore, that we should at a minimum eliminate the funds requested this year for deployment of Minuteman III and for further upgrading of the land-based force. If the threat does not develop as envisioned by the Secretary then these improvements will be unnecessary. If it does they will be incorporated into a system which cannot be relied upon to perform effectively. In either case the expenditures requested this year would be wasted. In addition, since they embark on deployment of a new and provocative weapons system, the multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle, or MIRV, they stand in direct contradiction to Secretary Laird's characterization of the 1971 defense program as transitional.

On last Monday the Long Island Daily Newsday editorialized on this subject in a manner which I believe deserves the attention of the Senate. The editors point out that Senate Resolution 211 constitutes good advice to the President but that it has in a sense already been rejected. They state further that in order to prevent MIRV's dangerously unsettling effects upon SALT "what the Senate should do is not just pass advisory resolutions but instead a law preventing the Pentagon from deploying MIRV. For as long as the weapon is not actually atop missiles, there is still some breathing space before the MIRV fail-safe line is irrevocably crossed."

Because it presents the MIRV issue so concisely and because it presents an extremely important reason for deleting Minuteman III—MIRV deployment funds from the fiscal 1971 budget, I ask unanimous consent that the editorial be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

## TOWARD A MIRV WORLD

It is the pride of the American technological elite and the triumph of the generals; it improves at once and by a quantum leap the already awesome power of the American missile arsenal. But, for those who wish to bring an end to the nuclear arms race, this new offensive weapon is a potential danger of thermonuclear proportions: its deployment will set back permanently mankind's efforts to avoid nuclear war. The product of America's drive for total security, the weapon promises only to exchange the slender margins of safety from doomsday that the nation now enjoys for the final radioactive solution. It is, all at once, the multiple, independently targeted reentry vehicle—for short, the MIRV.

The MIRV is an educated nose cone that will replace existing cones atop about half of the 1,050 land-based U.S. Minuteman missiles and on some 500 missiles launched by Polaris submarines. Each nose cone will contain not one but several nuclear weapons—from three to 14 depending, among other things, on the size of each bomb. Once propelled into the exoatmosphere, the MIRV changes speeds and directions according to instructions from the tiny onboard computer, and releases, one at a time, individual bombs on individual targets. In a sense, the MIRV becomes a kind of unmanned bomber, traveling at missile-rate speeds, and flying at far higher altitudes than manned bomb-

ers are capable of. No wonder the technological and military minds are so excited by MIRV: for the approximately 1,500 U.S. offensive missiles now become capable of dropping up to 10,000 bombs on the enemy, each one of which can be targeted on a different enemy city, missile site, or industrial area. Clearly, the MIRV is the biggest bang for a few million bucks to come out of the Pentagon in a long time.

## A MECHANICAL DECISION

The MIRV has the singular characteristic, however, that once deployed it fairly cries out to be used. The MIRV is not like the ABM system, which must await the firing of enemy missiles to go into action. On the contrary, the MIRV doesn't do its thing until it has been fired, until the computer begins releasing the warheads, until, in short, the decision-makers have opted for nuclear war. When must that millennial decision be made? Should we wait until the enemy has fired its MIRVs, until the enemy's force becomes transformed by MIRV into a threat 10 times as great as it is on the ground, until it has so many warheads in the air that our ABM missiles cannot possibly intercept all of them? Shouldn't we fire first, getting our birds into the air before theirs, catching many of their folded-up MIRV's on the ground, and hoping that our ABM missiles will intercept in the air what our MIRV's don't destroy on the ground? Clearly, to be caught with one's MIRV's down, while the enemy's are in the air proliferating like bunnies, is a nightmare possibility that would weigh heavily on the minds of Washington and Moscow decision-makers. It is in this way that the very mechanics of MIRV's operation cut heavily into man's ability to control the weapon's use.

Thus, the prospect created by MIRV deployment is a world made nuclear trigger-happy by the very technological exigencies of this weapon. The Pentagon plans to begin outfitting U.S. missiles with MIRV this summer, and the Kremlin is not too far behind. Once both sides have MIRVed, the U.S. and USSR negotiators might as well strike MIRV from the agenda of the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) due to resume in Vienna this week. By the time the negotiators are able to deal with MIRV as part of an overall arms limitation package deal, the new weapon will already be deployed. And once deployed, Pandora's box is forever open. For the only agreements likely to come out of SALT are arms limitations that can be verified by satellite reconnaissance. Since super-high power camera lenses in the satellites can do just about everything these days except peer inside a missile nose cone, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union will have any way of knowing for sure just how many missiles each side has MIRVed and just how many bombs are inside each nose cone. Since neither side would agree to the kind of extensive on-site inspection needed to verify a MIRV reduction once the weapon is deployed, it is probable that both the Kremlin and the Nixon administration may already have decided, among themselves, to MIRV and to forget about including MIRV in a SALT package.

## BREATHING SPACE

However, the Senate has passed a well-intentioned resolution sponsored by Sen. Edward Brooke and some 40 other senators. It calls for a mutual Soviet-American freeze on the deployment of all offensive and defensive strategic weapons pending the outcome of SALT. During the subcommittee's hearings on the resolution, McGeorge Bundy, president of the Ford Foundation, went a step further in recommending that the administration take the initiative by unilaterally deferring both MIRV and ABM deployments for a limited time. Unfortunately, both the Brooke resolution and Bundy's proposal add up to nothing more than good

advice the administration has already rejected (holding up all further weapons deployments because of SALT). What the Senate should do is not just pass advisory resolutions but instead pass a law preventing the Pentagon from deploying MIRV. For as long as the weapon is not actually atop missiles, there is still some breathing space before the MIRV fail-safe line is irrevocably crossed. For, quite simply, the case against MIRV deployment is the case against nuclear war.

## THE CIGARETTE HABIT

Mr. MOSS. Mr. President, I found very interesting an article in the Washington Post this morning which indicates that the cigarette habit is based upon both a physical and a psychological need which nicotine nurtures and builds up. This need is what makes it so difficult for a heavy smoker to stop smoking, even though he recognizes and accepts the health hazards of continuing his habit.

This new information on nicotine makes even more important the cigarette legislation passed by the Congress recently. The removal of cigarette advertising from TV takes away the most appealing medium for reaching to new and young smokers, who are more easily induced to take up smoking because of the "glamour" of the TV presentation, and then get hooked on the need for nicotine—a need some people cannot overcome.

I ask unanimous consent that the Post article be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

## SMOKING SEEN INDUCING ITS NEED

ATLANTIC CITY, N.J., April 15.—A scientist came up today with what he believes to be the physical basis for the cigarette habit.

It may explain why so many people keep right on smoking despite heavy health pressures.

This physical basis is what nicotine does with norepinephrine (NE), Dr. Budh D. Bhagat of St. Louis University told the annual meeting of the Federation of American Societies for Experimental Biology.

NE is a regulatory hormone of the brain and other nervous system tissue. Nicotine increases both its production and its utilization, Bhagat said. As the result, the smoker's brain is kept in a state of abnormal excitement.

"Once the body becomes accustomed to this increase in the production and use of NE, any withdrawal of nicotine results in depression," he said.

"Thus, the body begins to depend on nicotine. Therefore the smoker must smoke to 'dose' himself with nicotine to keep the production of NE at elevated levels."

Bhagat and his St. Louis associates came to this conclusion after three years of experimenting with rats and by reasoning from other scientific findings. For six weeks their rats got through injection as much nicotine as they would have gotten from smoking three packs of cigarettes a day.

Aside from greater activity and aggressiveness, they behaved like other rats. But their blood pressure was higher and an analysis of their brains revealed a much higher production and utilization of NE than is normal in rats.

Then came this reasoning:

Some tranquilizing drugs reduce NE in people and calm their behavior. Some anti-depression drugs increase NE production and energize behavior.



SALT

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# Arms Treaty Violation Held

By Spencer Rich

Washington Post Staff Writer

Russian violations of a strategic arms limitation treaty could be detected by the United States without on-site inspections, a former high CIA and disarmament agency official told a Senate subcommittee yesterday.

Dr. Herbert Scoville Jr., now with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said, "Any nation which attempts to violate any arms limitation agreement on a scale sufficient to obtain a significant military advantage will run some risk of being detected."

For this reason, Scoville indicated, it would be feasible and desirable for the U.S. and Russia to conclude arms limitations agreements in talks beginning in Vienna Thursday.

Another witness, Adrian S. Fisher of the Georgetown University Law School, said the strategic arms talks would be severely endangered if the U.S. went ahead with its previously announced plan to begin installing MIRVs (multiple independently targetable nuclear warheads) on Minutemen III ICBMs in June.

Even though the MIRVs have not been fully tested and are not as dependable as they would be after full testing, Fisher said, Soviet fear of their ability to penetrate Soviet fear of their ability to penetrate Soviet defenses might make it impossible to conclude a successful arms agreement once they were deployed.

Fisher, who served as Deputy Director of The U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, said the President, as a move toward making the arms talks successful, should announce a six-month deferral

of MIRV deployment. He said postponement of further development of the Safeguard anti-ballistic-missile system also would be desirable.

Scoville, a former CIA Assistant Deputy Director for Science, Technology and Research and an Assistant Director for Science and Technology, said it was still technically possible to detect arms control violations without on-site inspections because MIRV and other strategic systems had not been fully tested and deployed.

He indicated that sophisticated U.S. inspection devices, which already permit officials to estimate Soviet missiles with a high degree of accuracy, would be able to spot attempts to test or deploy weapons covered by an arms limit treaty if one emerges from the Vienna talks.

Running down the list of strategic weapons systems, he gave this analysis:

Installation of fixed land-based ICBMs requires extensive launch-site construction over many months and such installation in violation of a ban would be extremely difficult to conceal. The same would be true of mobile, land-based ICBMs, though installation of these would be somewhat easier to conceal.

- Enlargement of facilities to launch submarine-based missiles would also be difficult to conceal because of the use of shipyard facilities, the requirement of "many months" for fitting out, during all of which they are subject to observation.

- Installation of MIRVs on existing missiles would be hard to detect by aerial or satellite observation, but MIRV was not yet a fully tested system. Tests adequate to assure MIRV dependability would require full range and simulation of operational conditions and could be detected. Therefore, a MIRV test-ban, undertaken now before MIRV has been tested, could be adequately policed without on-site inspection.

- Installation of ABM systems, requiring large radars of high visibility and considerable other facilities could be detected without on-site inspection.

## Detectable